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LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION:
MEDICAID, FEDERALISM & IMMIGRANTS
MEDHA D. MAKHLOUF*
Medicaid’s cooperative federalism structure gives states significant discretion to
include or exclude various categories of noncitizens. This has created extreme
geographic variability in noncitizens’ access to health coverage. This Article
describes federalism’s role in influencing state policies on noncitizen eligibility for
Medicaid and its implications for national health policy. Although there are
disagreements over the extent to which public funds should be used to subsidize
noncitizen health coverage, this Article reveals that decentralized policymaking on
noncitizen access to Medicaid has weakened national health policy by increasing
wasteful spending and exacerbating inequities in access to healthcare. It has failed
to incentivize the type of state policy experimentation and replication that justifies
federalism arrangements in other contexts. Rather, federalism has (1) enabled states
to enact exclusionary policies that are ineffective and inhumane and (2) created
barriers for states to enact inclusionary policies that advance the normative goals of
health policy. This Article concludes that noncitizen access to health coverage is
best addressed through centralized policymaking.
This Article contributes to scholarly conversations about federalism and healthcare
by providing a case study to test the efficacy of federalism arrangements in
achieving equity for those who were left behind by health reform. More broadly, it
adds to the federalism literature by synthesizing insights from three fields that rarely
comment on one another: health law, immigration law, and federalism theory.
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1 See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, What Would Giving Health Care to Undocumented
Immigrants Mean?, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/health/
undocumented-immigrants-health-care.html.
2 See, e.g., Suzanne Gamboa, Undocumented Immigrants Without Health Care Were
Among the ‘Essential Workers’ Felled by COVID-19, NBCNEWS.COM (Aug. 28, 2020, 10:40
PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/blog/2020-08-27-rnc-updatesn1238267/ncrd1238617#blogHeader; Ariel Gelrud Shiro & Richard V. Reeves, Latinos
Often Lack Access to Healthcare and Have Poor Health Outcomes. Here’s How We Can
Change That, BROOKINGS: HOW WE RISE (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/how-we-rise/2020/09/25/latinos-often-lack-access-to-healthcare-and-have-poor-healthoutcomes-heres-how-we-can-change-that.
3 See Ashley Kirzinger, Audrey Kearney & Liz Hamel, Voters Are Souring on
President Trump’s Handling of Coronavirus, with Implications for November, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/voters-are-souring-onpresident-trumps-handling-of-coronavirus-with-implications-for-november.
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In the run-up to the 2020 presidential election, discussions of
whether and how to expand healthcare access for noncitizens were
already mainstream.1 Then came the coronavirus pandemic. The
tragic consequences and enormous risks of inequitable access to
health coverage are undeniable. Noncitizen essential workers who are
ineligible for publicly funded health insurance have faced particularly
dire circumstances.2 For the vast majority of U.S. voters who disapprove of the Trump Administration’s response to the pandemic,3
health reform can no longer wait. For the first time since 1996, when
harsh restrictions were imposed on noncitizen eligibility for public
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benefits, there is a real possibility that laws excluding noncitizens from
publicly funded health insurance will be reversed.4
As health reform once again becomes a central focus of
American politics—this time with formerly fringe ideas like a
nationally-uniform, single-payer healthcare system enjoying significant popularity5—determining how noncitizens residing in the United
States should be included within that universe is increasingly urgent.
However, this subject has eluded coherent policymaking due to the
complexity of the laws governing noncitizen eligibility for publicly
funded healthcare and the sheer number and diversity of noncitizen
statuses.
This Article is the first sustained treatment of the vitally important legal and policy question of the interactions among federalism,
access to healthcare, and immigration.6 It explores salient themes in
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4 Larry Levitt, Trump vs Biden on Health Care, JAMA HEALTH F. (Sept. 3, 2020),
https://jamanetwork.com/channels/health-forum/fullarticle/2770427 (describing Presidentelect Joe Biden’s proposal to eliminate the five-year bar on lawful permanent residents’
eligibility for Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and to allow
undocumented noncitizens to purchase unsubsidized coverage on the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (ACA) Marketplaces).
5 Jonathan Oberlander, Lessons From the Long and Winding Road to Medicare for
All, 109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1497, 1497 (2019) (noting that single payer has moved to the
“mainstream of American politics”).
6 I take inspiration from Laboratories of Destitution, David Super’s seminal case study
of the relationship between federalism and anti-poverty policy. David A. Super,
Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty
Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 547 (2008) (arguing that decentralized antipoverty policy has
failed to encourage effective state policy experimentation and advocating for more
centralized policymaking). However, the intersection of healthcare and immigration raises
complex issues of economics, sovereignty, and justice that are unique and not presented as
squarely in the anti-poverty context and in Super’s analysis. Health law scholars have
generally bracketed federalism issues as they relate to noncitizens, if they are mentioned at
all. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?,
70 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1726 (2018) (noting that undocumented and some lawfully present
noncitizens were left out of the ACA’s federalism-oriented Medicaid expansion); Elizabeth
Y. McCuskey, Big Waiver Under Statutory Sabotage, 45 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 213, 228–29
(2019) (mentioning California’s withdrawal of a section 1332 State Innovation Waiver
application seeking to permit undocumented noncitizens to purchase unsubsidized
Marketplace coverage as an example of limited waiver activity caused by uncertainty about
the future of the ACA); Lindsay F. Wiley, Medicaid for All? State-Level Single-Payer
Health Care, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 843, 865 (2018) (including undocumented noncitizens among
groups who may obtain access to health coverage through a state-level public option); id.
at 863–64 (describing California and Oregon section 1332 waiver applications that would
improve access to health coverage for undocumented noncitizens among state strategies to
use waivers to “open up access to new populations”). Recently, Wendy E. Parmet began
the project of mapping the values at stake when state and federal action in the immigration
and healthcare spheres intersect. Wendy E. Parmet, The Plenary Power Meets the Police
Power: Federalism at the Intersection of Health & Immigration, 45 AM. J.L. & MED. 224,
225 (2019). In the extensive literature on immigration and federalism, scholars typically
combine their analysis of Medicaid with other public benefit programs, and some of the
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federalism scholarship—including policy fragmentation, political inequity, and social exclusion—by examining how states react to federalism arrangements governing noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid. It
provides a valuable case study on the efficacy of federalism arrangements for achieving social justice. In particular, it examines who gets
left behind when Congress designates states to implement federal statutes, as in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).7
Finally, this Article adds to the growing literature analyzing federalism arrangements across a range of subjects in order to uncover
trans-substantive insights about whether these arrangements are
suited to achieving their stated policy goals.
I use the term “excluded noncitizens” to describe the population
of focus: low-income noncitizens who are ineligible for the major federally funded health coverage programs because of their immigration
status and who have resided or intend to reside in the United States
for the long term.8 The federal government subsidizes health coverage
for people with limited means in two major ways: by providing insurance through Medicaid and by subsidizing insurance purchased on the
ACA Marketplaces.9 The meaning of “excluded noncitizen” differs
depending on the program being discussed and, in the case of
Medicaid, the state of residence. In all states, however, undocumented
noncitizens and recipients of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals

42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 45 Side A
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most prominent articles were authored before the passage of the ACA. See, e.g., Stella
Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 733 (2013)
(describing Congress’s delegation of authority to states to enact noncitizen-exclusionary
public benefit laws); id. at 743 (describing state and local noncitizen-inclusionary laws
providing a variety of services to undocumented noncitizens); Stephen H. Legomsky,
Immigration, Federalism, and the Welfare State, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1453, 1470 (1995)
(including emergency medical costs among those incurred by states with disproportionate
numbers of undocumented noncitizens); Cristina M. Rodrı́guez, The Significance of the
Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 586 n.72 (2008) (using noncitizen
exclusion from Medicaid as an example of how “states and localities bear much of the cost
of absorbing immigrants”); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the
Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 506–09
(2001) (outlining the doctrine of state alienage restrictions in public benefit programs).
7 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
8 Research suggests that significant numbers of noncitizens who are not legally barred
from access to subsidized health coverage nevertheless avoid it because of immigrationrelated concerns. I focus on this population in other publications. See Medha D. Makhlouf
& Jasmine Sandhu, Immigrants and Interdependence: How the COVID-19 Pandemic
Exposes the Folly of the New Public Charge Rule, 115 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 146 (2020);
Medha D. Makhlouf, The Public Charge Rule as Public Health Policy, 16 IND. HEALTH L.
REV. 177, 194–96 (2019).
9 See infra notes 207–13 and accompanying text.
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(DACA) are excluded from Medicaid and Marketplace subsidies.10 In
this Article, I focus on Medicaid because it is the primary means by
which low-income households without access to affordable employersponsored insurance (ESI) obtain health coverage;11 it covers more
than a quarter of the population;12 it is more economically efficient
than subsidizing Marketplace insurance purchases;13 and it is an
important building block and comparator for policymakers seeking to
expand publicly funded health insurance.14
Medicaid’s cooperative federalism structure gives states significant discretion to make decisions about noncitizen eligibility. Federal

42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 45 Side B
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10 Health Coverage of Immigrants, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Mar. 18, 2020), http://
www.kff.org/disparities-policy/fact-sheet/health-coverage-of-immigrants (noting that
“[u]ndocumented immigrants are not eligible to enroll in Medicaid or CHIP or to purchase
coverage through the ACA Marketplaces” and “individuals with Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status are not considered lawfully present and remain
ineligible for coverage options”).
11 See Eligibility, M EDICAID . GOV , https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/eligibility/
index.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2020) (“Medicaid is the single largest source of health
coverage in the United States.”). The cost of ESI to beneficiaries is subsidized by
employers. Like some citizens, noncitizens may find even subsidized coverage to be
unaffordable. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 10 (stating that lower average
incomes among noncitizens make affording ESI challenging). Although some noncitizens
who are excluded from Medicaid are eligible to purchase subsidized coverage on the
Marketplaces, they are disproportionately likely, compared with citizens, to be uninsured
even when they are eligible for Marketplace coverage. See id. (noting that nonelderly
noncitizens are significantly more likely to be uninsured than nonelderly citizens and
stating that many eligible noncitizens remain uninsured). It is likely that nonfinancial
enrollment barriers that are unique to noncitizens play a role. See id. (noting that many
eligible noncitizens remain uninsured because of barriers such as confusion about
eligibility, difficulty navigating enrollment, and language and literacy challenges).
Noncitizens with significant means but without access to ESI can purchase unsubsidized,
non-Marketplace coverage on the individual market and are therefore not the subject of
this Article. Cf. SAMANTHA ARTIGA & MARIA DIAZ, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH
COVERAGE AND CARE OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 4 (2019), https://www.kff.org/
disparities-policy/issue-brief/health-coverage-and-care-of-undocumented-immigrants
(“Undocumented immigrants can also purchase private coverage on the individual market
outside of the ACA Marketplaces, although many may not be able to afford this coverage
due to their limited incomes and lack of subsidies to offset the costs of this coverage.”).
12 See MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, MACSTATS: MEDICAID AND
CHIP DATA BOOK 3 exhibit 1 (2019), https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/
01/MACStats-Medicaid-and-CHIP-Data-Book-December-2019.pdf (showing that
Medicaid and CHIP covered 29.3% of the U.S. population in 2018).
13 See Susannah Luthi, ACA Subsidies Cost More per Person than Medicaid. Is That
Sustainable?, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Aug. 8, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://
www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20180808/NEWS/180809915/aca-subsidies-cost-moreper-person-than-medicaid-is-that-sustainable (citing research indicating that state-based
public and private market structures are more efficient than exchanges).
14 See Jamila Michener, Medicaid and the Policy Feedback Foundations for Universal
Healthcare, 685 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 116, 118 (2019) (“Given its size and
scope, the future of any health care policy transformation likely pivots on the current-day
status and effects of Medicaid policy.”).

42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 46 Side A

12/10/2020 14:19:35

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\95-6\NYU603.txt

December 2020]

unknown

Seq: 6

LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION

9-DEC-20

16:25

1685

law mandates Medicaid coverage of only a small category of noncitizens.15 Beyond this floor, states may expand eligibility to additional
groups of noncitizens using federal and state funds.16 However, just as
there is a federal floor of noncitizen eligibility, there is also a ceiling or
limit on how much states can expand Medicaid to noncitizens using
federal funds.17 This ceiling excludes a substantial population of lowincome noncitizens from access to affordable health insurance in all
but a few states that fund Medicaid-like coverage themselves (typically in a piecemeal and restricted manner).18 I argue that this structure does not only create extreme geographic variability in
noncitizens’ access to health coverage, but also (1) enables states to
enact exclusionary policies that are ineffective and inhumane and (2)
creates barriers for states to enact inclusionary policies that would
advance the normative goals of health policy. This is consistent with
prior research demonstrating how federalism can exacerbate inequity
and hinder social citizenship.19 On balance, decentralized policymaking on immigrant access to Medicaid has weakened national
health policy.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the existing
patchwork of noncitizen exclusion from Medicaid and the other, less
15

See infra Section I.B; see also infra notes 134–55 and accompanying text.
See infra Sections I.B.3, I.C.
17 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 402(b), 110 Stat. 2105, 2264–65 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)
(1996)) (requiring states participating in Medicaid to cover certain noncitizens and
permitting them to determine the eligibility of other noncitizens); id. § 401(a), 110 Stat. at
2261 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)) (stating that non-qualified noncitizens are generally
ineligible for federal public benefits); id. § 403, 110 Stat. at 2265 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1613(a)) (describing five-year bar on benefits eligibility for qualified noncitizens
generally and exceptions to it); Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-3, § 214, 123 Stat. 8, 56–57 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1396b(v)(4)(A), 1397gg(e)(1)(N) (2018)).
18 See infra Sections I.B.3, I.C; see also infra notes 130–33 and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld, Federalism in Health Care Reform, in HOLES IN THE
SAFETY NET: FEDERALISM AND POVERTY 197, 207 (Ezra Rosser ed., 2019) (demonstrating
how federalism has permitted states to deviate from the standards and priorities of
Medicaid in ways that are contrary to health policy goals); JAMILA MICHENER,
FRAGMENTED DEMOCRACY: MEDICAID, FEDERALISM, AND UNEQUAL POLITICS 33–59
(2018) (describing how federalism in Medicaid generates geographical inequities and
perpetuates systemic health disparities); Andrew Hammond, Welfare and Federalism’s
Peril, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1721, 1736–41 (2017) (discussing state-level inequities in the
administration of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families); Rebecca J. Kreitzer, Candis
Watts Smith, Kellen A. Kane & Tracee M. Saunders, Affordable but Inaccessible?
Contraception Deserts in the US States, J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. (forthcoming 2020)
(assessing how differences in state administration of Title X programs leads to health
inequity); Robert A. Schapiro, States of Inequality: Fiscal Federalism, Unequal States, and
Unequal People, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1531 (2020) (examining the role of fiscal federalism in
creating inequities in education and health).
16
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efficient ways in which the U.S. government subsidizes healthcare for
excluded noncitizens. This latter consideration is often missing from
debates over whether immigrants should be eligible for publicly
funded health insurance. Those who are opposed to expanding coverage for noncitizens on efficiency grounds may reconsider their position when confronted with information about how public funds are
already used to subsidize healthcare for noncitizens and how we could
do so more effectively.20
Part II explains why the patchwork of noncitizen exclusion
weakens national health policy. First, variability in healthcare access
based on characteristics that are unrelated to medical need—like state
of residence and immigration status—raises ethical concerns about
healthcare equity, which scholars have identified as the emerging normative foundation of health law scholarship and healthcare regulation.21 Healthcare equity is about the fair distribution of healthcare
resources, including publicly funded health coverage.22 The classical
conception of equity contains two dimensions: horizontal and vertical.23 In the healthcare context, horizontal inequity occurs when
residents of different states with the same medical needs do not have
the same access to healthcare resources, while vertical inequity occurs
when noncitizen residents with greater healthcare needs have less
access than citizens with lesser needs.24 Second, when states underpro-

42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 46 Side B
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20 This information will not, of course, persuade those whose opposition to expanding
health coverage for noncitizens is motivated by racism. See infra Section II.D.
21 See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, The Body Politic: Federalism as Feminism in Health
Reform, 11 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 303, 311 (2018) (noting that healthcare
equity has become a guiding principle of healthcare regulation and scholarship); Lindsay F.
Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 50–51 (2014)
(proposing a new “health justice” paradigm that reflects the socially conscious aims of the
health law field). See generally DANIEL E. DAWES, 150 YEARS OF OBAMACARE (2016)
(detailing the health equity movement and the passage of the ACA); JENNIFER PRAH
RUGER, HEALTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 2 (2009) (arguing that health systems’ primary goal
is to reduce disparities while using resources efficiently); Michael Marmot, Sharon Friel,
Ruth Bell, Tanja AJ Houweling & Sebastian Taylor, Closing the Gap in a Generation:
Health Equity Through Action on the Social Determinants of Health, 372 LANCET 1661,
1661–62 (2008) (arguing that reducing health inequities is an ethical imperative and
providing recommendations to that end).
22 See Anthony J. Culyer, Equity - Some Theory and Its Policy Implications, 27 J. MED.
ETHICS 275, 275 (2001) (analyzing the equitable distribution of healthcare resources in
affluent societies).
23 Id. at 276 (“Horizontal equity requires the like treatment of like individuals and
vertical equity requires the unlike treatment of unlike individuals, in proportion to the
differences between them.”).
24 See, e.g., Barbara Starfield, The Hidden Inequity in Health Care, 10 INT’L J. FOR
EQUITY HEALTH 1, 1 (2011) (summarizing the concept of equity in access to healthcare
resources, including its horizontal and vertical dimensions); Culyer, supra note 22, at
276–77 (defining horizontal and vertical equity in general terms and in relation to health,
healthcare needs, and financial contributions to healthcare).
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vide subsidized health coverage, individual and population health outcomes worsen, quality metrics suffer, and costs shift to the federal
government and can increase. State decisions to exclude noncitizens
from Medicaid in order to cut costs may be undermining the national
health policy goal of improving the health system’s overall efficiency.25 Third, state control of Medicaid is a legacy of racial politics,
which are linked to immigration politics.26 Exclusion of noncitizens
from Medicaid disproportionately affects Latinx people and people of
color.27 State policies that are shaped by antidemocratic values like
racism or that exacerbate existing inequities in access to healthcare
undermine the national health policy goal of achieving health equity.
Part III analyzes federalism’s influence on the substance of state
policies concerning noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid, showing why
federalism fails to meet the national health policy goals discussed in
the previous Part. First, federalism enables states to enact exclusionary policies that are ineffective and inhumane. For example, the
American Medical Association Journal of Ethics published an illustrated narrative about the tragedy of undocumented noncitizens with
end-stage renal disease who live in states that do not authorize publicly funded coverage of routine outpatient dialysis, forcing patients
into near-death situations before they can receive emergency treatment.28 Without a robust federal floor of Medicaid coverage for
noncitizens, states like Alabama, Mississippi, North Dakota, Virginia,
Wyoming, and Texas have faced no obstacle to imposing harsher limits
on noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid than are required under federal
law.29 Federalism empowers states to enact exclusionary policies

12/10/2020 14:19:35

See infra Sections II.B–C.
See, e.g., MICHENER, supra note 19 (“[A]mple research has confirmed that
federalism bolsters one of the most antidemocratic forces in the American polity:
racism.”); Hana E. Brown & Rachel Kahn Best, Logics of Redistribution: Determinants of
Generosity in Three U.S. Social Welfare Programs, 60 SOC. PERSP. 786, 793 (2017) (noting
that racial dynamics play a stronger role in programs where authority has been delegated
to states); Ellen Reese, Elvia Ramirez & Vanesa Estrada-Correa, The Politics of Welfare
Inclusion: Explaining State Variation in Legal Immigrants’ Welfare Rights, 56 SOC. PERSP.
97, 98 (2013) (“[M]any scholars suggest that the policies towards [legal immigrants] were
shaped by wider attitudes toward the foreign-born population and its racial and ethnic
make-up.”).
27 See Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and
Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 269 (1996–1997)
(“Because a majority of immigrants are people of color, alienage classifications all-toofrequently are employed as a proxy for race. Alienage discrimination . . . allows one to
disproportionately disadvantage people of color.”).
28 Nathan A. Gray, Cruel Carousel: The Grim Grind of “Compassionate” Dialysis, 20
AMA J. ETHICS 778 (2018).
29 See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., TABLE: MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR
IMMIGRANTS IN VARIOUS STATES (2020) [hereinafter MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
26
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guided by ideologies that are peripheral to health policy, including
immigration restrictionism among other factors.
Second, federalism creates barriers that inhibit states from
enacting inclusionary policies that would advance the normative goals
of health policy: equitable access to healthcare, and cost-effectiveness,
defined as the benefits of better health and better care divided by
cost.30 Fiscal capacity presents a major obstacle to states that want to
expand Medicaid coverage for noncitizens.31 Poor baseline economic
conditions can prevent states from taking advantage of federal options
to expand coverage, which institutionalizes these decisions and
inhibits future reform.32 Because most states are required to balance
their budgets each year, unlike the federal government, programs supported by state funds are more vulnerable to changes in economic
conditions.33 States may be forced to cut their Medicaid budgets and
deny necessary care to enrollees who have few resources or alternative options.34 Predictably, only a handful of states have created statefunded programs to expand noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid-like
coverage.35
Part IV discusses the limits of federalism in the context of noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid, explaining why the currrent federalism
IMMIGRANTS IN VARIOUS STATES], https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/
med-services-for-imms-in-states.pdf (outlining Medical Assistance Programs for
immigrants in various states).
30 See infra notes 281, 295–99 and accompanying text. See generally Sections II.B–C,
III.B.
31 See Super, supra note 6, at 547 (noting that state and local governments cannot
respond effectively to increased responsibility for antipoverty programs, because they may
be affected by shrinking revenues, free-riding localities, and lack of increased federal
funding).
32 See Reese et al., supra note 26, at 117 (finding that states with higher poverty rates
were less likely to restore benefits for noncitizens using state funds after PRWORA); id.
(finding that states’ past spending patterns on welfare programs for noncitizens predict
future spending patterns).
33 See Jared Walczak, State Strategies for Closing FY 2020 with a Balanced Budget, TAX
FOUND. (Apr. 2, 2020), https://taxfoundation.org/fy-2020-state-budgets-fy-2021-statebudgets (noting that “states are constrained in a way the federal government is not:
revenues and expenditures must be aligned, and the longer they are out of balance, the
more intractable the problem becomes”); cf. Super, supra note 6, at 547 (stating that
economic conditions that increase poverty also affect state and local governments’
revenues).
34 See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 480 (2011)
(citing, as an example, Arizona’s fiscally motivated decision to cut transplant services from
its Medicaid program).
35 See Rebecca Adams, Undocumented Kids Get Health Care in Six States, D.C., CTR.
FOR HEALTH JOURNALISM (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.centerforhealthjournalism.org/
fellowships/projects/undocumented-kids-get-health-care-six-states-dc (describing how
undocumented noncitizen children are eligible for publicly funded health coverage in
California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Washington).
FOR
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structure fails to meet the goals of federalism itself. The conception of
states as “laboratories” of democracy assumes that states design and
conduct policy experiments in order to identify policies that accomplish their intended effects and that do not have counter-productive
side effects.36 Successful experiments should serve as policy templates
for other jurisdictions.37 Medicaid’s structure has largely failed to
incentivize this type of experimentation and replication.38 Many
states, including several of the “new destination” states for noncitizens—Alabama, Tennessee, South Dakota, Nevada, Georgia,
Kentucky, Idaho, Indiana, and Mississippi39—have not elected federal
options to expand Medicaid for noncitizens after adopting the federal
baseline of restrictions set out in the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), nor have
they used state funds exclusively to expand coverage for excluded
noncitizens.40 Policy reform has stagnated in these states despite
shifting demographics and unmet healthcare needs among noncitizens
residing there.41 The Article concludes by making a normative case
for centralization of policy relating to noncitizen eligibility for subsidized health coverage.
I
EXCLUDING NONCITIZENS FROM MEDICAID: HOW
TAXPAYERS PAY
Public support for expanding subsidized health coverage for
undocumented noncitizens—who make up the largest cohort of
excluded noncitizens42—is middling.43 Those who oppose expansion
42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 48 Side A
12/10/2020 14:19:35

36 See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636,
638–39 (2017) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
37 Id. at 649–50 (describing the mechanisms by which policies spread across
jurisdictions, including “policy learning,” a model wherein jurisdictions develop policy
based on successes or failures in other jurisdictions).
38 See, e.g., Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 1704 (“States have been limited in
what they can accomplish alone in healthcare experimentation.”).
39 “New destination” states are those in which “the foreign-born population grew at or
above twice the national rate between 2000 and 2009.” Aaron Terrazas, Immigrants in
New-Destination States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Feb. 8, 2011), https://
www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrants-new-destination-states. They are listed in
descending order of growth. Id.
40 See discussion infra Sections I.B.3, I.C.
41 See Terrazas, supra note 39 (“The foreign born in new-destination states were less
likely than immigrants elsewhere to have health insurance.”).
42 See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 10.
43 See Lawrence O. Gostin, Is Affording Undocumented Immigrants Health Coverage a
Radical Proposal?, 322 JAMA 1438, 1438 (2019); Grace Sparks, CNN Poll: Democrats See
Sanders as the Best to Handle Health Care, CNN (July 1, 2019, 7:01 PM), https://
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typically question why U.S. citizens should subsidize healthcare for
noncitizens at all.44 However, they often overlook the little-known
ways in which all taxpayers—noncitizens included—already pay for
such care: through existing safety net programs, public health services,
and federally qualified health centers (FQHCs); through supplemental Medicaid payments to hospitals that serve a high proportion of
uninsured low-income patients; and through grants intended to reimburse healthcare providers for uncompensated care provided to uninsured noncitizens.45 One might view these payments as a partial,
institutional commitment to the “rescue principle” in healthcare,46 or

42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 48 Side B
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www.cnn.com/2019/07/01/politics/cnn-poll-june-health-care/index.html (indicating that
thirty-eight percent of survey respondents agreed that health insurance coverage provided
by the government should be available to undocumented immigrants).
44 See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 27, 2019, 9:37 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1144419410729242625?lang=EN (“All
Democrats just raised their hands for giving millions of illegal aliens unlimited healthcare.
How about taking care of American Citizens first!?”).
45 See, e.g., Chris Conover, How American Citizens Finance $18.5 Billion in Health
Care for Unauthorized Immigrants, FORBES (Feb. 26, 2018, 5:06 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2018/02/26/how-american-citizens-finance-healthcare-for-undocumented-immigrants.
46 See Mark G. Kuczewski, Who is My Neighbor? A Communitarian Analysis of Access
to Health Care for Immigrants, 32 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 327, 329 (2011)
(defining the “rescue principle” as “anyone in immediate distress [should] not suffer and
die in the street”); see also PATRICIA ILLINGWORTH & WENDY E. PARMET, THE HEALTH
OF NEWCOMERS: IMMIGRATION, HEALTH POLICY, AND THE CASE FOR GLOBAL
SOLIDARITY 182 (2017) (noting that since noncitizens are not fully excluded from the U.S.
healthcare system, there is at least some health-related solidarity between citizens and
noncitizens); Patrick Glen, Health Care and the Illegal Immigrant, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 197,
229 (2013) (discussing EMTALA and its underlying ethical principle that every person
should receive medical treatment when it is necessary). Some might argue that this is an
eroding principle, particularly with respect to noncitizens and people of color. High-profile
members of the Trump Administration and the current President himself have openly
questioned the humanity of noncitizens, reacted with indifference to glaring racial
inequities in mortality from COVID-19, and encouraged violent policing that
disproportionately kills people of color. See, e.g., Abigail Simon, People Are Angry
President Trump Used This Word to Describe Undocumented Immigrants, TIME (June 19,
2018, 11:56 AM), https://time.com/5316087/donald-trump-immigration-infest (reporting on
reactions to Trump’s use of the word “infest” to describe the act of migration and a prior
use of the word “animals” to refer to immigrants); Laura Barrón-López, Trump
Coronavirus Response Feeds Distrust in Black and Latino Communities, POLITICO (Apr.
21, 2020, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/21/race-coronavirus-outreach197470 (noting statements by administration officials, including Surgeon General Jerome
Adams); Sean Collins, Trump’s Policies Have Enabled Police Violence Against Black
Americans, VOX (May 30, 2020, 3:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2020/5/30/
21275588/trump-policing-policies-doj-george-floyd-protests (“[S]ince his inauguration,
Trump and his administration have worked to solidify a place for police violence in
American life through both rhetoric and policy.”). In this environment, it may not be
prudent to take for granted reimbursement mechanisms that cover excluded noncitizens,
like Emergency Medicaid. However, I introduce the rescue principle as a value underlying
existing programs at the time of their establishment.
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as a pragmatic means of ensuring the financial viability of public and
teaching hospitals and safeguarding public health.47 Either way, the
important question for politicians and the public is not whether we
want to pay for such care, but how we want to do so.
A review of the landscape of subsidized health coverage for
noncitizens demonstrates an important point: noncitizens are not—
and have never been—completely excluded from subsidized health
coverage programs. Social welfare programs designed to increase
access to healthcare have long served noncitizens.48 The rationales for
including noncitizens in publicly funded health insurance are based on
achieving health policy goals relating to health-system efficiency and
equity.49 Safety net programs and funding sources are intended to fill
the gaps in our public health insurance system.50 However, the
47

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-603, MEDICAID: STATES’ USE
DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLEMENTAL PAYMENTS TO HOSPITALS 21 (2019) (finding that,
nationally, Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments covered about half
of the uncompensated care costs of the hospitals that received the payments); Health
Headlines – March 30, 2020, KING & SPALDING (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.kslaw.com/
news-and-insights/health-headlines-march-30-2020 (describing new federal funding and
program changes to protect public health during the COVID-19 pandemic, including
approval of Emergency Medicaid waivers, new grants through the Public Health and Social
Services Emergency Fund, approval of reimbursement for telehealth services provided by
FQHCs, and a delay of planned Medicaid DSH cuts).
48 See Cybelle Fox, Unauthorized Welfare: The Origins of Immigrant Status Restrictions
in American Social Policy, 102 J. AM. HIST. 1051, 1058–59 (2016) (describing the lack of
federal alienage restrictions in social assistance programs between 1935 and 1971, a pattern
that the introduction of Medicaid did not change); infra note 102; see also Fox, supra, at
1051 (describing the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s reliance, in
1971, on the fact that most states’ public assistance programs did not restrict eligibility on
the basis of citizenship or immigration status); Leighton Ku & Sheetal Matani, Left Out:
Immigrants’ Access to Health Care and Insurance, 20 HEALTH AFF. 247, 247 (2001) (noting
that before the passage of PRWORA in 1996, “[h]istorically, legally admitted immigrants
were eligible for Medicaid and other benefits on the same terms as citizens were”).
49 See Medha D. Makhlouf, Health Justice for Immigrants, 4 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFF.
235, 265 (2019) (noting that “exclusionary laws and policies based on immigration concerns
make bad health policy” and asserting that “[f]rom a population health perspective, to
ignore policies that reduce the public accessibility of health services is to ignore a major
determinant of inequity”).
50 This pattern of using inefficient and unreliable “patches” to fill intentional gaps in
primary public benefit programs is not exclusive to healthcare. For example, PRWORA
slashed funding for Food Stamps, now called the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP), even as it modestly increased funding for the Emergency Food
Assistance Program (TEFAP), a less efficient program that funds the purchase of food
commodities by emergency food pantries, food banks, soup kitchens, and shelters. See
David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 701
(2004) (“The agriculture committees cut the food stamp program $600 million more deeply
in PRWORA than the Republican leadership required so that they could buy commodities
for the Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), which aids food banks and soup
kitchens.”).

AND
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existing patchwork of programs is woefully inadequate to meet the
healthcare needs of many noncitizens.
This Part describes the legal framework for noncitizen access to
publicly funded health coverage. It begins with a discussion of terminology used throughout this Article. The next Section opens with a
synopsis of the doctrines governing issues at the intersection of health
law and immigration law. It then describes the history of noncitizen
eligibility for Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program
(CHIP), focusing on the impact of PRWORA’s sweeping restrictions
and its devolution of authority to states to make decisions about how
to treat noncitizens. The final Section describes state-funded efforts to
provide health coverage to noncitizens who are excluded from
Medicaid and Marketplace subsidies. This collection of programs,
each with its distinct logic for including or excluding various categories of people, creates the unique and threadbare patchwork of health
coverage for noncitizens living in the United States.
A.

Terminology

12/10/2020 14:19:35

51 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2012) (the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
broadly defines the term “immigrant” to mean “every alien except an alien who is within
one of the [delineated] classes of nonimmigrant aliens”); Immigrants and Refugees: What is
an Immigrant or Refugee?, U.C. IRVINE LIBR., https://guides.lib.uci.edu/immigrants/whatis
(last updated July 23, 2020, 6:39 PM) (“An illegal alien who entered the United States
without inspection, for example, would be strictly defined as an immigrant under
the INA . . . .”).
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Terminology about noncitizen status is complex, and choices
about terminology are often imbued with ideology. This Section provides an overview of the relevant categories of noncitizens that are
used throughout this Article. For the most part, I use the language
found in statutes or regulations. However, in some cases, relevant laws
use different terms to refer to the same or overlapping categories of
noncitizens. For example, PRWORA refers to a group of noncitizens
of various statuses who are qualified to enroll in federally funded
public benefits using a term that is not found in immigration law. In
other cases, common usages conflict with or do not have a legal definition but are so ubiquitous that they are unavoidable in a discussion of
noncitizen access to publicly funded healthcare. Finally, where there
are meaningful choices to be made about terminology, I opt for inclusive, humanizing language.
I use the term “noncitizen” to refer to any person who is not a
U.S. citizen. I opt for this term rather than the more common, colloquial term “immigrant,” because “immigrant” (1) has a legal meaning
that is narrower than a person who is not a U.S. citizen51 and (2) is

42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 50 Side A

12/10/2020 14:19:35

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\95-6\NYU603.txt

December 2020]

unknown

Seq: 14

LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION

9-DEC-20

16:25

1693

used conversationally and in some scholarship to refer to naturalized
U.S. citizens, i.e., people who are not “natural-born citizens” but who
have become citizens through the naturalization process established in
the Immigration and Nationality Act.
I prefer “noncitizen” to “alien” because, although the latter has a
long history of usage and is found in federal immigration laws and
state laws on a variety of matters, the term is increasingly recognized
by local and state policymakers as disparaging of noncitizens.52
Scholars have analyzed how use of the term “alien” has reinforced
hostility toward noncitizens and, as immigration has changed the
racial and ethnic composition of the country, become synonymous for
noncitizen people of color.53 This effect is magnified by the current
President’s vitriolic rhetoric about noncitizens—and about noncitizens
of color in particular54—coupled with his frequent and deliberate use
of the term “illegal alien.”55 Given the normative bent of this Article,
I eschew the ideologically loaded term, “alien,” in favor of the relatively neutral term, “noncitizen.” For example, even in discussions of
the category “qualified alien,” which originated in PRWORA, I use
the term “qualified noncitizen” unless I am quoting the statute
directly.
For similar reasons, I use the term “undocumented” instead of
“illegal.”56 To use the term “illegal” to refer to a person, as opposed to
their actions, is literally dehumanizing. The foregoing also explains
why I opt for “undocumented noncitizen” as opposed to “illegal
alien,” “undocumented immigrant,” or any combination of those
terms.
42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 50 Side A
12/10/2020 14:19:35

52 See Mihir Zaveri, This Lawmaker Wants to Remove the Words ‘Illegal Alien’ from
the Law, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/us/politics/
colorado-illegal-immigrants.html. Recently, the New York City Council voted to prohibit
the use of “alien” in local laws, replacing it with “noncitizen.” Maya Rajamani, NYC
Council Votes to Ban Phrases ‘Alien,’ ‘Illegal Immigrant’ from All Local Laws, 1010 WINS
(May 28, 2020, 3:30 PM), https://1010wins.radio.com/articles/nyc-council-bans-alien-illegalimmigrant-from-local-law. On the other hand, the Trump Administration’s Justice
Department has urged federal prosecutors to use the term “illegal aliens” instead of
“undocumented” in news releases. Zaveri, supra. Advocates for inclusive policies have
long recognized the dehumanizing nature of the term “alien.” Id.
53 See Johnson, supra note 27, at 267 (summarizing concerns of scholars about the use
of “alien” in immigration law).
54 See Jayashri Srikantiah & Shirin Sinnar, White Nationalism as Immigration Policy, 71
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 197, 198–200 (2019) (discussing President Trump’s remarks on
immigrants and immigration and noting that “[t]he President’s comments on immigration
. . . strongly suggest that he views immigration as a cultural threat to the U.S.”).
55 Zaveri, supra note 52 (noting that President Trump used the term “illegal alien” at
least five times during the February 2020 State of the Union address).
56 Use of the term “illegal immigrant” in local laws was also prohibited by the New
York City Council’s action. Rajamani, supra note 52.
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Regarding the concept of “undocumented,” there is no precise
definition.57 The term is not found in immigration law. Rather, it is
used to refer to people who entered the country either (1) without
inspection or (2) with authorization and inspection, but then violated
the terms of their authorization.58 For example, one way to become
undocumented is to remain in the United States beyond the authorized period of stay for a tourist visa.59 For many undocumented noncitizens, their status is temporary: they have held legal status in the
past and may obtain legal status in the future, depending on the outcome of pending immigration applications.60
In prior work, I described the complexity and number of noncitizen statuses as a “spectrum from ‘permanent’ to temporary to
quasi-status to undocumented.”61 In the following paragraphs, I will
describe some of these statuses or categories of statuses that matter
for determining eligibility for publicly funded health coverage. Lawful
permanent residents (LPRs) have the most secure status among
noncitizens and are on the path to U.S. citizenship.62 The government
recognizes that LPRs plan to live indefinitely and permanently in the
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57 In general usage, the term “unauthorized” is often used interchangeably with
undocumented. See, e.g., Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of Nonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV.
1115, 1126 (2015) (“[T]he approximately 11.5 million noncitizens in the United States
without status . . . are often described as ‘illegal,’ ‘undocumented,’ or ‘unauthorized’
noncitizens.”).
58 See, e.g., id. (describing undocumented immigrants as those who have overstayed
legal visas or entered the country without inspection); Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of
the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44 GA. L. REV. 65, 68–69 (2009) (same); Peter
L. Markowitz, Undocumented No More: The Power of State Citizenship, 67 STAN. L. REV.
869, 873 n.14 (2015) (same).
59 One report estimates that forty percent of undocumented noncitizens living in the
United States entered the country with authorization. MICHAEL A. RODRÍGUEZ, MARIAELENA YOUNG & STEVEN P. WALLACE, CREATING CONDITIONS TO SUPPORT HEALTHY
PEOPLE: STATE POLICIES THAT AFFECT THE HEALTH OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS
AND THEIR FAMILIES 3 (2015).
60 Id.
61 Makhlouf, supra note 49, at 292. Sociologist Tiffany Joseph has helpfully
conceptualized documentation status categories as a continuum from citizens to
undocumented noncitizens with “gray area” documentation statuses in between. The
documentation status continuum helps to explain how the allocation of public benefits
along the spectrum reinforces civic stratification. Tiffany D. Joseph, The Documentation
Status Continuum: Citizenship and Increasing Stratification in American Life, CTR. FOR
OPEN SCI. (2020).
62 See, e.g., Lawful Permanent Residents (LPR), U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., https://
www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/lawful-permanent-residents (last updated Oct. 22,
2020).
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United States, as the name implies, and therefore accords more rights
to this group than to other noncitizen groups.63
A similar term, “lawfully present,” refers to a much broader
group than LPRs, and was used in the ACA to describe noncitizens
who are eligible to enroll in health coverage through the Health
Insurance Marketplace and receive subsidies in the form of premium
tax credits.64 As defined in regulations, “lawfully present” noncitizens
include LPRs, a variety of persons with humanitarian statuses,65 applicants for certain humanitarian statuses, and some noncitizens without
status whose removal from the country has been deferred—what I
refer to as a “quasi-status.”66
Yet another similar term, “lawfully residing in the United States,”
is used in the context of Medicaid and CHIP. Since 2009, states have
had the option to provide Medicaid or CHIP to lawfully residing
noncitizen children and/or pregnant women who are otherwise ineligible for those programs.67 The term is functionally equivalent to
“lawfully present.”68
The term “qualified alien” originates in PRWORA and encompasses a narrower group of noncitizens than “lawfully present” and
“lawfully residing.” It refers to noncitizens who qualify for eligibility
for Medicaid and CHIP.69 These include LPRs and certain humanitarian statuses: refugees, people granted asylum, people granted
parole by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for a
period of at least one year, people granted withholding of deportation/
removal, people granted conditional entry, Cuban and Haitian
42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 51 Side A
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63 See, e.g., id. (“LPRs may accept an offer of employment without special restrictions,
own property, receive financial assistance at public colleges and universities, and join the
Armed Forces.”).
64 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
§ 1411(a)(1) (2010).
65 Humanitarian, U.S. C ITIZENSHIP & I MMIGR . S ERVS ., https://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian (last visited Aug. 11, 2020) (summarizing humanitarian statuses, which
include refugee; asylum; battered spouse, children, and parents; victims of human
trafficking and other crimes; Temporary Protected Status (TPS); Deferred Enforced
Departure (DED); and other special situations).
66 See 45 C.F.R. § 152.2 (2018). The healthcare.gov website provides a clearer list of
twenty-eight immigration statuses that qualify for Marketplace coverage. Immigrants:
Immigration Status and the Marketplace, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/
immigrants/immigration-status (last visited Aug. 11, 2020).
67 See infra Section I.B.4.
68 See Letter from Cindy Mann, Director, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to
State Health Officials (July 1, 2010), https://downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archiveddownloads/SMDL/downloads/SHO10006.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Letter from Cindy Mann].
69 The term applies to a variety of federally funded public benefit programs, but
Medicaid and CHIP are the only relevant programs for this Article’s purposes.
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entrants, certain survivors of trafficking, and certain abused immigrants, their children, and their parents.70
“Permanently residing in the United States under color of law”
(PRUCOL) is another term that is used in the Medicaid context.71 It
is not clearly defined in federal statutes or regulations but is generally
understood to refer to noncitizens “actually living in the United States
without any formal immigration status” and who have “the [federal
immigration agency’s] tacit, if not explicit, permission to remain.”72
There is evidence that Congress intended for the term to be interpreted broadly,73 and courts in various jurisdictions have interpreted
PRUCOL differently, creating an informal zone of state policymaking.74 Prior to PRWORA, PRUCOL signified a category of
noncitizens who were eligible for Medicaid.75 By creating the new category of qualified noncitizens, PRWORA essentially eliminated usage
of PRUCOL in Medicaid.76 However, some states continue to use the
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70 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of
1996, § 431(b), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2274 (1996) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1641(b)); see also William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 211, 122 Stat. 5044, 5063 (2008)
(adding certain survivors of trafficking to the definition of “qualified alien”). A detailed
discussion of qualified noncitizen statuses is provided in Section I.B.
71 See, e.g., Medicaid for Immigrants Who Are Not Permanent Residents (Do Not Have
“Green Cards”)-- PRUCOL and Temporary Non-Immigrant Eligibility, N.Y. HEALTH
ACCESS, http://www.wnylc.com/health/entry/33/#PRUCOL (last updated Sept. 29, 2020).
72 See Richard A. Boswell, Restrictions on Non-Citizens’ Access to Public Benefits:
Flawed Premise, Unnecessary Response, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1475, 1488 (1995).
73 Janet M. Calvo, Alien Status Restrictions on Eligibility for Federally Funded
Assistance Programs, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 395, 412 (1987–88) (“According
to the House report on the bill, Congress intended that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services interpret this phrase broadly so as to include aliens residing in the United
States pursuant to immigration law, policy or practice.”).
74 See, e.g., Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1576–77 n.33 (2d Cir. 1985) (defining
PRUCOL to include fifteen categories of noncitizens, including those “residing in the
United States with the knowledge and permission of the [INS] and whose departure from
the United States the INS does not contemplate enforcing” (alteration in original));
Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1459–60 (9th Cir. 1985) (“‘[P]ermanently residing . . .
under color of law’ rests on two factors: first, an official determination by the INS that an
alien is legitimately present in the country and, second, a determination that the alien is
legitimately present for an indefinite period of time.”). See generally Calvo, supra note 73,
at 411–16 (discussing judicial interpretations of PRUCOL).
75 The Second Circuit, in Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977), derived from 45
C.F.R. § 233.50 a doctrine that required states to provide public benefits to certain
categories of noncitizens. See Holley, 553 F.2d at 848–51. The doctrine outlined in Holley
would come to be referred to as PRUCOL. See Julia Field Costich, Legislating a Public
Health Nightmare: The Anti-Immigrant Provisions of the “Contract with America”
Congress, 90 KY. L.J. 1043, 1046 & n.14 (2001–02) (citing Holley in explaining the origins
of the PRUCOL doctrine).
76 See Costich, supra note 75, at 1053 (“The PRWORA defines ‘qualified aliens’ . . . in a
manner that abolishes the PRUCOL doctrine.”).
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term to describe noncitizens who may qualify for state-funded
benefits.77
B. Federal Framework
This Section illustrates how, over time, the federal government
has become increasingly influential in regulating and financing healthcare, yet has devolved considerable power and discretion to states to
govern noncitizen eligibility for publicly funded health insurance. As
Professor Wendy Parmet notes in her authoritative analysis of the
roles of the federal and state governments as they relate to policies at
the intersection of health and immigration, regulation of both health
law and immigration law is “complex and dynamic.”78 While matters
relating to health are traditionally within the domain of state and local
governments,79 matters relating to immigration are theoretically
within the exclusive domain of the federal government.80 The “messy”
reality is that each level of government has a role in regulating matters
at the intersection of health and immigration policy.81
The doctrinal foundation of states’ authority to enact laws to preserve and protect the safety, health, welfare, and morals of the com-
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77 See, e.g., infra note 320 (describing health coverage for PRUCOL noncitizens in
California).
78 Parmet, supra note 6, at 225–26.
79 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) (holding that the power to
enact health laws belongs to the states).
80 See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration
is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280
(1875) (“The passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of
foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States.”).
81 Parmet, supra note 6, at 232. In the earliest colonial governments, localities were
deemed responsible for caring for indigent people in their territory under the “doctrine of
local care.” MICHENER, supra note 19, at 34. However, even then, when the tradition of
local primacy in health-related matters was strongest, certain health-related matters
involving immigrants were shunted to a central authority when local authorities
determined that they were beyond the scope of the locality’s ability to address them. For
example, when “impoverished immigrants flooded seaport cities,” colonial localities could
seek funds from the colonial treasury to provide for their basic needs. Id. at 34–35.
Immigrants were among those characterized as the “unsettled” poor, which referred to
people who had not settled in the locality but for whom it had nevertheless assumed
responsibility. See id. at 35. The corollary to local responsibility for public assistance in the
colonies (and later in the states prior to the establishment of the first comprehensive
federal immigration law in 1882) was the authority to prohibit from settling or to expel
persons who were dependent or likely to become dependent on public assistance. See
Makhlouf, supra note 8, at 179–81 (describing the rights and responsibilities of colonial
localities and states prior to 1882 relating to the provision of public assistance and the
expulsion of people with few financial resources). States’ police powers also encompassed
the ability to exclude immigrants from admission for public health reasons. See Parmet,
supra note 6, at 228.
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munity is known as the “police power.”82 Although the traditional
presumption of state primacy in matters relating to health retains
some influence in healthcare policy and constitutional jurisprudence,83
federal authority to regulate health insurance is undisputed.84 Debates
over the preservation of states’ roles are not based on considerations
about the primary function of each level of government with respect
to health insurance regulation and finance, typical of “separate
spheres” federalism; rather, they are mainly about policy
disagreements.85
Laws regulating noncitizen eligibility for publicly funded healthcare sit at the nexus of two doctrinal traditions. They are not “immigration laws” per se as they do not regulate core immigration concerns
such as admission and removal.86 Rather, they may be considered
alienage laws, which regulate noncitizens’ rights and responsibilities
once they are residing within the country. Alienage laws use citizenship or immigration status as the basis for treating residents differently, such as excluding them from eligibility for Medicaid.87
In constitutional challenges to laws relating to noncitizens’ access
to publicly funded healthcare programs, courts have cited various
bases for their decisions—not only because such laws sit at this nexus,
but also because they are heavily regulated and complex fields.88
While it is true that the plenary power and police power doctrines
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82 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1905); see also Gibbons, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) at 203 (noting various exercises of the police power, including quarantine,
inspection, and health laws); Parmet, supra note 6, at 227–28 nn.28–31.
83 See Parmet, supra note 6, at 228.
84 See Carleton B. Chapman & John M. Talmadge, Historical and Political Background
of Federal Health Care Legislation, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 334, 345 (1970)
(discussing the federal government’s cemented role in health matters after the passage of
Medicare and Medicaid); Huberfeld, supra note 34, at 464 (“If Congress were to federalize
Medicaid, the Spending Clause clearly provides the enumerated power to do so, just as it
does for Medicare.”).
85 See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 1724 (“[W]e should be wary of arguments
for federalism or states’ rights that are couched in constitutional arguments when they are
really arguments about policy disagreements and statutory design.”).
86 See Parmet, supra note 6, at 229–30 (distinguishing “‘alienage laws,’ which regulate
the rights and responsibilities of non-citizens who live within the U.S. from ‘immigration
laws,’ which regulate admissibility, deportability, registration, and immigration
enforcement”).
87 See Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 618 (2013).
88 See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82 (1976) (“Congress has no constitutional
duty to provide all aliens with the welfare benefits provided to citizens . . . .”); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378 (1971) (“State laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for
welfare benefits merely because of their alienage conflict with . . . overriding national
policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government.”); League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 783–84 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding
that the provision excluding undocumented noncitizens from receiving services from
community health centers is preempted by the Public Health Service Act).
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have eroded over time, they remain influential in shaping the creation
and interpretation of laws at the intersection of health and immigration.89 For example, courts have relied on the federal exclusivity principle of the plenary power doctrine to strike down alienage
restrictions in state-funded healthcare programs.90 Such analyses are
particularly apt when these state laws actually regulate immigration by
imposing unequal burdens on noncitizens as compared with citizens.91
In general, however, the interjection of immigration-policy motives
into what is essentially a health-policy matter has proven unnecessary
and unhelpful for achieving national health policy goals.
1.

Origin of Exclusions

The Social Security Act of 1935 is the cornerstone of the modern,
federal social welfare system in the United States. It created a
national system of retirement benefits and unemployment insurance
and established the mechanism by which states receive federal funds
to provide a range of public assistance.92 This Act was the foundation
for the creation of Medicare, a health insurance program for aged
Social Security recipients, and Medicaid, a health insurance program
for low-income people, in 1965.93
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89 See Parmet, supra note 6, at 228–29 (describing how states have retained significant
discretion in implementing federal healthcare laws as a result of the police power’s
influence on federal healthcare legislation and federal lawmakers’ rhetoric); id. at 226–27
(describing how the plenary power doctrine is the basis for a bifurcated equal protection
jurisprudence of equal protection claims brought by noncitizens); see also infra note 441.
90 See Kurti v. Maricopa Cty., 33 P.3d 499, 502 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (striking down
eligibility requirements for healthcare benefits that excluded certain noncitizens in Arizona
because the state-law requirements could not withstand strict scrutiny); Ehrlich v. Perez,
908 A.2d 1220, 1243 (Md. 2006) (applying strict scrutiny and awarding healthcare benefits
to noncitizens in Maryland because the eligibility requirements “discriminated in the
provision of State-funded medical assistance benefits based on an alienage classification or
sub-classification”); Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1094 (N.Y. 2001)
(“Plaintiffs urge this Court to adopt strict scrutiny because section 122 [New York state
Medicaid eligibility requirements] creates classifications based on alienage. The State
argues that section 122 implements Federal immigration policy and therefore must merely
withstand rational basis scrutiny. We agree with plaintiffs.”); see also Graham, 403 U.S. at
378–81 (discussing the federal exclusivity principle in the context of cash assistance welfare
programs); Commonwealth of Pa., Office of the Att’y Gen., Opinion Letter (Dec. 9, 1996)
(binding opinion applying strict scrutiny and preserving lawfully present noncitizen
eligibility for a state-funded healthcare program).
91 Graham considered state statutes imposing alienage restrictions on cash assistance
benefits. 403 U.S. at 366. The Court noted that the states stipulated that the residency
requirements “discourage[d] entry into or continued residency in the State [by
noncitizens].” Id. at 379.
92 See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 269–70
(1982).
93 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286. The
beneficiaries and services covered by Medicare have expanded significantly since its
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While Medicare has always enjoyed popular approval, Medicaid
has long been “burdened by the stigma of public assistance.”94 Upon
its establishment, Medicaid was widely regarded as an extension of
existing, state-centric “welfare medicine” programs, such as KerrMills.95 Although both programs are funded primarily through federal
income taxes, public misperceptions of the funding sources have contributed to the idea of distinct programs for distinct populations: there
is a belief that Medicare is funded solely through employer payroll
taxes and premiums paid by beneficiaries.96 Medicaid, on the other
hand, is jointly funded by the state and federal governments, and state
funding comes primarily from state general fund appropriations.97 The
federal government provides matching funds to states at the Federal
Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) rate to provide medical assistance to certain categories of low-income people.98
While Medicare can be described as a type of national health
insurance on account of its “uniform national standards for eligibility
and benefits,” Medicaid cannot be characterized as uniform because
of the considerable flexibility that states have to design and implement the program.99 Although states are required to provide
Medicaid to applicants who fall within mandatory coverage groups,
the number of which has increased over time, states make their own
decisions about whether to take advantage of federal matching funds
to expand coverage to additional groups.100
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founding. See, e.g., Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, sec. 201(b)(1),
299I, 86 Stat. 1329, 1370–74, 1463–64 (expanding eligibility to people under the age of
sixty-five with long-term disabilities and people with end-stage renal disease).
94 STARR, supra note 92, at 370.
95 Id. at 369 (describing Medicaid as “expanded assistance to the states for medical care
for the poor”). Medicaid has been criticized as both “under-theorized and underfunded.”
Huberfeld, supra note 34, at 432. In establishing Medicaid, Congress did not explicitly
grapple with the humanitarian, solidaristic, or other possible justifications for federal
funding of healthcare for low-income people; rather, it “built on what came before; the
program was remarkably path dependent.” Id. at 449.
96 See David A. Super, The Modernization of American Public Law: Health Care
Reform and Popular Constitutionalism, 66 STAN. L. REV. 873, 923 (2014) (describing public
beliefs about the self-sufficiency of social insurance programs like Medicare and the reality
of how their redistributive nature has been concealed); id. at 928 (“The myth of selfsufficiency of first-tier programs [like Medicare], along with the appeal of the populations
they serve, has resulted in considerable political strength, low stigma for beneficiaries, and
generally respectful, deferential program administration.”).
97 ALISON MITCHELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42640, MEDICAID FINANCING AND
EXPENDITURES 1–4 (2015).
98 Id.
99 STARR, supra note 92, at 370.
100 See MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N (MACPAC), MANDATORY
AND OPTIONAL ENROLLEES AND SERVICES IN MEDICAID 5 tbl.1-1 (2017) (summarizing
mandatory and optional Medicaid eligibility groups).
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Given the distinct characters of Medicare and Medicaid, it is not
surprising that each program’s restrictions on noncitizen eligibility
evolved differently. The law governing Medicare eligibility has always
contained alienage restrictions.101 Medicaid, by contrast, did not initially have any federal restriction on noncitizen eligibility.102 Rather, it
required states to cover “all individuals” who fell within the
mandatory coverage groups, without reference to citizenship or immigration status.103 In 1971, only eight states had alienage-based eligibility restrictions for any federally funded welfare programs.104 Most
states provided Medicaid to all otherwise eligible people, without
regard to citizenship or immigration status.105
It was not until 1973 that the federal government began to make
centralized policy on immigrant eligibility for Medicaid. That year, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)—the federal
agency that administered Medicaid at the time—promulgated a regulation imposing the first alienage-based restriction on Medicaid, man-
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101 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 103(4), 79 Stat. 286, 333
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-2(a)(3)(B)) (relating to alienage restrictions in
Part A eligibility); id. at § 1836 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1395o) (relating to
alienage restrictions in Part B eligibility). The Supreme Court affirmed the federal
government’s authority to impose a five-year bar on Medicare eligibility for lawful
permanent residents in Mathews v. Diaz, stating that “Congress may decide that as the
alien’s tie grows stronger, so does the strength of his claim to an equal share of that
munificence.” 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
102 See Sharon F. Carton, The PRUCOL Proviso in Public Benefits Law: Alien
Eligibility for Public Benefits, 14 NOVA L. REV. 1033, 1036 (1990) (“It was only in the
1970s that states began to restrict eligibility for state-administered federal programs such as
[Aid to Families with Dependent Children] or welfare.”); Steven Sacco & Sarika Saxena,
Permanently Residing Under Color of Law: A Practitioner’s Guide to an Ambiguous
Doctrine, 23 CUNY L. REV. 364, 369 (2020) (citing Lewis v. Grinker, 965 F.2d 1206, 1211
(2d Cir. 1992)) (“Between the original enactment of Medicaid in 1965 and 1973, there were
actually no [federal] citizenship-based restrictions on Medicaid . . . .”); Charles Wheeler,
Alien Eligibility for Public Benefits: Part I, 88-11 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (1988) (“Twenty
years ago there were no restrictions on alien access to public benefits.”).
103 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1902(a)(10), 79 Stat. 286,
345. Regulations promulgated in 1971 clarified that there was no federal limit on
noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid. 45 C.F.R. § 248.50 (1972). States were explicitly
authorized, and in some cases required, to provide Medicaid to individuals “without regard
to citizenship status,” a group that included undocumented immigrants. Id.
104 See Citizenship and Alienage, 38 Fed. Reg. 16911 (June 27, 1973).
105 See, e.g., Lewis v. Gross, 663 F. Supp. 1164, 1181–82 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that
“[f]rom Medicaid’s inception in 1965 until the promulgation of the Secretary’s alienage
requirement in 1973, New York State provided federally participating Medicaid benefits to
all otherwise eligible aliens”); see also Fox, supra note 48, at 1053 (noting that “[s]tates
were free to enact their own alienage-based restrictions on jointly funded programs, but in
1970 only Texas required Aid to Families with Dependent Children . . . and Medicaid
recipients to be U.S. citizens” and stating that “Arizona and eight other states barred
noncitizens from some of their other welfare programs, but the vast majority of states did
not ask applicants about their legal status”).
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dating the exclusion of undocumented immigrants.106 In 1986, a
federal district court invalidated the regulation, holding that it had no
statutory basis.107 In part to respond to this decision, Congress passed
a law codifying the exclusion of certain noncitizens from Medicaid,
namely those who were not LPRs or PRUCOL.108 The law also created a waiver of the alienage restriction in Medicaid for coverage of
emergency services, known as Emergency Medicaid.109
2. The Emergency Medicaid Exception
Emergency Medicaid authorizes federal reimbursement to states
for “such care and services [that] are necessary for the treatment of an
emergency medical condition” for people who would be eligible for
Medicaid but for the alienage restriction, including undocumented
noncitizens.110 In all fifty states, Emergency Medicaid authorizes payments for care and services related to childbirth (labor and delivery),
but not prenatal care.111 States then reimburse healthcare providers—
typically hospitals—that provide such care and services.112 Emergency
Medicaid is not intended to cover preventive healthcare or follow-up
care for patients discharged from the hospital after treatment of an
emergency medical condition.113
Since Emergency Medicaid is available to noncitizens excluded
from Medicaid eligibility, and states have options to expand or restrict
Medicaid to noncitizens, the types of noncitizens who qualify for it in
each state vary. For example, a Texas resident who became an LPR
through marriage six years ago would not qualify for Medicaid

12/10/2020 14:19:35

45 C.F.R. § 248.50 (1974).
Lewis, 663 F. Supp. 1164.
108 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9406(a), 100 Stat.
1874, 2057 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1982)) (providing that, with the exception of
Emergency Medicaid, “no payment may be made to a State under this section for medical
assistance furnished to an alien who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence or
otherwise permanently residing in the United States under color of law”).
109 Id.
110 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 § 9406(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(1)–(3)
(2018).
111 C. Annette DuBard & Mark W. Massing, Trends in Emergency Medicaid
Expenditures for Recent and Undocumented Immigrants, 297 JAMA 1085, 1085–86 (2007)
(“Federal funds cannot be applied toward Medicaid coverage of any services that fall
outside of this definition, such as routine prenatal care.”).
112 MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N (MACPAC), THE MEDICAID
FEE-FOR-SERVICE PROVIDER PAYMENT PROCESS 3 (2018), http://www.macpac.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/Medicaid-Fee-For-Service-Provider-Payment-Process.pdf.
113 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-725, at 380 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (noting congressional intent
that Emergency Medicaid only cover “medical care that is strictly of an emergency
nature”).
107
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because of their immigration status.114 However, if they suffered a
traumatic injury, they would likely qualify for Emergency Medicaid to
reimburse their providers for treatment received in the emergency
room, but not for follow-up care.115 By contrast, a Pennsylvania resident in the same situation would qualify for Medicaid, which would
cover the emergency room visit, hospitalization (if necessary), and any
follow-up care.116
Depending on the state, Emergency Medicaid can look like
health insurance. In some states, residents can apply for Emergency
Medicaid coverage in advance of treatment;117 in others, residents can
only apply after receiving treatment for an emergency medical condition or labor and delivery.118 States have significant discretion to
define, within certain limits, the “emergency medical conditions”
(EMCs) that will be covered by Emergency Medicaid. There is enormous variation in the types of conditions that states have deemed to
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114 See Texas Medicaid, BENEFITS.GOV, https://www.benefits.gov/benefit/1640 (last
visited Aug. 11, 2020) (listing Texas’s eligibility requirements). Because Texas did not
expand Medicaid under the ACA, eligibility is very restrictive for non-disabled, nonelderly U.S. citizen adults as well. However, such a person could qualify under the
Medicaid for Parents and Caretaker Relatives Program, 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 366.707,
.713 (2020), if their income is low enough. See Texas Works Handbook: C-100, Income
Limits and Proration Charts: C-131.2 Medically Needy and Parents and Caretaker Relatives
Medicaid, TEX. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Apr. 1, 2020), https://hhs.texas.gov/lawsregulations/handbooks/twh/part-c-appendix/c-100-income-limits-proration-charts#C131.2
(indicating an income limit of $285 per month for a two-parent family of four, for example,
which is equivalent to thirteen percent of the Federal Poverty Level). The LPR described
here would not qualify for the program under § 366.713(3). See Texas Works Handbook:
A-300, Citizenship: A-342 TANF and Medical Programs Alien Status Eligibility Charts:
Chart C, TEX. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Apr. 1, 2020), https://hhs.texas.gov/lawsregulations/handbooks/twh/part-a-determining-eligibility/section-300-citizenship#A342.
115 Texas Medicaid Provider Procedures Manual § 4.3.1, T EX . M EDICAID &
HEALTHCARE PARTNERSHIP (Aug. 2020), http://www.tmhp.com/Manuals_HTML1/
TMPPM/Current/index.html (click “Section 4: Client Eligibility” dropdown, then click “4.3
Restricted Medicaid Coverage” dropdown, then click “4.3.1 Emergency Only” hyperlink)
(specifying services covered).
116 Medical Assistance Eligibility Handbook § 322.31–.311, PA. DEP’T HUM. SERVS.,
http://services.dpw.state.pa.us/oimpolicymanuals/ma/Medical_Assistance_Handbook.htm
(last updated Oct. 5, 2018) (in left-hand sidebar, under “Contents,” click “322 Citizen
Noncitizen” dropdown, then click “322.3 Non-Citizen Status” dropdown, then click
“322.31_Qualified_Non-Citizens” hyperlink) (describing LPR eligibility for Medicaid after
completing the five-year bar). Because Pennsylvania has expanded Medicaid, the LPR in
this situation would qualify with a higher income, up to 138% of the FPL.
117 See, e.g., Medicaid for the Treatment of an Emergency Medical Condition
(“Emergency Medicaid”), N.Y.C. HUM. RESOURCES ADMIN., DEP’T SOC. SERVS. (2016),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ochia/downloads/pdf/fly-957-emergency-medicaid-english.pdf
(noting New Yorkers’ ability to pre-apply for Emergency Medicaid and obtain coverage for
twelve-month periods).
118 See, e.g. Texas Medicaid Provider Procedures Manual, supra note 115, § 4.3.1 (noting
that in Texas, “[c]ertification for emergency Medicaid occurs after the services have been
provided”).
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fall within the federal statutory definition. For example, only twelve
states and the District of Columbia characterize End Stage Kidney
Disease (ESKD) as an EMC.119 An estimated 6000 undocumented
noncitizens have ESKD.120 The standard treatment option for ESKD
is thrice-weekly dialysis or a kidney transplant.121 Emergency
Medicaid does not cover organ transplants or antirejection medications,122 but the states that have recognized ESKD as an EMC enable
Medicaid-ineligible noncitizens to receive routine dialysis rather than
wait until they are “in nearly critical condition” to obtain it on an
emergency basis.123 Studies have found that “[u]ndocumented immigrants with ESKD that rely on emergency-only hemodialysis describe
significant physical and psychosocial distress”; that they spend “tenfold more time in the hospital and less time in the outpatient setting
compared with those receiving standard hemodialysis”; and that their
mortality is fourteen times higher than those receiving the standard
treatment.124
It is fairly simple for a state to begin classifying ESKD as an
EMC. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the
Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) generally defer to state interpretations of the
term “EMC.”125 They have not contested state requests for reimbursement of dialysis treatment through Emergency Medicaid.126
Colorado’s Department of Health Care Policy and Financing recently
announced a policy change that will enable its residents with ESKD to
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119 See Lilia Cervantes, William Mundo & Neil R. Powe, The Status of Provision of
Standard Outpatient Dialysis for US Undocumented Immigrants with ESKD, 14 CLINICAL
J. AM. SOC’Y NEPHROLOGY 1258, 1259 (2019); see also Carolyn Crist, Scheduled Dialysis
for Undocumented Immigrants Saves Money and Lives, REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2018, 11:19
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-immigrants-dialysis/sched. . .is-forundocumented-immigrants-saves-money-and-lives-idUSKCN1OR17Z.
120 David Ansell, Kristen Pallok, Marieli D. Guzman, Marycarmen Flores & Jose
Oberholzer, Illinois Law Opens Door to Kidney Transplants for Undocumented
Immigrants, 34 HEALTH AFF. 781, 783 (2015).
121 Id. (transplant); Crist, supra note 119 (thrice-weekly dialysis).
122 Vanessa Grubbs, Undocumented Immigrants and Kidney Transplant: Costs and
Controversy, 33 HEALTH AFF. 332, 334 (2014) (noting that Emergency Medicaid does not
pay for transplants); Emergency Medical Coverage for Noncitizens, ILL. DEP’T OF HUM.
SERVS. (Mar. 21, 2003), https://www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=19608 (“Organ
transplants and related services, such as anti-rejection drugs are not covered under this
program.”); Medicaid for the Treatment of an Emergency Medical Condition Fact Sheet,
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/
emergency_medical_condition_faq.htm (last updated Dec. 2013).
123 See Cervantes et al., supra note 119, at 1258.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1259.
126 Id.
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obtain Emergency Medicaid coverage for routine dialysis.127 However, states need not pass a law or even submit a State Plan
Amendment in order to cover a broader range of conditions under
Emergency Medicaid.128 The state agency administering Medicaid
could simply begin interpreting the term EMC more broadly, so long
as the interpretation can be justified as reasonable under the federal
definition.
3.

Increasing Exclusion Under PRWORA

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (PRWORA) heralded a new era of restrictions on noncitizen eligibility for public benefits, and PRWORA is the framework
for the laws governing noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid today.129
Anti-poor and anti-immigrant animus collided in 1996 to impose dramatic restrictions on noncitizen eligibility for public benefits, including
Medicaid.130 PRWORA limited eligibility for federal public benefits
to citizens and “qualified aliens,” a term first used in the Act.131
Noncitizens who do not have statuses that fall within the definition of
“qualified alien” are generally ineligible for Medicaid.132 Undocumented noncitizens were already barred from Medicaid, but
PRWORA provided an opportunity for lawmakers to clarify the lim-
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127 See COLO. DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE POLICY & FIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS: EMERGENCY MEDICAID & END-STAGE RENAL DISEASE POLICY 1–3 (2019),
https://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/emergency_medical_condition_faq.htm.
128 See Eilis O’Neill, Transplants a Cheaper, Better Option for Undocumented
Immigrants with Kidney Failure, NPR (May 12, 2019, 5:09 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/
05/12/721800514/transplants-a-cheaper-better-option-for-undocumented-immigrants-withkidney-fail (describing how some states, like Washington, are “quietly expanding”
Emergency Medicaid coverage to include scheduled, rather than emergency-only, dialysis).
129 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. and 8 U.S.C.).
130 See Amanda Levinson, Immigrants and Welfare Use, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Aug.
1, 2002), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrants-and-welfare-use (noting that
“[a]pproximately 935,000 noncitizens lost benefits due to the passage of the [PRWORA]”
and “[a]t the time of PRWORA’s passage in 1996, immigrants represented 15 percent of all
welfare recipients in the U.S.,” but “[b]y 1999, that number dropped to 12 percent”).
131 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 401, 110 Stat. 2105, 2261–62 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
and 8 U.S.C. § 1611) (stating that only qualified noncitizens are eligible for federal public
benefits); id. § 431, 110 Stat. at 2274 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1641) (defining
“qualified alien”).
132 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2018). See Makhlouf, supra note 49, at 249–54, for an overview
of noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid.

42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 56 Side B

12/10/2020 14:19:35

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\95-6\NYU603.txt

1706

unknown

Seq: 27

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9-DEC-20

16:25

[Vol. 95:1680

ited scope of services eligible for reimbursement under Emergency
Medicaid.133
PRWORA created a new, lower federal “ceiling” of Medicaid eligibility for lawfully present noncitizens, who were hit the hardest by
its restrictions. Many previously eligible, lawfully present noncitizens
were barred from eligibility, and even qualified noncitizens faced a
new barrier to eligibility: the five-year bar. Qualified noncitizens are
generally barred from eligibility for federal public benefits for five
years,134 although individuals holding certain statuses are exempt
from this bar.135
TABLE 1. PRE- AND POST-PRWORA ELIGIBILITY OF SELECTED
CATEGORIES OF NONCITIZENS FOR MEDICAID136
Broad Categories of Noncitizens

Pre-PRWORA

Post-PRWORA

Lawful permanent residents (LPRs),
generally

Eligible.137

LPRs with 40 or more qualifying
work quarters are eligible.138
States have the option to provide to:
(1) LPRs with fewer than 40
qualifying work quarters who
arrived before August 22, 1996;139
and
(2) LPRs with fewer than 40
qualifying work quarters who
arrived on or after August 22, 1996,
and who have held LPR status for at
least 5 years.140
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133 Emergency Medicaid, discussed infra in Section I.B.2, was not affected by
PRWORA’s new restrictions. However, the PRWORA House conferees emphasized that
the types of services to be covered under Emergency Medicaid are very limited. H.R. REP.
NO. 104-725, at 380 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2768
(noting that “[t]he allowance for emergency medical services under Medicaid is very
narrow” and that “[t]he conferees intend[ed] that it only apply to medical care that is
strictly of an emergency nature, such as medical treatment administered in an emergency
room, critical care unit, or intensive care unit” and did not intend it to include or cover
“prenatal or delivery care assistance that is not strictly of an emergency nature”).
134 8 U.S.C. § 1613 (2018).
135 Id. § 1613(b) (listing categories of qualified noncitizens who are exempt from the
five-year bar).
136 Id. § 1612(b) (governing eligibility of qualified noncitizens for Medicaid).
137 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9406(a), 100 Stat.
1874, 2057 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1982)) (limiting participation in Medicaid to U.S.
citizens, LPRs, and PRUCOL noncitizens).
138 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(2)(B) (noting, however, that a quarter of work is not counted if it
occurred after 1996 and the noncitizen received a federal means-tested public benefit
during that period).
139 See id. § 1612(b)(1); see also id. § 1612(b)(2)(B) (requiring coverage of LPRs with
forty or more qualifying work quarters).
140 See id. § 1612(b)(1); see also id. § 1612(b)(2)(B); id. § 1613 (2010) (imposing fiveyear bar on qualified aliens who enter after enactment).
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Refugees and asylees (including Eligible.141
former refugees and asylees with
LPR status)
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Eligible for first 7 years; state option
after 7 years.142

Veterans and noncitizens on active
duty (a subgroup of LPRs)

Eligible.143

Eligible.144

Persons residing in the United States
under color of law (PRUCOL)

Eligible.145

Emergency Medicaid only.146

Lawfully present noncitizens in a Emergency
temporary status (e.g., tourists, Medicaid
students, temporary workers)
only.147

Emergency Medicaid only.148

Undocumented

Emergency Medicaid only.150

Emergency
Medicaid
only.149

16:25
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141 Refugees and asylees without LPR status were considered PRUCOL. See Boswell,
supra note 72, at 1488. Therefore, they were eligible under the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9406(a), 100 Stat. 1874, 2057 (amending
42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1982)).
142 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(2)(A)(i).
143 As LPRs, these individuals qualify under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9406(a), 100 Stat. 1874, 2057 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396b
(1982)).
144 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(2)(C).
145 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9406(a), 100 Stat.
1874, 2057 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1982)) (limiting participation in Medicaid to U.S.
citizens, LPRs, and PRUCOL noncitizens).
146 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1641(b) (1996) (defining qualified alien and not including a
category of PRUCOL noncitizens); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1611(b)(1)(A) (1996) (describing the
Emergency Medicaid exception from the restriction on eligibility for federal public benefits
for non-qualified aliens); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396b(v)(2)(A) (1996) (mechanism of
reimbursement).
147 Although the definition of “PRUCOL” is imprecise, people with temporary status do
not fit the definition of a “person . . . in the United States with the INS’s tacit, if not
explicit, permission to remain [permanently].” Boswell, supra note 72, at 1488. Rather,
they have explicit permission to remain temporarily. New York’s interpretation of
PRUCOL aligns with this understanding. See, e.g., Medicaid for Immigrants Who Are Not
Permanent Residents (Do Not Have “Green Cards”)— PRUCOL and Temporary NonImmigrant Eligibility, supra note 71 (stating that persons who entered with a temporary
visa and have not filed for permanent immigration status or relief are not considered
PRUCOL); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396b(v)(2)(A) (providing the mechanism of
reimbursement for emergency medical care).
148 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1641(b) (1996) (defining qualified alien to include LPRs, along with
other limited categories, but not including a general category of lawfully present
noncitizens who are not LPRs); id. § 1611(b)(1)(A) (describing the Emergency Medicaid
exception from the restriction on eligibility for federal public benefits for non-qualified
aliens); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396b(v)(2)(A). In 2009, however, Congress passed a law giving
states the option to cover lawfully residing children and/or pregnant women through
Medicaid. See infra Section I.B.4.
149 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9406(a), 100 Stat.
1874, 2057 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1982)) (limiting participation in Medicaid to U.S.
citizens, LPRs, and PRUCOL noncitizens).
150 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1641(b) (defining qualified alien to include, among others, LPRs
but not undocumented noncitizens); id. § 1611(b)(1)(A) (describing the Emergency
Medicaid exception from the restriction on eligibility for federal public benefits for nonqualified aliens); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396b(v)(2)(A).
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Section 402(b) of PRWORA created a federal “floor” of
Medicaid coverage by requiring states that participate in Medicaid to
include select categories of noncitizens. In general, these include:
• LPRs with 40 or more qualifying work quarters;151
• Qualified noncitizens with a military connection;152
• Certain humanitarian immigrants within seven years of
receiving such status;153
• Certain noncitizen American Indians;154 and
• Noncitizens receiving Medicaid based on Supplemental
Security Income.155
PRWORA did not create anything close to a uniform national
policy on noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid.156 It devolved
considerable authority to the states to restrict noncitizen eligibility for
Medicaid between the statutory floor and ceiling. States now had the
authority to make critical decisions about whether to impose
restrictions on various categories of noncitizens in Medicaid, including
qualified noncitizens.157 They were not merely incorporated into a
federal scheme; they were given broad discretion within the federal
scheme to create wide-ranging policies on noncitizen eligibility for
Medicaid. For example, states can expand or restrict eligibility for
Medicaid to LPRs who do not otherwise fall into one of the
mandatory noncitizen coverage groups.158 Another example is that
states can extend or bar Medicaid eligibility to humanitarian
immigrants after their first seven years in such status.159
As a result of this new discretion, shortly after PRWORA
became effective, Louisiana and Wyoming barred most LPRs from

12/10/2020 14:19:35

8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(2)(B) (2018).
Id. § 1612(b)(2)(C).
153 Id. § 1612(b)(2)(A)(i) (describing this group as “refugees and asylees”).
154 Id. § 1612(b)(2)(E).
155 Id. § 1612(b)(2)(F). Noncitizen eligibility for SSI is described in § 1612(a).
156 See generally WENDY ZIMMERMANN & KAREN C. TUMLIN, URBAN INST.,
PATCHWORK POLICIES: STATE ASSISTANCE FOR IMMIGRANTS UNDER WELFARE REFORM
(1999), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/69586/309007-PatchworkPolicies-State-Assistance-for-Immigrants-under-Welfare-Reform.PDF.
157 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b) (2018).
158 Id. § 1612(b)(1) (authorizing states to determine eligibility for qualified noncitizens);
id. § 1612(b)(2) (describing mandatory coverage categories); id. § 1641(b)(1) (defining
“qualified alien” to include LPRs). PRWORA does not permit states to extend Medicaid
eligibility to LPRs who arrived after PRWORA was enacted, who have not held qualified
status for at least five years, and who do not otherwise fall into one of the mandatory
noncitizen coverage groups. id. § 1613 (imposing five-year bar on public benefits eligibility
for qualified noncitizens who entered the United States after PRWORA was enacted).
159 See id. § 1612(b)(2)(A)(i) (listing time-limited exceptions to a state’s authority to
determine eligibility for Medicaid).
152
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Medicaid eligibility entirely.160 Currently, Wyoming and Texas have
the most restrictive noncitizen eligibility criteria for Medicaid, setting
eligibility at or near the federal floor of Medicaid coverage: LPRs who
entered the country on or after August 22, 1996—the date PRWORA
was enacted—are generally ineligible for Medicaid, even after
completing the five-year bar, unless they have credit for forty quarters
of work history in the United States.161 Wyoming went a step further
than Texas by excluding even those LPRs who entered the country
before August 22, 1996—that is, it went no higher than the federal
floor of Medicaid coverage.162
States were also authorized to impose restrictive criteria on
noncitizens that were previously unknown in the Medicaid program,
such as durational residency requirements and time limits.163 They
also had virtually free rein to impose alienage-based restrictions on
public benefits that are funded and administered solely by state
governments, subject only to a federally imposed floor that is even
lower than the floor for Medicaid described above and, in the case of
discrimination against LPRs, to equal protection principles.164

160

Wishnie, supra note 6, at 495 n.9.
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR IMMIGRANTS IN VARIOUS STATES, supra note
29, at 5. Both states have elected options to slightly expand Medicaid eligibility: Wyoming
has elected the option to expand Medicaid to lawfully residing pregnant women. Id. at 5.
Texas has elected to expand Medicaid and CHIP to lawfully residing children and is one of
the largest beneficiaries of reimbursement through the CHIP unborn child option, which
provides maternity care to pregnant people regardless of citizenship or immigration status.
Id.; Julia Belluz & Nina Martin, The Extraordinary Danger of Being Pregnant and
Uninsured in Texas, VOX (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2019/12/
6/20995227/women-health-care-maternal-mortality-insurance-texas (“CHIP Perinate [in
Texas] provides benefits to about 33,000 women a month, regardless of their immigration
status, up to 202 percent of the federal poverty level.”). Nevertheless, the limitations of the
program and barriers to access mean that “Texas [still] has the highest rate of uninsured
women of reproductive age in the country . . . . In some counties, mainly along the Mexico
border, that estimate approaches 40 percent.” Id.
162 See Table 6 Qualified Immigration Status – Wyoming Eligibility Online Manual,
WYO. DEP’T OF HEALTH (Mar. 1, 2016), https://sites.google.com/a/wyo.gov/ecom/tables/
table6 (last visited Aug. 25, 2020).
163 See Wishnie, supra note 6, at 495 n.9 (describing Connecticut’s six-month residency
requirement, Washington’s twelve-month residency requirement, and Indiana’s two-year
eligibility limit for Medicaid that applied to noncitizens only).
164 See 8 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (2018) (allowing states “to determine the eligibility for any
State public benefits” except as provided in § 1622(b)); id. § 1622(b) (providing exceptions
for, among others, certain noncitizens who are subject to withholding of deportation for
the first five years they hold such status, certain refugees and asylees for the first five years
they hold such status, LPRs with forty or more qualifying work quarters, and certain
veterans); infra Section III.A.
161
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4. State Options to Expand Coverage for Children and Pregnant
Women
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165 Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 1113, § 214, 123 Stat. 8, 56–57 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(v)(4)(A), 1397gg(e)(1)(N)
(2018)); see 2010 Letter from Cindy Mann, supra note 68, at 1; Medicaid and CHIP Income
Eligibility Limits for Children as a Percent of the Federal Poverty Level, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. (Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/medicaid-andchip-income-eligibility-limits-for-children-as-a-percent-of-the-federal-poverty-level
(showing that CHIP has a higher overall income threshold than Medicaid).
166 Legal Immigrant Children’s Health Improvement Act of 2007, S. 764, 110th Cong.
§ 2 (2007).
167 See supra Table 1.
168 See e.g., LEIGHTON KU, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, REDUCING
DISPARITIES IN HEALTH COVERAGE FOR LEGAL IMMIGRANT CHILDREN AND PREGNANT
WOMEN 3–4 (2007), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-20-07health2.pdf.
169 See id. at 2–3 (describing disparities in access to care faced by immigrant children
and suggesting that health insurance coverage can ameliorate these disparities).
170 See Mara Youdelman, Q&A on ICHIA: The Legal Immigrant Children’s Health
Improvement Act, NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM 3 (June 2013), https://healthlaw.org/
resource/q-a-the-legal-immigrant-childrens-health-improvement-act.
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In the years following PRWORA’s implementation, the
Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009
(CHIPRA) gave states the option to cover lawfully residing children
and/or pregnant women through Medicaid or CHIP, a program with a
higher overall income threshold than Medicaid.165 These are known as
the Immigrant Children’s Health Improvement Act (ICHIA) options
because they were initially proposed in a Senate bill by that name in
2007.166 The ICHIA options restored eligibility for federally funded
health coverage to a subset of noncitizens who had been eligible for
Medicaid pre-PRWORA: children and/or pregnant women who are
LPRs and subject to the five-year bar or who have a non-qualified
lawful status.167 The ICHIA options enjoyed broad, bipartisan support
from both houses of Congress, the National Governors Association,
and the National Conference of State Legislatures.168 Advocates for
the ICHIA options were motivated to address the disparity in health
coverage between citizen and noncitizen children caused by
PRWORA’s alienage restrictions, which was impacting noncitizen
children’s health as well as healthcare-system efficiency.169 Many
treatable conditions affecting children and pregnant women can be
addressed in a cost-effective manner through primary and preventive
care, which Medicaid and CHIP cover.170 Although the ICHIA
options were a positive development from a health policy perspective,
they contribute to the geographic variability of noncitizen access to
health coverage because not all states have elected them.
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In order to elect one or both ICHIA options, a state must submit
a state plan amendment under the Medicaid program or under the
Medicaid and CHIP programs to CMS.171 The state must specify
whether it is electing the option for pregnant women, for children, or
for both.172 States receive funding at an enhanced federal matching
rate for individuals served by CHIP or for CHIP-funded Medicaid
expansions, including noncitizens.173 Currently, the enhanced Federal
Medical Assistance Percentage (eFMAP) for CHIP ranges from
76.50% in Wyoming to 95.93% in Mississippi.174 States that have
elected the option to expand CHIP to lawfully residing pregnant
women receive funding at the Medicaid match rate.175 Federal
matching rates for Medicaid and CHIP are designed to induce and
enable states to expand their publicly funded health programs or
maintain them during recessions.176
As of January 2020, thirty-five states have adopted the ICHIA
option to expand Medicaid coverage to lawfully residing children, and
twenty-four of those states have also expanded CHIP to this population.177 In twenty states, lawfully residing children became eligible for
Medicaid and/or CHIP shortly after CHIPRA was enacted, between
171

2010 Letter from Cindy Mann, supra note 68, at 5.
Id.
173 See id. (noting that children eligible for Medicaid or CHIP under the CHIPRA
section 214 option are considered “targeted low-income children,” who are eligible for the
enhanced federal matching rate). However, because CHIP is a fixed block grant, a state
would not receive more funding at the eFMAP after electing the ICHIA option unless it is
not already using all its available federal CHIP funds or it is eligible for a shortfall funding
source. See id. at 8–9; see also Tricia Brooks, CHIP Funding Has Been Extended, What’s
Next for Children’s Health Coverage?, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Jan. 30, 2018), https://
www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180130.116879/full.
174 Enhanced Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) for CHIP, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., https://www.kff.org/state-category/medicaid-chip/chip (follow “Enhanced
Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) for CHIP” and navigate to “Map,”
ensuring that “FY 2021” is selected in the “Timeframe” dropdown menu) (last visited Oct.
15, 2020).
175 NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., FACTS ABOUT FEDERAL FUNDING FOR STATES TO
PROVIDE HEALTH COVERAGE TO IMMIGRANT CHILDREN AND PREGNANT WOMEN 5
(2010), https://www.medicaid.gov/sites/default/files/2020-01/facts-about-federal-fundingfor-states-to-provide-health-coverage-to-immigrant-children-and-pregnant-women.pdf.
176 See Genevieve Kenney & Victoria Lynch, Monitoring Children’s Health Insurance
Coverage Under CHIPRA Using Federal Surveys, in DATABASES FOR ESTIMATING
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR CHILDREN 66–67 (2010) (describing the role of
eFMAP in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and the ACA).
177 TRICIA BROOKS, LAUREN ROYGARDNER, SAMANTHA ARTIGA, OLIVIA PHAM &
RACHEL DOLAN, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID AND CHIP E LIGIBILITY,
ENROLLMENT, AND COST SHARING POLICIES AS OF JANUARY 2020: FINDINGS FROM A 50STATE SURVEY 37 tbl.2 (2020), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Medicaid-and-CHIPEligibility,-Enrollment-and-Cost-Sharing-Policies-as-of-January-2020.pdf.
172
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178 JENNIFER SULLIVAN, FAMILIES USA, EXPANDING COVERAGE FOR RECENT
IMMIGRANTS: CHIPRA GIVES STATES NEW OPTIONS 6–8 (2010), http://
research.policyarchive.org/96110.pdf.
179 See Paul Pierson, Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political
Processes, 14 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 72, 72–73 (2000).
180 Lawrence R. Jacobs & Timothy Callaghan, Why States Expand Medicaid: Party,
Resources, and History, 38 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 1023, 1038 (2013).
181 Id. at 1037; see also id. at 1038 (“[T]he policy trajectory of widening access may have
generated identities, interests, and resources that predispose states—in conjunction with
other factors—to support adoption of the [ACA’s] Medicaid expansion.”).
182 Pierson, supra note 179, at 74.
183 Id. at 75 (“[O]utcomes of early events or processes in the sequence are amplified,
while later events or processes are dampened. . . . [E]arly stages in a sequence can place
particular aspects of political systems onto distinct tracks, which are then reinforced
through time.”).
184 BROOKS ET AL., supra note 177, at 38 tbl.4.
185 See SULLIVAN, supra note 178, at 6–8 (noting that seventeen states adopted the
ICHIA option for lawfully residing pregnant women between 2009 and 2010).

42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 59 Side B

2009 and 2010.178 Political scientists have studied how temporal
sequences of events and processes can explain policy trajectories.179
For example, Jacobs and Callaghan have found that states’ past policy
decisions to expand access to Medicaid may have predisposed them to
adopt the ACA Medicaid expansion.180 The mechanism explaining
these policy outcomes is that established policies “generate both identities and groups that equate their interests with programmatic continuation and expansion and generate resources to mobilize
beneficiaries.”181 The term for this temporal process is “path dependence,” which, in the simplest terms, holds that “[i]nitial moves in a
particular direction encourage further movement along the same
path.”182 Early events or processes are more significant in influencing
the development of future policies than later events or processes.183
Although a full analysis of whether path dependence is at work in
states’ decisions to expand noncitizen eligibility would be beyond the
scope of this Article, I highlight some data points in this Section suggesting that this may be the case.
Fewer states have adopted the ICHIA option to expand Medicaid
or CHIP coverage to lawfully residing pregnant women than have
expanded coverage to lawfully residing children. Twenty-five states
have expanded Medicaid to lawfully residing pregnant women, and
three of those states (Colorado, New Jersey, and Virginia) have done
the same for CHIP coverage.184 The trend in state adoptions of this
option is similar to the pattern described for the ICHIA option for
lawfully residing children. Most of the states that have elected the
ICHIA option to expand Medicaid to lawfully residing pregnant
women adopted it soon after CHIPRA was enacted.185
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LEIGHTON KU & MARIELLEN JEWERS, MIGRATION POLICY INST., HEALTH CARE
IMMIGRANT FAMILIES: CURRENT POLICIES AND ISSUES 5 (2013), http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/COI-HealthCare.pdf (describing
states’ reactions to the ICHIA option to cover legal permanent resident pregnant women
following passage of CHIPRA).
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 See id. at 5–6.
190 Id. at 6.
191 See Charles Barrilleaux & Carlisle Rainey, The Politics of Need: Examining
Governors’ Decisions to Oppose the “Obamacare” Medicaid Expansion, 14 ST. POL. &
POL’Y Q. 437, 447–49 (2014) (analyzing empirical data to show that political considerations
had greater influence on state decisions to not adopt Medicaid expansion than
considerations of need and economics).
FOR
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Of the states that elected one or both ICHIA options shortly
after CHIPRA was enacted, many were already using state funds to
provide coverage to LPR children or pregnant women who were
excluded from Medicaid because of the five-year bar.186 For these
states, it should have been an easy decision to elect the ICHIA
options from the perspective of maximizing net resources, taking
advantage of the available federal matching funds to subsidize care for
these populations. A somewhat surprising finding, however, is that
several “very different and diverse states” that had not subsidized coverage of these populations using state funds elected to expand
Medicaid to lawfully residing noncitizen children under the ICHIA
option.187 These include Illinois, Iowa, Montana, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, and Washington.188 This suggests
that the infusion of federal funds via ICHIA made a difference in
states’ ability to expand coverage to this population. One might infer
that prior to ICHIA, they desired, but could not afford, to expand
coverage to lawfully residing noncitizen children. These decisions
were particularly noteworthy because they indicated the states’ willingness to commit funds to a Medicaid expansion for noncitizens
during a recession.189 These expansions may demonstrate that even
during an economic downturn, it is possible to obtain bipartisan support for efforts to fill healthcare coverage gaps.190
Another finding is that the eFMAP for CHIP that applies to the
ICHIA option for lawfully residing children has not generally induced
states to adopt it if they are ideologically or otherwise opposed to it,
much as political ideology has influenced some states to decline significant funding for expanding Medicaid under the ACA.191 Figure 1 is a
map of states depicting whether they have elected one, both, or
neither of the ICHIA options. Figure 2 displays the eFMAP for each
state. Notably, several states that would receive the “best deals” for
adopting the ICHIA child option have not done so. These include
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Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Oklahoma, Louisiana,
Michigan, Missouri, and Tennessee.
FIGURE 1. STATES THAT HAVE ELECTED ONE
ICHIA OPTIONS192

OR

BOTH

FIGURE 2. ENHANCED FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
PERCENTAGE (EFMAP) FOR CHIP, FY2021193
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BROOKS ET AL., supra note 177, at 13 fig.9.
Enhanced Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) for CHIP, supra note 174.
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Perhaps indicating the role of path dependence, all seven of the
jurisdictions that have created robust self-funded programs to provide
health coverage for low-income undocumented noncitizens and
DACA recipients (which are discussed in the next Section) were
among the earliest adopters of the ICHIA options.194 This may indicate a link between state decisions to expand Medicaid generally and
state decisions to elect noncitizen-specific expansion options.
Another option states can use to receive federal reimbursement
for providing pregnancy-related care regardless of citizenship or immigration status is the “unborn child option.”195 In states that have
elected this option, any person who is pregnant and otherwise qualifies for CHIP can receive subsidized, limited-scope coverage of prenatal care, labor, and delivery.196 From the time the federal
rulemaking for the unborn child option was announced, states understood it as a means to subsidize maternity care for undocumented
noncitizens.197 At least some agency staff, on the other hand, did not
seem to appreciate or did not want to acknowledge this use of the
option until after states began submitting claims for reimbursement of
services provided to pregnant undocumented noncitizens.198 This
oversight by the federal government betrays the “incidental”—as
opposed to intentional—nature of many federal policies relating to
noncitizen access to Medicaid.
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194 California, Washington, D.C., Massachusetts, New York, and Washington elected
both ICHIA options in 2009. SULLIVAN, supra note 178, at 6–7. Illinois and Oregon elected
the ICHIA child option only in 2009, but already covered prenatal care for excluded
noncitizens through the unborn child option. Id.
195 See State Children’s Health Insurance Program; Eligibility for Prenatal Care and
Other Health Services for Unborn Children, 67 Fed. Reg. 61,956, 61,974 (Oct. 2, 2002)
(codified at 42 C.F.R. § 457.10) (revising the definition of “child” to mean a person from
conception through age 19 for purposes of CHIP coverage). This revision was
controversial, not only because pro-choice advocates considered it to be a step toward
establishing legal personhood for fetuses, but also because it “put the unborn children of
undocumented women in competition with already born children for diminishing SCHIP
resources.” Patricia Gray, Unborn v. Undocumented: A Collision of Policy and Politics,
HEALTH L. PERSP., Jan. 2008, at 1, http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2008/
(PG)%20CHIP%20peri.pdf.
196 States have considerable flexibility to define pregnancy-related care and treatments
to prevent complications in pregnancy if they elect the option, but postpartum services
cannot be covered under the option because they are not provided to the child. 67 Fed.
Reg. at 61,969.
197 See Gray, supra note 195, at 1–2.
198 See id. at 2 (describing how CMS initially denied Louisiana’s claim for
reimbursement on the ground that “the federal enabling legislation does not authorize
service to undocumented residents”). HHS states that the unborn child option avoids
PRWORA’s prohibition on providing federal public benefits to certain noncitizens because
“an unborn child is not an alien, and the status of the child is not necessarily tied to the
status of the mother.” 67 Fed. Reg. at 61,966.
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As of January 2020, seventeen states have elected the CHIP
unborn child option to provide limited-scope coverage to pregnant
women, regardless of their citizenship or immigration status.199 In a
curious twist, conservative political ideology favors CHIP expansion
under the unborn child option: half of the states that have adopted it
are red states.200 It is possible that the option’s association with fetal
personhood has dissuaded more blue states from adopting it.201
Of the five states with the largest share of undocumented noncitizens, only California and Texas have elected this option.202 Indeed,
California and Texas are the largest beneficiaries of the unborn child
option, with nearly 116,000 and 96,000 enrolled, respectively, in
2016.203
Of the seventeen states that have adopted the unborn child
option, seven have also elected the ICHIA option for expansion of
full-scope Medicaid or CHIP coverage for lawfully residing pregnant
women: Arkansas, California, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Washington, and Wisconsin.204 Four are blue states (California,
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199 BROOKS ET AL., supra note 177, at 40 tbl.3. Some states may restrict benefits under
this option for certain income categories. See id. at 41–42.
200 This characterization is based on a state’s popular vote for the Democratic or
Republican presidential candidate in the 2016 presidential election. See, e.g., 2016
Presidential Election Results, 270TOWIN, https://www.270towin.com/maps/2016-actualelectoral-map (last updated July 20, 2017) (showing the winner of the popular vote in each
state for the 2016 presidential election). Support for this option is part of a conservative
strategy to consistently recognize unborn children as full human beings, with the goal of
overturning Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the decision whether or
not to seek an abortion falls within the constitutional right of privacy).
201 See, e.g., ELIZABETH RICH, NAT’L FAMILY PLANNING & REPROD. HEALTH ASS’N,
POLICY SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVING ACCESS TO COVERAGE FOR IMMIGRANTS 3 (2016),
https://www.nationalfamilyplanning.org/file/documents---policy-briefs/
ImmigrationReport.pdf (“Health equity advocates . . . oppose this policy because . . .
underlying the conferral of prenatal and maternity coverage is the notion that fetuses are
functionally awarded personhood status and therefore rights to health care through the
[unborn child option].”).
202 The states with the largest share of undocumented noncitizens in the population are
Nevada (7.2%), California (6.8%), Texas (6.7%), New Jersey (6.2%), and Arizona (6.0%).
PEW HISPANIC CTR., PEW RESEARCH CTR., UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION:
NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 15 tbl.5 (2011) [hereinafter 2010 UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS], https://www.pewresearch.org/
wp-content/uploads/sites/5/reports/133.pdf. California and Texas are also the only two of
the top five states with the largest share of undocumented noncitizens in the workforce to
have elected the unborn child option. The share is 9.7% in California and 9% in Texas. Id.
at 21 tbl.A1. The other states in the top five are Nevada (10%), New Jersey (8.6%), and
Arizona (7.4%). Id.
203 MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, FACT SHEET: STATE CHILDREN’S
HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM (CHIP) 16–17 tbl.5 (2018), http://www.macpac.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/State-Childrens-Health-Insurance-Program-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
204 BROOKS ET AL., supra note 177, at 40 tbl.3.
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Massachusetts, Minnesota, Washington), and three are red states
(Arkansas, Nebraska, Wisconsin).205
Although a detailed analysis of the states’ motivations for making
these choices is beyond the scope of this paper, the big picture seems
to indicate that states do not always choose to adopt policies that maximize health-system efficiency and equity, whether that is due to ideological, fiscal, or other reasons.206
5. Maintenance of Exclusions Under the ACA
In 2010, after lengthy debate and compromise, the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)207 transformed health law
and policy by moving the U.S. healthcare system closer to universal
coverage. A key provision of the ACA created a new, mandatory category of Medicaid eligibility for adults with incomes up to 138% of the
Federal Poverty Level (FPL).208 Until the passage of the ACA, states
were required to cover only those adults who met both financial and
categorical eligibility criteria. The latter criterion consisted of various
categories of “deserving poor,” which have historically included families with dependent children, people with disabilities, people who are
blind, and the elderly.209 The ACA’s attempt to create a new baseline
of Medicaid coverage for low-income adults was a major shift in the
law of publicly funded healthcare.210 However, a successful legal chal205

See 2016 Presidential Election Results, supra note 200.
See Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 180, at 1040 (finding that political party
orientation, economic circumstances, previous policy trajectories, and administrative
capacity influence states’ decisions to expand Medicaid under the ACA); Joshua MeyerGutbrod, Between National Polarization and Local Ideology: The Impact of Partisan
Competition on State Medicaid Expansion Decisions, 50 PUBLIUS 237, 238–39 (2019)
(describing the role of strong inter-party competition in mitigating partisan decisionmaking
among Republican-controlled states regarding Medicaid expansion under the ACA);
Jamila Michener, Race, Politics, and the Affordable Care Act, 45 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y &
L. 547, 551 (2020) (describing studies that found racialized politics played a role in states’
decisions to expand Medicaid under the ACA).
207 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and I.R.C.).
208 ACA § 2001(a)(1)(C); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2018). This is the
effective minimum income limit for Medicaid eligibility under the ACA expansion, taking
into account a standard income disregard of five percentage points of the federal poverty
level. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (establishing the 133% FPL income limit);
42 C.F.R. § 435.603(d)(4) (2019) (describing the 5% income disregard).
209 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1. Since the establishment of welfare medicine, Medicaid and its
precursors were benefits restricted to the “deserving poor,” what some commentators
describe as “poor plus.” See Nicole Huberfeld, NFIB v. Sebelius at 5, 12 U. ST. THOMAS
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 48, 51 (2017).
210 See Huberfeld, supra note 34, at 450 (“Considering that the welfare/deserving poor/
medical assistance connection dates to colonial America, this is a sea change.”); Super,
supra note 96, at 930 (suggesting that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion was the most decisive
move against the concept of the deserving poor in decades because it, “[a]part from
206
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lenge rendered the Medicaid expansion optional for states, foreclosing
a guarantee of near-universal coverage of low-income people through
Medicaid.211
Nevertheless, the ACA played a critical role in reducing the
national uninsured rate from 15.5% to a historic low of 8.6% in
2016.212 It also represented a remarkable expansion of the federal
government’s role in subsidizing health coverage for low- and middleincome people living in the United States. This occurred through two
main mechanisms: the aforementioned Medicaid expansion, the costs
of which are borne almost entirely by the federal government; and
new subsidies for income-qualifying consumers who purchase private
health insurance on the ACA Marketplaces.213
Despite its success with increasing access to health coverage, the
ACA maintained PRWORA’s framework of alienage restrictions for
Medicaid eligibility.214 The result is a nationally uniform policy of fed-
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undocumented immigrants, . . . recognizes all people’s need for health care—and on
surprisingly equal terms”).
211 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012) (holding that states
could not be penalized for failing to expand Medicaid). At the time of publication, the
number of states that have not expanded Medicaid is small and declining. See Alex Smith,
Missouri Voters Approve Medicaid Expansion Despite Resistance from Republican
Leaders, NPR: SHOTS (Aug. 5, 2020, 11:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/
2020/08/05/898899246/missouri-voters-approve-medicaid-expansion-despite-resistancefrom-republican-le (noting that thirty-eight states plus the District of Columbia had
expanded Medicaid as of August 2020). The states that have held out on expanding
Medicaid tend to be states with very high levels of uninsurance and large noncitizen
populations, e.g., Texas and Florida. JENNIFER TOLBERT, KENDAL ORGERA, NATALIE
SINGER & ANTHONY DAMICO, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KEY FACTS ABOUT THE
UNINSURED POPULATION 6, 14 tbl.A (2019), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-BriefKey-Facts-about-the-Uninsured-Population; see infra notes 231–32 and accompanying text.
212 MATT BROADDUS & AVIVA ARON-DINE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
UNINSURED RATE ROSE AGAIN IN 2019, FURTHER ERODING EARLIER PROGRESS 4 (2020),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/9-15-20health.pdf.
213 ACA § 1321, 124 Stat. at 186–87 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041); id. §§ 1401(a),
10105(a)–(c), 10108(h)(1), 124 Stat. at 213–19, 906, 914 (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 36B); Huberfeld, supra note 34, at 432, 450–51; see also Explaining Health Care Reform:
Questions About Health Insurance Subsidies, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 16, 2020),
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/explaining-health-care-reform-questionsabout-health (“The ACA offers subsidies to reduce monthly premiums and out-of-pocket
costs in an effort to expand access to affordable health insurance for moderate and lowincome people . . . .”).
214 Some lawfully present but non-qualified noncitizens benefited from eligibility for the
premium tax credits associated with health insurance purchases on the new ACA
Marketplaces. Theoretically, lawfully present immigrants would also benefit from
eligibility for Basic Health Programs (BHPs), established by ACA § 1331, 42 U.S.C.
§ 18051. BHPs are health plans for individuals who earn slightly too much to qualify for
Medicaid or who are lawfully present yet ineligible for Medicaid due to their immigration
status. STAN DORN, MATTHEW BUETTGENS & CAITLIN CARROLL, HEALTH POLICY CTR.,
URBAN INST., USING THE BASIC HEALTH PROGRAM TO MAKE COVERAGE MORE
AFFORDABLE TO LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS: A PROMISING APPROACH FOR MANY
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eral Medicaid exclusion for millions of noncitizens living in the United
States, including undocumented noncitizens, recipients of Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA),215 and a handful of others;
and a patchwork of state policies governing Medicaid eligibility for
lawfully present noncitizens. Although millions of people, many of
them low-income, remain uninsured for reasons unrelated to legal eligibility for subsidized health coverage,216 low-income noncitizens are
the only ones who are disqualified from Medicaid as a matter of law.
In short, the progressive reform to universalize Medicaid eligibility for
low-income people did not extend to noncitizens.
The ACA did expand access to subsidized health coverage for a
subset of noncitizens who are excluded from Medicaid through the
subsidies offered for health insurance purchased on the Marketplace.
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STATES 1 (2011), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/27596/412412-Usingthe-Basic-Health-Program-to-Make-Coverage-More-Affordable-to-Low-IncomeHouseholds-A-Promising-Approach-for-Many-States.PDF. However, only two states—
New York and Minnesota—have elected to establish Basic Health Programs. See, e.g.,
Basic Health Program, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/basic-health-program/
index.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2020); see also Michelle Andrews, Few States Use Health
Law Option for Low-Cost Plans, NPR: SHOTS (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:33 AM), https://
www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/02/02/465184081/few-states-use-health-law-optionfor-low-cost-plans (describing Basic Health Programs).
215 DACA is one category of deferred action, which is “a use of prosecutorial discretion
to defer removal action against an individual for a certain period of time.” Consideration of
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV.,
https://www.uscis.gov/archive/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last
visited Aug. 10, 2020). Although deferred action is not technically an immigration status, it
permits individuals who qualify to reside in the United States for a limited time period and,
in some cases, provides work authorization. Id. Most individuals with deferred action are
considered “lawfully present” in the United States and are therefore eligible for
Marketplace coverage. Immigrants: Coverage for Lawfully Present Immigrants,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/immigrants/lawfully-present-immigrants
(last visited Aug. 10, 2020) (stating that lawfully present noncitizens can purchase
insurance on the Health Insurance Marketplace); Immigrants: Immigration Status and the
Marketplace, supra note 66 (listing Deferred Action Status among noncitizens who qualify
to use the Marketplaces, and noting the exception for DACA recipients). DACA
recipients, however, were specifically excluded from eligibility for those programs as ACA
coverage was not deemed to fall within the intended scope of DACA status. See Fatma
Marouf, Alienage Classifications and the Denial of Health Care to Dreamers, 93 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1271, 1279–83 (2016). DACA recipients are effectively treated as undocumented
immigrants for purposes of eligibility for federally funded health coverage programs. See
Immigrants: Coverage for Lawfully Present Immigrants, supra (noting that only lawfully
present immigrants are eligible); Immigrants: Immigration Status and the Marketplace,
supra note 66 (excluding DACA as an immigration status eligible for coverage).
216 Munira Z. Gunja & Sara R. Collins, Who Are the Remaining Uninsured, and Why Do
They Lack Coverage?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Aug. 28, 2019), https://
www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2019/aug/who-are-remaininguninsured-and-why-do-they-lack-coverage (noting that despite the passage of the ACA,
many people remain uninsured, and uninsured working-age adults are disproportionately
low-income).
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Although the alienage criterion for Marketplace participation is complex, it is nationally uniform: only “lawfully present immigrants” are
eligible.217 Noncitizens who are considered lawfully present and
who earn income up to 400% of the FPL may benefit from the
Marketplace’s subsidies.218 However, consumers generally consider
Marketplace coverage to be inferior to Medicaid because of costsharing obligations, even if they are subsidized.219 Some participants
would qualify for premium-free “bronze” plans,220 but they would
then be responsible for paying a higher deductible for costs associated
with non-preventive care.221
Although some excluded noncitizens may be eligible for subsidized employer-sponsored insurance (ESI), it is unavailable or unaf217

See Immigrants: Coverage for Lawfully Present Immigrants, supra note 215.
I.R.C. 36B(c)(1)(A)–(B) (2018); Health Coverage of Immigrants, supra note 10. The
ACA provides that individuals with income between 100% and 400% of the FPL are
eligible for Marketplace subsidies. RACHEL GARFIELD, KENDAL ORGERA & ANTHONY
DAMICO, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE COVERAGE GAP: UNINSURED POOR ADULTS IN
STATES THAT DO NOT EXPAND MEDICAID 2 (2020), http://files.kff.org/attachment/IssueBrief-The-Coverage-Gap-Uninsured-Poor-Adults-in-States-that-Do-Not-ExpandMedicaid. It was presumed that individuals with income below 100% of the FPL would be
eligible for Medicaid instead because of the mandatory expansion. See id. at 1. Congress
realized, however, that some lawfully present noncitizens with income below 100% of the
FPL would be barred from Medicaid because of their immigration status, and specially
provided that such noncitizens could purchase subsidized Marketplace coverage. Sonya
Schwartz, A Step Forward for Lawfully Present Immigrants Living in Poverty, GEO. U.
HEALTH POL’Y INST.: CTR. FOR CHILD. & FAM. (Dec. 11, 2014), https://
ccf.georgetown.edu/2014/12/11/step-forward-covering-lawfully-present-immigrant-familiesliving-poverty. When NFIB v. Sebelius decentralized the Medicaid expansion decision and
some states chose not to expand Medicaid, it created a coverage gap for citizens and
noncitizens who qualify for Medicaid and whose income is below 100% of the FPL but
above the income limit for Medicaid in their state. GARFIELD ET AL., supra, at 1 (noting
that the median income limit for Medicaid eligibility in non-expansion states is 40%).
Oddly, this means that lawfully present noncitizens who live in non-expansion states, who
are ineligible for Medicaid, and whose income falls in this range are in a better position
than their citizen and Medicaid-eligible noncitizen counterparts: the former can purchase
subsidized Marketplace coverage and the latter cannot. See Schwartz, supra.
219 See Aaron E. Carroll & Austin Frakt, Don’t Assume that Private Insurance Is Better
than Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/upshot/
dont-assume-that-private-insurance-is-better-than-medicaid.html (describing a study that
found that “poorer and sicker people — exactly the kind more likely to be on Medicaid —
were slightly more likely to die” if they were enrolled in insurance that required cost
sharing than if they were enrolled in insurance without cost sharing).
220 Rachel Fehr, Cynthia Cox & Matthew Rae, How Many of the Uninsured Can
Purchase a Marketplace Plan for Free in 2020?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.kff.org/private-insurance/issue-brief/how-many-of-the-uninsured-canpurchase-a-marketplace-plan-for-free-in-2020.
221 See Explaining Health Care Reform: Questions About Health Insurance Subsidies,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/
explaining-health-care-reform-questions-about-health; Fehr et al., supra note 220.
218
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fordable to many.222 The federal government subsidizes the provision
of ESI through a tax exclusion for employer and employee contributions to health insurance premiums.223 Noncitizens who work for
employers that offer ESI are eligible to enroll on the same terms as
citizens.224 The federal government is effectively subsidizing health
insurance for these noncitizens through the federal tax exclusions on
payroll and income tax. Notably, this group includes DACA recipients, who are ineligible for both Medicaid and Marketplace insurance
because of their status.225 Other categories of lawfully present noncitizens whose ESI is subsidized through the tax exclusion may be
ineligible for Medicaid but eligible for subsidized Marketplace
coverage.226
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222 See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 10 (discussing low-income noncitizens’
limited access to ESI and, when it is offered, the challenge of affording it).
223 See Employee Benefits, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/
businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/employee-benefits (last updated Jan. 16, 2020)
(discussing tax exclusions for employer contributions); Topic No. 502 Medical and Dental
Expenses, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc502 (last
updated June 26, 2020) (discussing tax exclusions for employee contributions). Employer
contributions are not treated as wages, which are subject to payroll taxes. Tax Policy
Center Briefing Book: Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System: Taxes and Health Care, TAX
POL’Y CTR. (May 2020), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/briefing-book/
taxes_and_health_care_1.pdf (describing income tax exclusion for employee contributions
to health insurance premiums and estimating that the exclusion from income and payroll
taxes reduced government revenue by $273 billion in 2019).
224 However, noncitizens generally are more “often employed in low-wage jobs and
industries that are less likely to offer employer-sponsored coverage.” See, e.g., KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., supra note 10. Undocumented noncitizens—who may make up
approximately one quarter of the foreign-born population in the United States—are much
less likely than citizens to be offered ESI. ARTIGA & DIAZ, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that
undocumented noncitizens often work in low-wage positions that do not offer ESI); Abby
Budiman, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Aug. 20,
2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/17/key-findings-about-u-simmigrants (finding twenty-three percent of immigrants in 2017 to be “unauthorized”).
This may be because undocumented noncitizens lack work authorization and therefore
work “off the books.”
225 KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KEY FACTS ON INDIVIDUALS ELIGIBLE FOR THE
DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA) PROGRAM 2 (2018), http://
files.kff.org/attachment/Fact-Sheet-Key-Facts-on-Individuals-Eligible-for-the-DACAProgram (noting Medicaid and Marketplace ineligibility); Immigrants: Immigration Status
and the Marketplace, supra note 66 (noting Marketplace ineligibility).
226 These include, among others, temporary agricultural and non-agricultural workers,
temporary specialty occupation workers, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients and
applicants with employment authorization, asylum applicants with employment
authorization, Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) recipients, applicants for Special
Immigrant Juvenile Status, Deferred Action Status recipients (except DACA recipients),
applicants for adjustment to LPR status, and LPRs, depending on their state of residence.
Immigrants: Coverage for Lawfully Present Immigrants, supra note 215 (listing Medicaidqualifying immigration statutes); Immigrants: Immigration Status and the Marketplace,
supra note 66. Given that noncitizens are more likely to be low-income, they are less likely
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In addition to tax exclusions for employer health benefits, the
federal government may subsidize health coverage for certain noncitizens on the same terms it does for citizens, through other deductions or exclusions.227 These subsidies, while important, are unlikely to
benefit the population of focus in this Article, low-income noncitizens
who are excluded from Medicaid because of their immigration status,
because they are designed for people for whom purchasing health
insurance is an option.
C.

State-Funded Programs

12/10/2020 14:19:35

to take up ESI even when it is offered. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 10 (visually
depicting in Figure 5 how noncitizens are more likely to be low-income).
227 See ALISON SISKIN & ERIKA K. LUNDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43561,
TREATMENT OF NONCITIZENS UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 5 (2016); Tax Policy
Center Briefing Book: Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System: Taxes and Health Care, supra
note 223, at 5–6 (discussing various subsidies besides the exclusion for employer
contributions to health insurance).
228 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a), (d) (2018). These provisions should not be read to require that a
state legislature enact a statute to opt out of the prohibition on providing state and local
benefits to undocumented noncitizens. Rather, “any state enactment with the force of law
is [likely] sufficient to opt out of the federal prohibition.” David A. Super, Options for
State and Local Governments to Aid Low-Income Immigrants 5 (May 20, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). For a detailed analysis of the requirements
of section 1621(d), see id. at 3–8.
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This Section describes state-funded programs that are intended to
subsidize health coverage for noncitizens who are excluded from
Medicaid and/or premium tax credits associated with health insurance
purchases on the ACA Marketplaces. This group may include undocumented noncitizens, DACA recipients, and, in some cases, lawfully
present noncitizens who are otherwise excluded from Medicaid. As a
general rule, PRWORA maintained state discretion to expand noncitizen eligibility for state-funded public benefits. However, it created
an obstacle to enacting immigrant-inclusive policy in the form of two
interlocking provisions: (1) an express prohibition on most state- and
locally-funded benefits for certain non-qualified noncitizens, including
all undocumented noncitizens; and (2) a new requirement that states
desiring to provide undocumented noncitizens with otherwise prohibited state or local benefits must authorize such provision through state
law.228
Six states—California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York,
Oregon, and Washington—and Washington, D.C., have created programs to provide health coverage for all children who reside in the
jurisdiction regardless of immigration status, which includes otherwise
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excluded noncitizen children.229 Politically, all seven jurisdictions are
Democratic strongholds, and all have elected to expand Medicaid.230
Although five states—California, Florida, Texas, New York, and New
Jersey—are home to more than half of undocumented noncitizens
living in the United States, twenty-two states have at least one hundred thousand undocumented noncitizen residents.231 Of the five
states with the highest percentage of undocumented noncitizen
residents,232 only California has created a state-funded health coverage program for excluded noncitizens.233 Of the four states with the
highest share of undocumented noncitizens in the workplace,234 again,
only California is on this list.235 Using median household income as a
measure of wealth, all seven jurisdictions are in the top half.236
A review of state-funded health coverage programs for excluded
noncitizens reveals significant diversity in program design. One commonality is that the programs in all seven jurisdictions treat incomequalifying children as special, offering comprehensive health coverage
to this population.237 However, some states define that category as
people under age nineteen,238 and others as under age twenty-one.
Going one step further, California began covering income-qualifying
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229 ERICA WILLIAMS, ERIC FIGUEROA & WESLEY THARPE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, INCLUSIVE APPROACH TO IMMIGRANTS WHO ARE UNDOCUMENTED CAN
HELP FAMILIES AND STATES PROSPER 15–16 (2019) [hereinafter CBPP REPORT], https://
www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/8-21-19sfp.pdf.
230 See Jeffrey M. Jones, Democratic States Exceed Republican States by Four in 2018,
GALLUP (Feb. 22, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/247025/democratic-states-exceedrepublican-states-four-2018.aspx (classifying each state’s political party leaning and
strength of lean); Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (July 27, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-statemedicaid-expansion-decisions-interactive-map.
231 CBPP REPORT, supra note 229, at 3.
232 See 2010 UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS,
supra note 202, at 15 tbl.5 (identifying Nevada, California, Texas, New Jersey, and Arizona
as the five states with the largest share of unauthorized immigrants in their population).
233 Bobby Allyn, California Is 1st State to Offer Health Benefits to Adult Undocumented
Immigrants, NPR (July 10, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/10/740147546/californiafirst-state-to-offer-health-benefits-to-adult-undocumented-immigrants.
234 U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Population Estimates by State, 2016, PEW RES. CTR.
(Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/interactives/u-s-unauthorizedimmigrants-by-state (identifying Nevada, California, Texas, and New Jersey as the four
states with the largest share of unauthorized immigrants in their workforce).
235 Id.
236 See Historical Income Tables: Households, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, tbl.H-8 (Sept. 8,
2020), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historicalincome-households.html (setting out data in current dollars).
237 See MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR IMMIGRANTS IN VARIOUS STATES, supra
note 29, at 1–5.
238 See, e.g., About All Kids, ILL. DEP’T HEALTHCARE & FAM. SERVS., https://
www.illinois.gov/hfs/MedicalPrograms/AllKids/Pages/about.aspx (last visited July 18,
2020).
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young adults ages nineteen to twenty-six in 2020.239 Health and immigration advocates, along with California Governor Gavin Newsom,
see this expansion as an incremental step towards universal coverage
of California residents.240
The upper range of income eligibility for state programs varies
considerably, as do policies relating to cost sharing by enrollees. For
example, New York’s Child Health Plus program is available to all
children regardless of immigration status or income.241 There is no
cost sharing for households with income up to 160% FPL, and households with income up to 400% FPL have to pay a subsidized monthly
premium on an income-based sliding scale ranging from $9 to $60 per
child.242 Households with income at 400% FPL and above can still
receive coverage through the program at full cost.243 By contrast,
Washington’s Apple Health for Kids has an income limit of 317%
FPL.244 There is no cost sharing for households with income up to
215% FPL.245 For households with an income between 215% FPL and
265% FPL, the monthly premium is $20 per child with a $40 family

42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 65 Side B
12/10/2020 14:19:35

239 See S.B. 104, 2019-20 Reg. Sess., ch. 67 § 3 (Cal. 2019); see also Press Release,
California Dep’t of Healthcare Servs., DHCS Expands Medi-Cal Young-Adult Eligibility,
Restores Benefits, Adds Childhood-Trauma Screening in 2020 (Dec. 30, 2019), http://
www.dhcs.ca.gov/formsandpubs/publications/oc/Documents/2019/19-03-DHCSEXPANDS-YOUNG-ADULT-ELIGIBILITY.pdf (explaining that the coverage extension
was designed to mimic the ACA provision that permits young adults up to age twenty-six
to be covered by their parents’ private health insurance).
240 Sammy Caiola, Regardless of Immigration Status, All Low-Income Californians Up to
Age 26 Can Now Sign Up for Medi-Cal, CAPRADIO (Jan. 6, 2020), https://
www.capradio.org/articles/2020/01/06/regardless-of-immigration-status-all-low-incomecalifornians-up-to-age-26-can-now-sign-up-for-medi-cal; Sammy Caiola, Young
Undocumented Californians Cheer Promise of Health Benefits, NPR: SHOTS (July 11, 2019,
2:48 PM) [hereinafter Caiola, Promise of Health Benefits] https://www.npr.org/sections/
health-shots/2019/07/11/739536305/young-undocumented-californians-cheer-promise-ofhealth-benefits.
241 Child Health Plus, N.Y.C. OFF. OF CITYWIDE HEALTH INS. ACCESS, https://
www1.nyc.gov/site/ochia/coverage-care/child-health-plus.page (last visited Aug. 3, 2020).
242 N.Y.C. OFFICE OF CITYWIDE HEALTH INS. ACCESS, CHILD HEALTH PLUS YEARLY
INCOME ELIGIBILITY AND MONTHLY PREMIUMS (2020), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ochia/
downloads/pdf/child_health_plus.pdf. At each income level, there is a maximum monthly
premium for a household regardless of the number of children. For example, for
households with income from 160–222% FPL, the maximum monthly premium is $27 per
month, while it is $180 per month for a family with household income between 350–400%
FPL. Id.
243 Id.
244 Health Care Services and Supports – Children, WASH. ST. HEALTH AUTHORITY,
https://www.hca.wa.gov/health-care-services-supports/apple-health-medicaid-coverage/
children (last visited Aug. 19, 2020); see also Federal Poverty Level (FPL),
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/federal-poverty-level-fpl (last
visited Aug. 19, 2020).
245 Health Care Services and Supports – Children, supra note 244.
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maximum.246 For other households, the monthly premium is $30 per
child with a $60 family maximum.247
Another way in which it appears states and the District of
Columbia have sought to reduce costs is to limit adult eligibility for
programs based on the type of medical service needed. The DC
Healthcare Alliance, a locally funded program in Washington, D.C.,
covers basic primary and secondary services.248 The program does not
cover vision, mental/behavioral health, and substance abuse services;
non-emergency transportation services; long-term care longer than
thirty days; cosmetic surgery; open heart surgery; organ transplantation; and dental services costing more than $1000.249 New York,
California, Illinois, and Oregon all use state funds to cover prenatal
care for residents, regardless of citizenship or immigration status.250
Massachusetts provides comprehensive coverage for pregnant
residents with an income up to 200% FPL.251 Illinois’s program also
covers kidney transplants for people with end-stage renal disease,252
while California’s program also covers long-term care,253 dialysis,254
anti-rejection medication for organ transplant recipients,255 and breast
and cervical cancer treatment.256 It appears that these coverage limitations are a mechanism for states to conserve costs—in some cases, by
excluding coverage of elective or expensive services; in others, by
choosing to cover cost-effective services.
It is clear that there is no template for state-funded programs covering excluded noncitizens. Given the unique fiscal environment and
demographic composition of each state, along with the common fiscal
246

42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 66 Side A
12/10/2020 14:19:35

Id.
Id.
248 See Health Care Alliance, DC.GOV, https://dhcf.dc.gov/service/health-care-alliance
(last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
249 Id.
250 MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR IMMIGRANTS IN VARIOUS STATES, supra note
29, at 1–2, 4.
251 Id. at 3.
252 See Ansell et al., supra note 120, at 782, 785.
253 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 14007.2, 14.007.65 (West 2018).
254 See Eilis O’Neill, ‘It’s a Terrible Existence’: The Crisis of Emergency Dialysis Care for
Undocumented Immigrants, NATION (July 8, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/
archive/dialysis-health-immigration (noting that California “decided to define kidney
failure as a ‘permanent emergency’ covered by Medicaid, allowing all patients to qualify
for regular dialysis, paid for by state taxpayers”).
255 See WELF. & INST. § 14132.70; Letter No. 11-02 from Toby Douglas, Director, Cal.
Dep’t of Health Care Servs., to All County Welfare Directors, All County Administrative
Officers, All County Medi-Cal Program Specialists/Liaisons, All County Health
Executives, All County Mental Health Directors, at 2 (Feb. 1, 2011), https://
www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/medi-cal/eligibility/letters/Documents/c11-02.pdf.
256 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 104161-104163 (discussing California’s statefunded Breast and Cervical Cancer Treatment Program).
247
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constraint of a lack of federal funding, true experimentation in programs covering excluded noncitizens at the state level has been
thwarted. Likewise, no clear lessons have emerged from the last twoand-a-half decades of state policymaking on publicly funded health
coverage for noncitizens in general. States that want to expand coverage for health policy reasons are forced to ration limited resources,
experimenting with ever-narrower categories of eligibility. This patchwork of state policies on coverage and exclusion of noncitizens means
that for low-income noncitizens, the only certainty is that access to
healthcare is uncertain. What is inevitable, however, is the patchwork’s link with undesirable policy outcomes.

PROBLEMS

WITH THE

II
EXISTING PATCHWORK

OF

EXCLUSION

12/10/2020 14:19:35

257 2010 UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS,
supra note 202, at 15. It is also true that only a few states are home to the largest
concentrations of undocumented noncitizens. Id.
258 Id. (describing Georgia and North Carolina as new destination states); id. at 2
(noting a decline in the population of undocumented immigrants in Colorado, Florida,
New York, and Virginia).
259 Id. at 17 (“State patterns differ widely, but generally states with large numbers or
shares of unauthorized immigrants also have relatively large numbers or shares in the
workforce.”); cf. Rob Paral et al., Growing the Heartland: How Immigrants Offset
Population Decline and an Aging Workforce in Midwest Metropolitan Areas, CHI. COUNCIL
ON G LOBAL A FF . (June 2014), http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/
GrowingHeartland_June2014.pdf (noting that “[i]mmigrants play a key role in the Midwest
economy because the Midwest’s Baby Boomers are moving into retirement and the nativeborn population as a whole is aging,” whereas “[i]mmigrants are predominantly young
adults, and they help to fill precisely [these declining] age groups,” and asserting that
“thousands of immigrants from around the globe choose the Midwest as the place they
want to live”).
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All states have either already confronted or may soon confront
the reality that a meaningful percentage of state residents lack access
to affordable insurance because they are legally barred from eligibility
for federal subsidies because of their immigration status. Undocumented noncitizens live in every state.257 Demographic trends indicate
that certain states with historically low numbers of undocumented
noncitizens have become top destinations over the past decade, and
other states that were previously top destinations have become less
attractive.258 Shifts in immigration policy and labor needs have an
impact on where undocumented noncitizens settle, and settlement
patterns are likely to change over time.259
This Part provides a lens through which to understand how states
have exercised their options to restrict noncitizen eligibility for pub-
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licly funded coverage in a way that weakens national health policy. It
closes by examining the particularly salient, distortive role that racism
plays in skewing health policy away from its normative goals.
A.

Goals Versus Drivers of Health Policy

260
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See supra notes 134–70 and accompanying text.
See CBPP REPORT, supra note 229, at 2 (describing the benefits of expanding health
coverage to all children regardless of immigration status); Glen, supra note 46, at 221–24
(discussing the system-wide cost savings that could be achieved by extending health
coverage to unauthorized immigrants). Regarding state health policy’s effect on increasing
healthcare inequity between citizens and noncitizens, one study found that restrictive
alienage criteria in Medicaid had the biggest effect in states with the lowest levels of
immigrant population density. Ling Zhu & Ping Xu, The Politics of Welfare Exclusion:
Immigration and Disparity in Medicaid Coverage, 43 POL’Y STUD. J. 456, 457–58 (2015).
262 See supra Section I.C.
263 These states are California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and
Washington, as well as the District of Columbia. CBPP REPORT, supra note 229, at 15–16.
264 Parmet, supra note 6, at 234–35.
265 See discussion supra Sections I.B.3, I.B.4.
261
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In one sense, PRWORA entrenched a national program of immigration restrictionism in public benefits eligibility by limiting the availability of federal funds for noncitizen recipients of public benefits. In
another sense, PRWORA may be interpreted as an abdication of federal responsibility for making uniform federal policy on noncitizen eligibility for public benefits. In the current arrangement, states can
make policies on eligibility for Medicaid along a spectrum from universally inclusive to nearly exclusive of noncitizens.260
Aside from state adoptions of the federal ICHIA and unborn
child options, state policies relating to noncitizen access to health coverage have stagnated instead of responding to demographic changes
since 1996. Most states have failed to use health policy changes to
acknowledge the robust evidence indicating that inclusive approaches
can improve population health outcomes and community well-being,
reduce healthcare inequity, and benefit state and local economies in
the long term.261 Very few states have engaged in serious efforts to
address the health coverage needs of undocumented noncitizens.262
Predictably, the few states that have elected to use state funds to
expand coverage to undocumented noncitizens tend to fall on the progressive end of the political spectrum.263 They also tend to have a
more expansive view of the state’s responsibility for ensuring
residents’ access to health coverage, as demonstrated by their decisions to expand Medicaid under the ACA.264 A larger number—and a
more politically diverse collection—of states have chosen to take
advantage of federal matching funds by electing options to expand
Medicaid or CHIP to lawfully residing but excluded noncitizens.265 As
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described in Section I.B, even some states that would stand to benefit
in terms of population health and net resource maximization by
expanding coverage for noncitizens have chosen not to do so.
State decisions to restrict or expand eligibility for Medicaid are
influenced by several possible factors.266 Ideological polarization
undoubtedly plays an important role.267 Researchers have also found
that states’ economic circumstances, previous policy trajectories, and
institutional capacity to implement health policy can affect their decisions to expand Medicaid.268 In some states, political actors and the
electorate may favor restrictions on noncitizen eligibility that are
based on racism,269 nativism,270 and xenophobia.271 In others, economic or sovereignty-related concerns may be the dominant motivation for restrictive policy relating to noncitizens. Nevertheless, health
policies that exclude noncitizens based on the latter concerns are just
as effective in impeding the advancement of health policy as those
based on the former.272
Even if one were to assume that states are well-motivated to
advance health policy, there is considerable debate among academics
and policymakers over what makes “good” health policy.273 In the
decade since the passage of the ACA, however, certain frameworks
have influenced academic and high-level political discussions of the
goals of the U.S. health system. The Triple Aim framework, created
by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI), was designed to
guide improvement efforts at the level of the healthcare organization,
but it has been adapted for and integrated into national health-system
266
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Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 180.
See Meyer-Gutbrod, supra note 206 (describing how national partisanship interacts
with state politics to influence states’ decisions to expand Medicaid); Jacobs & Callaghan,
supra note 180, at 1031 (describing how the “bubbling cauldron of party vitriol” in which
the ACA was born spilled over into state implementation decisions).
268 Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 180, at 1031, 1033–40.
269 See Michener, supra note 206, at 551 (describing the racialized motivations of some
states’ decisions to not expand Medicaid under the ACA and the disproportionate impact
on people of color).
270 Nativism is defined as “the preference for native-born people of a given society.”
Lilia Fernandez, Nativism and Xenophobia, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GLOBAL HUMAN
MIGRATION 1, 1 (Immanuel Ness ed., 2013).
271 Xenophobia is defined as “the fear of foreigners or ‘others’ considered to be
outsiders based on racial, ethnic, or national origin or religion.” Id.
272 See id. (describing how “purportedly economic concerns” can mask nativist and
xenophobic policy); id. at 5 (describing how objections to illegal immigration are racially
charged because of the overrepresentation of certain ethnic or national origin groups
among the undocumented).
273 See Norman Daniels, The Ethics of Health Reform: Why We Should Care About Who
Is Missing Coverage, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1057, 1064 (2012) (counseling that any discussion of
how to allocate healthcare resources will involve reasonable disagreement based on
differing values).
267
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policy in the United States and other countries.274 The Triple Aim is
the simultaneous pursuit of “improving the individual experience of
care; improving the health of populations; and reducing the per capita
costs of care for populations.”275 More pithily, the Triple Aim is
“better care, better health, lower cost.”276
Two common adaptations of the Triple Aim for national healthsystem policy are to replace the aim of “lower cost” with “better
value” and include an additional aim of health equity.277 The first
adaptation reflects the understanding that while reducing overall costs
may be a worthwhile aim at the level of the healthcare provider, at the
national-health-system level, a plateau or even an increase in expenditures may be justified by improved health outcomes.278 To achieve
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274 Gustavo Mery, Shilpi Majumder, Adalsteinn Brown & Mark J. Dobrow, What Do
We Mean When We Talk About the Triple Aim? A Systematic Review of Evolving
Definitions and Adaptations of the Framework at the Health System Level, 121 HEALTH
POL’Y 629, 629–30 (2017) (“Despite numerous references by [IHI] about the implications
of pursuing the Triple Aim for the healthcare system, the framework was proposed as the
strategic organizing principle to guide improvement initiatives at the organization or local
community level.”); John W. Whittington, Kevin Nolan, Ninon Lewis & Trissa Torres,
Pursuing the Triple Aim: The First 7 Years, 93 MILBANK Q. 263, 297 (2015) (“The concept
of the Triple Aim is now widely used, both in the United States, where it has become a
national model for implementing health care, and around the world.”). The Triple Aim was
incorporated into the U.S. National Quality Strategy. See About the National Quality
Strategy, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, https://www.ahrq.gov/
workingforquality/about/index.html (last updated Mar. 2017) (describing the Strategy as
building on the IHI’s Triple Aim); Maria Castellucci, Quality Experts Call for HHS to
Revive the National Quality Strategy 10 Years After ACA, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Mar. 9,
2020, 1:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/safety-quality/quality-experts-callhhs-revive-national-quality-strategy-10-years-after-aca (stating that the “Strategy’s main
objective was to achieve the Triple Aim: better care, healthier communities and lower
costs”). The National Strategy has three similar aims: better care, healthy people/healthy
communities, and affordable care. About the National Quality Strategy, supra; see also
Mery et al., supra, at 634 (noting the similarity between the National Strategy and the
Triple Aim and summarizing its goal as “to provide better, more affordable care for
individuals and the community”). However, the Triple Aim’s creators made clear that it
does not necessarily address all of the goals of a national healthcare system. Id. at 630.
275 Donald M. Berwick, Thomas W. Nolan & John Whittington, The Triple Aim: Care,
Health, and Cost, 27 HEALTH AFF. 759, 760 (2008).
276 Donald M. Berwick, And We Said, “No,” in PROMISING CARE: HOW WE CAN
RESCUE HEALTH CARE BY IMPROVING IT 249, 262 (2013).
277 Mery et al., supra note 274, at 633. But see id. (noting that “replacing [‘lower cost’]
with ‘better value’ presents a problematic redundancy in the framework” because “[t]he
Triple Aim is inherently a ‘value’ framework”).
278 See, e.g., Elizabeth H. Bradley & Amanda Brewster, Untangling the Relationship
Between Social Service and Health Care Spending and Health Outcomes, HEALTH AFF.:
BLOG (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20191112.848045/full/
?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=COVID-19%3A+Prenatal+
Care+And=Delivery%2C+Pricing+Vaccines+And+Therapeutics%3B+Improving+
Birth+Outcomes+And+Lowering+Costs+For+Women+On+Medicaid&utm_campaign=
HAT+6-23-20 (suggesting that increased investment in social services may improve health
outcomes but will not necessarily lead to a reduction in overall healthcare costs).
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better value in a national health system is to become more costeffective from a societal perspective.279 This means “achieving the
best outcome at the lowest cost.”280 When all three aims are pursued
simultaneously, the Triple Aim can itself be understood as a proxy for
cost-effectiveness: the value of a particular reform is measured by its
benefits of better health and better care divided by its cost.281
Regarding the second adaptation, health equity may be defined
as a state in which “everyone . . . [has] a fair opportunity to attain their
full health potential.”282 It requires eliminating health inequities,
which are “differences in health that are not only unnecessary and
avoidable, but in addition, are considered unfair and unjust.”283 A
related concept, healthcare equity, calls for the elimination of barriers
to healthcare access that cause or exacerbate health inequities.284
Healthcare equity may be defined as “equal access to available care
for equal need, equal utilization for equal need, equal quality of care
for all.”285 Equity in access to high-quality healthcare is essential to
achieving health equity.286
These definitions make it clear that equity is a matter of ethics
and values.287 Although the concept of equity is related to equality, it
is not identical.288 Healthcare equity does not necessarily require that
every person has equally unfettered access to healthcare for every
health-related need.289 Rather, it “requires that patients who are alike
in relevant respects be treated in like fashion and that patients who
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279 See, e.g., Joel Tsevat & Christopher Moriates, Value-Based Health Care Meets CostEffectiveness Analysis, 169 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 329, 329 (2018) (explaining that costeffective analysis “considers costs and benefits from the societal or healthcare sector
perspective” in order to assess value).
280 Kevin Fiscella, Confronting the Post-ACA American Health Crisis: Designing Health
Care for Value and Equity, 42 J. AMBULATORY CARE MGMT. 202, 204 (2019).
281 Mery et al., supra note 274, at 633.
282 Margaret Whitehead, The Concepts and Principles of Equity and Health, 22 INT’L J.
HEALTH SERVS. 429, 433 (1992).
283 Id.
284 Id. at 434–36.
285 Id. at 434. This definition aligns with the healthcare profession’s ethical norm of the
“principle of need,” which holds that a provider should respond to a patient’s need based
on sound medical judgment and without regard to any other consideration. See Makhlouf,
supra note 49, at 295–97 (discussing healthcare professionals’ ethical obligations to
noncitizens guided by the principle of need).
286 Geoffrey W. Wilkinson et al., No Equity, No Triple Aim: Strategic Proposals to
Advance Health Equity in a Volatile Policy Environment, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S223,
S223–24 (2017) (“To achieve health equity and improve the overall health of the
population, it is necessary to . . . ensure medical security to all US residents through
universal access to affordable, high-quality health care.”).
287 Culyer, supra note 22, at 275.
288 Id. at 276.
289 Id. at 280.
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are unlike in relevant respects be treated in appropriately unlike
fashion.”290 These are the concepts, described earlier, of horizontal
and vertical equity. If there is a relevant characteristic that makes
unlike treatment of two people appropriate, such treatment may be
considered equitable.291 Since healthcare equity is considered pluralist—or informed by many, sometimes overlapping values—a determination of what is equitable must balance these elements and
minimize or reject those that contradict strongly held principles.292
Several scholars have identified equity as an implicit element of
the Triple Aim,293 and in 2016, the IHI described equity as “not a
fourth aim, but rather an element of all three components of the
Triple Aim.”294 In other words, pursuing health equity reinforces the
aims of improving health, cost-effectiveness, and quality. Because
access to healthcare is an important determinant of health, and health
coverage is the means of ensuring financial access to healthcare, it follows that pursuing healthcare equity also reinforces the Triple Aim.
Based on the principles that guided the last health reform and
that are still used by federal healthcare agencies,295 I identify two
overarching goals of national health reform in the post-ACA era:
equity and cost-effectiveness.296 These goals should influence decisions about noncitizen eligibility for publicly funded health coverage
in a universal system, regardless of the financing structure that is
adopted. Cost-effectiveness as a principle of national health policy
asks if the benefits of a particular reform are worth the cost. The question reveals that cost-effectiveness, like other principles that purport
to be objective (such as “efficiency” or “utility maximization”), in fact

12/10/2020 14:19:35

Id. at 276.
Id.
292 Id.
293 See, e.g., Fiscella, supra note 280, at 204 (“Equity is presumed but not explicitly
called out.”); Mery et al., supra note 274, at 634 (“[I]t can be argued that the aim of ‘equity’
may be implicit in the Triple Aim’s ‘better population health’ . . . .”); Wilkinson et al., supra
note 286, at S224 (“Ultimately, population health goals cannot be achieved without a focus
on equity.”); id. at S227 (describing health equity as “the guiding framework for achieving
the Triple Aim”).
294 RONALD WYATT, MARA LADERMAN, LAURA BOTWINICK, KEDAR MATE & JOHN
WHITTINGTON, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, ACHIEVING HEALTH EQUITY: A
GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 5 (2016).
295 See Castellucci, supra note 274 (indicating that the priorities of the National Quality
Strategy still guide the work of both AHRQ and CMS, as well as the healthcare industry as
a whole).
296 Fiscella proposes a similar Dual Aim of “value (outcomes and processes desired by
patients relative to costs) and equity (optimal outcomes and process regardless of
disadvantaged status).” Fiscella, supra note 280, at 204.
291
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rests on value judgments.297 What counts as cost-effective depends on
what one values.298 This is where equity comes in, and where the next
Section begins: equity supplies the baseline for determining what
counts as cost-effective.299
B. Equity
A growing number of health law scholars now identify equity as
the normative foundation of health law scholarship and healthcare
regulation.300 Professor Lindsay F. Wiley’s Health Justice model is a
conceptual framework for understanding these changes and has generated a significant body of scholarship.301 Health Justice conceives of
health law as a vehicle for social justice and identifies a shift in the
way that health insurance is regulated post-ACA: from a system based
on protecting individual interests toward one based on protecting collective interests.302

42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 69 Side B
12/10/2020 14:19:35

297 See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, A Tale of Two Formalisms: How Law and
Economics Mirrors Originalism and Textualism, 106 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 5) (“[T]he very idea of efficiency is empty without a highly contestable set
of value judgments.”); Guido Calabresi, An Exchange About Law and Economics: A Letter
to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553, 558–59 (1980) (discussing wealth
maximization in light of other values such as wealth distribution and justice); Jules L.
Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 510–12
(questioning the value of the wealth maximization principle both in general and in legal
theory).
298 See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 297 (manuscript at 14) (“[W]here one starts as a
baseline determines what counts as efficient and inefficient.”).
299 With this framing, I am attempting to avoid engaging in what Buchanan and Dorf
term “the equity/efficiency debate,” in which scholars on both sides tacitly accept the
coherence and objectivity of the term “efficiency.” Id. (manuscript at 9). In the health
systems literature, efficiency and cost-effectiveness are closely related concepts. See
Ranjeeta Thomas & Kalipso Chalkidou, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, in HEALTH SYSTEM
EFFICIENCY: HOW TO MAKE MEASUREMENT MATTER FOR POLICY AND MANAGEMENT
115 (Jonathan Cylus et al. eds., 2016) (discussing the use of cost-effectiveness analysis to
achieve health-system efficiency). I do not argue that concern for equity should outweigh
concern for efficiency, but that concern for equity should inform our understanding of
efficiency.
300 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
301 Wiley, supra note 21; see, e.g., ELIZABETH TOBIN-TYLER & JOEL B. TEITELBAUM,
ESSENTIALS OF HEALTH JUSTICE: A PRIMER, at x (2019) (contextualizing the concept of
health justice in the United States); Makhlouf, supra note 49, at 285 (explaining how the
Health Justice model is grounded in a communitarian conception of social justice); Emily
A. Benfer, Health Justice: A Framework (and Call to Action) for the Elimination of Health
Inequity and Social Injustice, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 277–78 (2015); Lindsay F. Wiley,
From Patient Rights to Health Justice: Securing the Public’s Interest in Affordable, HighQuality Health Care, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 833, 838 (2016) [hereinafter Wiley, Patient
Rights] (describing how a new health justice model could transform healthcare); Lindsay F.
Wiley, Applying the Health Justice Framework to Diabetes as a Community-Managed Social
Phenomenon, 16 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 191 (2016) [hereinafter Wiley, Applying the
Health Justice Framework to Diabetes].
302 Wiley, Patient Rights, supra note 301, at 859.
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A society’s willingness to tolerate health and healthcare inequities will depend to some extent on its time- and context-bound judgment of what is unfair.303 As a result, the strength of the health equity
norm’s influence on health policy is also time- and context-bound.
Post-ACA, a growing number of Americans recognize the benefits of
a collective approach, facilitated by the government, to meet healthcare needs.304
Equity in healthcare is the principle behind efforts to achieve universal health coverage.305 This is evident from health reform’s overwhelming focus on regulation of health insurance, “the financial and
pragmatic point of access to care for most people.”306 The goal of the
ACA was to make access to healthcare more equitable by expanding
eligibility for Medicaid and by creating new programs to reach a larger
portion of the nation’s uninsured.307 With respect to the Medicaid
expansion, Congress attempted to mandate that state Medicaid programs add a category of eligibility for people who were not traditionally considered “deserving poor.”308 Previously, Medicaid was
available to low-income children, pregnant women, caretakers of
dependent children, and people with disabilities.309 The ACA
expanded Medicaid to include non-elderly, non-pregnant adults with
income up to 138% of the FPL.310
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303 Whitehead, supra note 282, at 433; Culyer, supra note 22, at 275 (“[A]ny idea of
‘equity’ must embody value judgments about what it is that makes for a good society.”).
304 Healthcare System, GALLUP HISTORICAL TRENDS, https://news.gallup.com/poll/4708/
healthcare-system.aspx (last visited July 26, 2020) (indicating that 42% of respondents
preferred a government-run healthcare system in November 2019, compared with 34% of
respondents with the same preference in November 2010).
305 See Daniels, supra note 273, at 1058 (stating that the focus of the ACA was the
question “[w]hy should we care about who is missing coverage?”).
306 McCuskey, supra note 21, at 312. While financial access to healthcare is necessary to
ensure equity in healthcare, it is insufficient alone. See, e.g., Whitehead, supra note 282, at
440 (stating that equity in healthcare “means actively promoting policies in the health
sector to enhance access to and control quality of care, rather than assuming that a
universal service provided by law is equitable in practice”). Other barriers to access and
overall quality of care must also be addressed. See id. at 436–37 (noting that “[b]ecause
most of the present inequities in health are determined by living and working conditions,
attempts to reduce them need to focus on these root causes, with the aim of preventing
problems developing” and suggesting that “[t]his is potentially a more efficient approach
than relying solely on the healthcare sector to patch up the ill-health and disability such
inequities create”).
307 Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 180, at 1024.
308 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) § 2001(a)(1)(C) (2010); 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(i)(VIII).
309 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a).
310 The pre-ACA eligibility categories remain as the statutorily mandated categories
that determine the financial criteria for eligibility—i.e., individuals with income up to
138% of the FPL floor. For example, the minimum income threshold for the category of
“pregnant women” ranges, depending on the state, from 133% to 185% of the FPL.
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Millions of people living in the United States gained access to
health insurance by qualifying for the Medicaid expansion category,
which does not depend on notions of “deservingness” that are unrelated to financial need. This success, shared by multiple constituencies
with differing interests, was built on the understanding that all humans
are vulnerable to illness and the financial devastation that can result
from efforts to combat illness.311 However, as discussed supra, the
Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius hindered this goal by
making Medicaid expansion optional for states.312 Because some
states have chosen not to expand Medicaid, there is extreme geographic variability in Medicaid eligibility across the country even for
citizens (and noncitizens whose immigration status does not bar them
from eligibility).313 A 2015 study estimated that 3.1 million citizens
and noncitizens who would have been eligible for Medicaid had the
mandatory expansion provision survived are excluded because they
live in states that have opted not to expand Medicaid.314 Therefore,
the ACA’s aim of ensuring equitable access to health coverage for
low-income citizens and eligible noncitizens is still incomplete.
Similarly, because the ACA did not modify the federal framework governing noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid,315 states continue
to wield broad authority to craft alienage restrictions, producing horizontal inequity in access to health coverage for low-income non-
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MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS AND STATE
OPTIONS: ELIGIBILITY 5 tbl.1, 14 n.2 (2017), http://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2017/03/Federal-Requirements-and-State-Options-Eligibility.pdf.
311 See, e.g., Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care Spending and Financial Security After the
Affordable Care Act, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1483 (2014) (“[The ACA] attempted to ensure
that Americans would have adequate health insurance, in part to reduce these threats to
financial security.”); Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J.
HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 287, 290 (1993) (“The politics of health insurance can only be
understood as a struggle over the meaning of sickness and whether it should be a condition
that automatically generates mutual assistance.”).
312 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
313 Historically, federal legislation and policymaking have served as the driving force
behind equity reforms in healthcare. See McCuskey, supra note 21, at 311–12 (citing
DAWES, supra note 21, at 10–90). Only a few states have dabbled in cutting-edge
policymaking to promote health equity. See id. at 312 (noting few states use health
insurance regulation to promote health equity). This pattern aligns with the historical
trends in other equity-based reforms, such as the civil rights movement. See Heather K.
Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695, 1708–09 (2017) (describing how the Civil
Rights Era shaped federalism theory’s assumptions about the roles of states and localities
versus the federal government); id. at 1709 (“It is precisely to combat the evils of
decentralization that equality scholars emphasize the need for nationally enforced
constitutional rights in the first place.”).
314 See Tiffany D. Joseph, Still Left Out: Healthcare Stratification Under the Affordable
Care Act, 43 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 2089, 2096 (2017).
315 See Daniels, supra note 273, at 1065–66 (questioning whether it was fair for the ACA
to “leave[] out many immigrants and undocumented individuals”).
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citizens and vertical inequity between noncitizens and citizens.316
Horizontal inequity occurs among noncitizens when noncitizen
residents of different states with the same medical needs do not have
the same access to health coverage. Vertical inequity occurs when
noncitizen residents with great healthcare needs have less access than
citizens with lesser needs.317 On account of this arrangement, each
state has a unique set of alienage restrictions for the unique set of
programs it offers.
As an illustration of horizontal inequity among noncitizens, consider the difference between the types of noncitizens who fall within
the category of excluded noncitizens in Texas versus in California—
i.e., those who do not qualify for Medicaid or a comparable statefunded program.
TABLE 2. NONCITIZEN ELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICAID OR
COMPARABLE STATE-FUNDED COVERAGE IN CALIFORNIA
AND TEXAS
California
Ineligible

Texas318

Undocumented immigrants over 26 Everyone not listed in the box below.
years of age.319
Nonimmigrant visa holders age 21 and
over who are not pregnant and not
considered to be permanently residing
in the U.S. under color of law
(PRUCOL).320 Examples may include
noncitizens with tourist visas and
student visas.
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316 States’ decisions to restrict noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid under PRWORA
entrenched healthcare inequities between citizens and noncitizens. A notable exception is
Massachusetts, which has provided some form of subsidized health coverage to all
noncitizen residents since it reformed its state healthcare in 2006. See Joseph, supra note
314, at 2097–98. By leaving states in charge of policymaking on noncitizen access to
publicly funded health coverage, the ACA further entrenched the existing healthcare
inequities.
317 See, e.g., Culyer, supra note 22, at 276–77 (defining horizontal and vertical equity in
general terms and in relation to health, healthcare needs, and financial contributions to
healthcare); Starfield, supra note 24, at 1 (summarizing the concept of equity in access to
healthcare resources, including its horizontal and vertical dimensions).
318 Texas Works Handbook: A-300, Citizenship: A-342 TANF and Medical Programs
Alien Status Eligibility Charts: Chart C, supra note 114.
319 S. 104, 2019-20 Reg. Sess. § 3 (Cal. 2019).
320 PRUCOL noncitizens are eligible for Medi-Cal, California’s Medicaid program.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 50301 (2020). For an explanation of the term “PRUCOL,” see
discussion supra Section I.A.
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Noncitizens who received SSI,
Medicaid, or both on August 22, 1996,
and lawfully resided in the United
States on or before that date;
LPRs with 40 or more qualifying work
quarters or a military connection;
Certain humanitarian immigrants;
Non-citizen cross-border American
Indians; and
Lawfully residing children ages 18 and
under.

12/10/2020 14:19:35

321 This scenario draws on the clinical profile of a patient described in a narrative by
physician Cheryl Bettigole. Cheryl Bettigole, An Uninsured Immigrant Delays Needed
Care, 34 HEALTH AFF. 2192, 2192 (2015) (detailing a physician’s first-hand experience with
an uninsured immigrant who avoided care).
322 See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 225 (noting that DACA recipients are
ineligible for Medicaid); supra Section I.C.
323 Bettigole, supra note 321, at 2193 (“Stage 4 renal cell carcinoma is a diagnosis I’ve
never seen before or since.”).
324 See Culyer, supra note 22, at 276 (noting equity in healthcare necessitates similar
patients be treated in a similar fashion).
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As an illustration of vertical inequity between low-income
citizens and noncitizens—and an example of the distinctive health
harms that uninsured noncitizens face—consider the following
scenario: Jasmine is a 36-year-old DACA recipient whose parents
brought her to live in the United States when she was one year old.
She works as a caregiver for a family with four children.
Approximately one year ago, Jasmine began feeling pain in her side
and rapidly losing weight.321 She delayed seeking care due to the
expense. She does not have health insurance and is ineligible for
Medicaid because DACA recipients are beyond the ceiling of
federally-funded Medicaid coverage and she does not live in a state
that funds coverage for noncitizens who are excluded from
Medicaid.322 When the pain became debilitating, Jasmine sought care
at an FQHC, but the next available appointment was several months
later. After her examination, Jasmine learned that she has Stage 4
renal cell carcinoma—a rare and terminal diagnosis because this
condition is typically detected at an earlier stage.323 This scenario is
certainly tragic, but it would be considered inequitable only if it is
deemed unfair to treat Jasmine—a long-residing noncitizen—
differently from a citizen with regard to Medicaid eligibility.
Alienage restrictions in public benefits laws use citizenship as a
proxy for community membership. The goal of healthcare equity is
the equitable distribution of health in the community (however that
community is defined).324 Health enables members of the community
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to flourish; therefore, the subjects of healthcare equity are those who
the community believes have an equal right to flourish.325
In a prior Article, I argued that noncitizens’ interests should be
considered in health law and policy efforts to improve health and
healthcare equity. Drawing on the Health Justice model’s foundation
in the social philosophy of responsive communitarianism, I identified
broadly shared norms about the embeddedness of noncitizens in the
healthcare sphere and in the broader community.326 For example, they
are embedded in American society as neighbors, schoolmates, and
colleagues at work. They live with and among U.S. citizens and
contribute to the common good by paying taxes and supporting local
and state economies.327 They play important roles in the healthcare
and caregiving workforces.328 I also demonstrated how ethical norms
within healthcare—namely, the principle of need and the concept of
mutual aid—support inclusion of noncitizens in publicly funded
healthcare programs.329
The patchwork of noncitizen exclusion from Medicaid, which is
enabled by PRWORA’s alienage restrictions, weakens national health
policy by running counter to the larger trend of embracing health
equity as the normative foundation of health policy. Alienage is a
crude and imperfect proxy for community membership, which is what
matters when it comes to health and healthcare equity. Therefore, any
examination of social equity should consider the relative position of
325

Id. at 276.
Makhlouf, supra note 49, at 287–95.
327 See, e.g., Gretchen Frazee, 4 Myths About How Immigrants Affect the U.S. Economy,
PBS (Nov. 2, 2018, 6:48 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/making-sense/4myths-about-how-immigrants-affect-the-u-s-economy.
328 See, e.g., Jeanne Batalova, Immigrant Health-Care Workers in the United States in
2018, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (May 14, 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
immigrant-health-care-workers-united-states. The COVID-19 pandemic has drawn
attention to the importance of the immigrant healthcare workforce in the United States as
well as how immigration policy can create barriers to deploying this workforce effectively.
See, e.g., Silva Mathema, Removing Barriers for Immigrant Medical Professionals Is
Critical to Help Fight Coronavirus, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 2, 2020, 10:38 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2020/04/02/482574/removingbarriers-immigrant-medical-professionals-critical-help-fight-coronavirus (highlighting
federal immigration barriers and state medical licensing barriers for noncitizen healthcare
providers); Miriam Jordan & Annie Correal, Foreign Doctors Could Help Fight
Coronavirus. But U.S. Blocks Many., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/04/13/us/coronavirus-foreign-doctors-nurses-visas.html (same);
Adam Liptak, ‘Dreamers’ Tell Supreme Court Ending DACA During Pandemic Would Be
‘Catastrophic,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/27/us/
dreamers-supreme-court-daca.html (warning of the public health threat of ending DACA
during the pandemic).
329 Makhlouf, supra note 49, at 295–99.
326
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noncitizens.330 But, as the next Section illustrates, achieving
healthcare equity is not merely an ethical imperative. It also
contributes to healthcare-system efficiency.
C.

Cost-Effectiveness

12/10/2020 14:19:35

330 See Zhu & Xu, supra note 261, at 458 (suggesting that “social inequality in the U.S.
states cannot be fully understood without considering the politics of [immigrant] exclusion
in policymaking . . . at the subnational level”).
331 Mery et al., supra note 274, at 633.
332 Cf. Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 297 (manuscript at 14) (“[W]here one starts as a
baseline determines what counts as efficient and inefficient.”).
333 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NO. 19-0070-EF, NATIONAL
HEALTHCARE QUALITY & DISPARITIES REPORT 2 (2019) [hereinafter NATIONAL
HEALTHCARE QUALITY & DISPARITIES REPORT] (incorporating reporting on “disparities
in care experienced by different racial and socioeconomic groups” as a component of
healthcare quality); LINDSAY A. MARTIN, EUGENE C. NELSON, ROBERT C. LLOYD &
THOMAS W. NOLAN, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, WHOLE SYSTEM MEASURES
4 (2007) (describing thirteen measures of overall quality of a health system (“Whole
System Measures”) that are closely related to the Triple Aim, one of which is “equity”).
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As discussed in Section II.A, the cost-effectiveness of a health
policy is measured by the benefits of better health and better care
produced by the policy divided by the cost of the policy.331 The
meaning of cost-effectiveness, however, rests on assumptions about
what we value in terms of “better health” and “better care.” It also
depends on the baseline against which “costs” are assessed.332 The
previous Section described why the principle of equity should inform
each of these terms. This Section describes how.
The relationship between equitable access to health coverage and
each of the three aims can be summarized as follows: (1) Improving
health in populations that are disparately unhealthy is a strategy for
improving population health overall. Access to health coverage is an
important determinant of health. (2) Equitable access to health coverage improves health-system quality because it helps to ensure that
patients receive care when they need it. Equity is a widely recognized
measure of quality healthcare across the various frameworks that
influence U.S. national health policy.333 (3) Addressing inequities in
access to health coverage can be cost-effective when it shifts spending
from expensive healthcare venues like the emergency room to less
expensive primary and preventive care. A detailed analysis of these
relationships follows.
The United States has long spent far more on healthcare than its
peer countries but, perhaps paradoxically, has experienced a pervasive
health disadvantage relative to other wealthy countries for nearly four
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decades.334 For example, during that time, the United States has fallen
behind in annual gains in life expectancy, a common indicator of a
population’s health.335 Troublingly, life expectancy at birth has stagnated over the last decade, even declining each year from 2014 to
2017.336
However, increases in mortality rates have not burdened everyone living in the United States equally. Young and middle-aged
adults in a lower socioeconomic class, with fewer years of education,
and living “in rural areas or other settings with evidence of economic
distress or diminished social capital” have suffered disproportionately.337 It is posited that “systemic deficiencies” in the healthcare
system—including the lack of universal access to healthcare—may
partially explain increased mortality from certain conditions, and that
state policies affecting the social determinants of health could explain
geographic inequities.338 The U.S. healthcare system is marked by significant inequity in access to healthcare in comparison to other
wealthy countries.339
Aside from ethical reasons to combat healthcare inequity, discussed in the previous Section, there are instrumental reasons to do
so. If the United States seeks to keep pace with peer countries with
respect to annual gains in population health indicators like average
life expectancy, it must decide where to allocate its resources. This
includes but is not limited to healthcare resources.340 Improving
health outcomes for the most affluent groups is likely to require technological or scientific advances. By contrast, one strategy for
improving health outcomes in the least affluent groups is low-tech and
42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 73 Side A
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334 Steven H. Woolf & Heidi Schoomaker, Life Expectancy and Mortality Rates in the
United States, 1959-2017, 322 JAMA 1996, 1996 (2019).
335 Id.
336 See Sabrina Tavernise & Abby Goodnough, American Life Expectancy Rises for First
Time in Four Years, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/30/us/uslife-expectancy.html. Each year from 2015 to 2017, the country experienced “rare and
troubling” declines in life expectancy, attributed to “‘deaths of despair’ – younger people
dying from overdoses, suicide, and alcoholism.” Id.
337 Woolf & Schoomaker, supra note 334, at 2009; see also Julia Belluz, What the Dip in
U.S. Life Expectancy Is Really About: Inequality, VOX (Nov. 30, 2018, 9:13 AM), https://
www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/1/9/16860994/life-expectancy-us-income-inequality
(describing America’s worsening life expectancy wealth gap).
338 Woolf & Schoomaker, supra note 334, at 2010.
339 Fiscella, supra note 280, at 204.
340 See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EXPLAINING DIVERGENT LEVELS OF
LONGEVITY IN HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES 118 (Eileen M. Crimmins et al. eds., 2011) (“[A]
country with greater income inequality . . . may have worse average health and greater
average mortality because the health benefits to the wealthy from their extra income are
outweighed by the health deficits experienced by the poor.”).
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straightforward: expanding access to health coverage.341 Addressing
health inequities is thus an implicit goal of national health policy.342
From a societal perspective, the policies underlying the conditions that create marked health inequities can cause harm to all members of the community.343 Lack of access to affordable healthcare is a
condition that contributes to health inequities. An obvious way in
which the effects of this condition spill over to the general population
is during an outbreak of an infectious disease. Uninsured members of
the community with symptoms of illness may hesitate to seek care and
therefore risk exposing the rest of the community to the infectious
agent—a topic with increased salience during the COVID-19 pandemic.344 Less obvious are the health-related spillover effects of
untreated substance abuse and mental illness, which may include
higher rates of property and violent crimes.345 When pregnant women
are unable to access prenatal care, opportunities to prevent harm to
women and fetuses are lost.346 Finally, immigration restrictions on
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341 One of the main ways in which the ACA aims to improve population health is “by
improving access to the health care delivery system, which is a critical component of a
community’s population health production system.” Michael A. Stoto, Population Health
in the Affordable Care Act Era, ACAD. HEALTH 1, 4 (2013), https://
www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/files/AH2013pophealth.pdf. To target lowincome populations specifically, the ACA created a new category of eligibility for lowincome adults who were otherwise excluded from the historic “deserving poor” categorical
eligibility in Medicaid. Huberfeld, supra note 209, at 51 (“Medicaid has covered only the
deserving poor . . . . The ACA changed that standard by creating a new baseline, allowing
non-elderly adults earning up to 133% of the FPL to enroll in Medicaid, regardless of the
status of being ‘deserving.’”).
342 Stoto, supra note 341, at 2 (stating that reducing disparities is a goal of the
population health perspective); see also Berwick et al., supra note 275, at 760 (“[T]he gain
in health in one subpopulation ought not to be achieved at the expense of another
subpopulation.”). Although the terms “health disparity” and “health inequity” are
sometimes used interchangeably, I have elected to use the latter term to mean “differences
in health outcomes that are systematic, avoidable, and unjust,” unless I am quoting directly
from a source. WYATT ET AL., supra note 294, at 8. “Health disparity” is “the difference in
health outcomes between groups within a population,” without the implicit judgment of
such difference as unjust. Id.
343 Alistair Woodward & Ichiro Kawachi, Why Reduce Health Inequalities?, 54 J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 923, 923 (2000).
344 See Karen Hacker, Maria Anies, Barbara L. Folb & Leah Zallman, Barriers to
Health Care for Undocumented Immigrants: A Literature Review, 8 RISK MGMT. &
HEALTHCARE POL’Y 175, 178 (2015); Makhlouf & Sandhu, supra note 8, at 4–5.
345 See Hefei Wen, Jason M. Hockenberry & Janet R. Cummings, The Effect of
Medicaid Expansion on Crime Reduction: Evidence from HIFA-Waiver Expansions, 154 J.
PUB. ECON. 67, 68 (2017) (finding the increase in substance abuse disorder treatment and
decrease in substance use that result from state HIFA-waiver expansions may lead to
reductions in crime).
346 See Krista M. Perreira & Juan M. Pedroza, Policies of Exclusion: Implications for the
Health of Immigrants and Their Children, 40 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 147, 155–56 (2019)
(noting that some studies show undocumented noncitizen “pregnant women are less likely
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health coverage can have spillover effects on U.S. citizen family members and low-income and minority communities, exacerbating health
inequities in already vulnerable populations.347 For example, undocumented noncitizen parents may decline to enroll their U.S. citizen
children in Medicaid if they are required to provide information or
documentation about themselves.348 And U.S. citizens who do not
have ready access to birth certificates or passports—a problem that
disproportionately affects children, the mentally ill, and people with
dementia—are likely to experience documentation requirements
linked to immigration restrictions as a barrier to healthcare.349 When
health outcomes for the most vulnerable or disadvantaged members
of a community are significantly worse than for others, the community
as a whole is worse off. It follows that improving conditions for the
most vulnerable or disadvantaged members of a community can
improve the well-being of all.
A large body of research has examined states’ immigration
restrictions on Medicaid eligibility and their impact on noncitizen
access to care and health outcomes. Some of these studies have found
that exclusionary laws have negative impacts on individual and population health.350 Scholars theorize that legal barriers to accessing subsidized health programs are the major cause of health inequities
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to have adequate prenatal care visits and are more likely to experience complications
during delivery, to have preterm births, and to have low-birthweight babies”).
347 Hacker et al., supra note 344, at 178 (describing spillover effects of documentation
requirements on U.S. citizen family members); see also DONNA COHEN ROSS, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, MEDICAID DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENT
DISPROPORTIONATELY HARMS NON-HISPANICS, NEW STATE DATA SHOW 3–4 (2007),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-10-07health.pdf (noting that
documentation requirement has led to decline in Medicaid enrollment among citizen
children in several states).
348 See Hacker et al., supra note 344, at 178.
349 See Meredith A. Devlin, When Policies Collide: Citizenship Documentation
Requirements and Barriers to Obtaining Photo Identification—The New Medicaid
Citizenship Requirements as a Case Illustration, 41 IND. L. REV. 451, 462–63 (2008)
(discussing how a Medicaid requirement to provide documentation of citizenship will
negatively impact disabled citizens’ access to healthcare). Documentation requirements
linked to immigration restrictions are found to pose a “special risk” to Black children, who
are both more likely to lose Medicaid because of a documentation requirement and more
likely to be diagnosed with conditions that are difficult and expensive to treat without
health coverage, such as asthma. COHEN ROSS, supra note 347, at 4 (finding the largest
declines in Medicaid enrollment after implementation of the documentation requirement
in Black children).
350 See TIM O’SHEA & CRISTOBAL RAMÓN, IMMIGRANTS AND PUBLIC BENEFITS: WHAT
DOES THE RESEARCH SAY? 1, 9 (Bipartisan Pol’y Ctr. 2018), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/
wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Immigrants-and-Public-Benefits-What-Does-the-ResearchSay.pdf.
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351 Fernando S. Mendoza, Health Disparities and Children in Immigrant Families: A
Research Agenda, 124 PEDIATRICS S187, S192 (2009).
352 Ariel Kalil & Danielle A. Crosby, Welfare-Leaving and Child Health and Behavior in
Immigrant and Native Families, in IMMIGRANTS AND WELFARE: THE IMPACT OF WELFARE
REFORM ON AMERICA’S NEWCOMERS 193 (Michael E. Fix ed., 2009).
353 Ariel Kalil & Danielle Crosby, Welfare Leaving and the Health of Young Children in
Immigrant and Native Families, 39 SOC. SCI. RES. 202, 212 (2010).
354 Id. at 209–10.
355 See Woodward & Kawachi, supra note 343, at 923; id. at 926 (“[I]f governments’
social and economic policies can widen health inequalities, then it is plausible that different
policies could reduce them.”); CBPP REPORT, supra note 229, at 13–14 (describing the
growing body of evidence showing that immigrant-inclusive policies improve individual
and population health outcomes).
356 See Jane Perkins, Medicaid Coverage of Emergency Medical Conditions, 38
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 384, 385–86 (2004) (noting that
PRWORA’s restrictions would cut the number of noncitizens who qualify for full Medicaid
while expanding the number of people who can rely on Emergency Medicaid).
357 See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S1028 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2009) (statement of Sen. Durbin)
(“The policy [of restricting noncitizen eligibility for public benefits under PRWORA] was
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between noncitizen and native-born children.351 A pair of researchers
focused on young Latinx noncitizen children in Illinois who had lost
public benefits post-PRWORA, finding that their general health
status had declined significantly relative to their peers.352 A subsequent expanded study of preschoolers in noncitizen families in Illinois
found that loss of public benefits after PRWORA was associated with
“substantial and significant declines in their health over time.”353
These findings spanned multiple health dimensions, including parental
ratings of children’s health, number of sick days, frequency of respiratory illness, and emergency room visits.354 Such studies support the
proposition that exclusionary health policies are associated with poor
health outcomes among noncitizens and health inequities between
noncitizens and U.S. citizens. This evidence demonstrates the ways in
which exclusionary laws create health inequities. Conversely,
inclusionary laws may reduce health inequities and their associated
spillover effects on other members of the community.355
Moreover, laws that limit noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid can
negatively affect national-health-system efficiency. Congress has recognized this, and has passed legislation to partially ameliorate those
impacts. After the passage of PRWORA, observers noted that many
lawfully present noncitizens, including children and pregnant women,
would be cut off from Medicaid coverage, reducing their access to preventive care and increasing their reliance on Emergency Medicaid for
treatment of emergency medical conditions.356 Such concerns about
PRWORA’s impact on healthcare-system efficiency and health outcomes for children and pregnant women were the motivation behind
Congress’s creation of the ICHIA options.357 Congress understood
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that by eliminating the arbitrary five-year delay on children’s and
pregnant women’s access to subsidized health coverage, the ICHIA
options would reduce the risk of negative health impacts and developmental delays for future U.S. citizens.358 This reasoning may be
extended to all noncitizens who are considered members of the community: health policies that ameliorate vertical health inequity
between U.S. citizens and a subset of noncitizens will be more effective at reducing inequity when applied to all noncitizen residents.
“Better care,” the second component of the numerator of the
cost-effectiveness equation, involves the quality of care provided in a
national health system.359 Equity is a goal of both the Triple Aim and
the National Quality Strategy, the leading frameworks guiding U.S.
national health policy on quality improvement. These frameworks
draw on an influential 2001 report by the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
which proposed a strategy for improving the quality of healthcare in
America in the twenty-first century.360 The committee that authored
the report recommended that “all health care constituencies . . .
commit to . . . a shared agenda of six aims for improvement that can
raise the quality of care to unprecedented levels.”361 In summary,
healthcare should be safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient,
and equitable.362 By “equitable” care, the committee meant “providing care that does not vary in quality because of personal characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, geographic location, and
socioeconomic status.”363 The goal is to reduce differences in patient
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instated over 10 years ago, and almost immediately we started changing it, realizing it
really did not work as planned. . . . [E]xtending health insurance to this population actually
saves the health care system of America a lot of money.”); id. at S1050 (stating that the
five-year bar under PRWORA has “severely undermined the health status of immigrant
families across the Nation”); 155 CONG. REC. H230 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 2009) (describing the
purpose of the ICHIA options as “promot[ing] the health of needy children and pregnant
women residing lawfully in the United States”).
358 See Youdelman, supra note 170, at 4.
359 See Berwick et al., supra note 275, at 760 (arguing that the United States will not
“achieve high-value health care unless improvement initiatives pursue a broader system of
linked goals”).
360 INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE
21ST CENTURY (2001) [hereinafter IOM REPORT]; see also NATIONAL HEALTHCARE
QUALITY & DISPARITIES REPORT, supra note 333, at 67 (discussing the IOM report’s
identification of healthcare disparities as a quality issue); WYATT ET AL., supra note 294, at
4–5 (discussing progress on the IOM report’s equity aim and its relationship to the Triple
Aim); Castellucci, supra note 274 (noting that the National Quality Strategy goals were
strongly influenced by the IOM report).
361 IOM REPORT, supra note 360, at 5.
362 Id. at 5–6.
363 Id. at 6.

42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 75 Side B

12/10/2020 14:19:35

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\95-6\NYU603.txt

1744

unknown

Seq: 65

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9-DEC-20

16:25

[Vol. 95:1680

experience that are based on personal characteristics, which could
include actual or perceived immigration status.364
In addition, as discussed earlier, the IHI has recognized that
equity is an element of each component of the Triple Aim, including
better care.365 The IHI has developed a system of metrics that is
linked with the Triple Aim and designed to measure health-system
quality.366 One of the Whole System Measures is equity, which examines stratification of quality measures among subpopulations and aims
to “drive the difference in [health] outcomes between subpopulations
to zero.”367
Likewise, the National Quality Strategy, established in 2011 as a
requirement of the ACA, builds on the Triple Aim.368 Its purpose is to
coordinate quality improvement strategies in the public and private
healthcare sectors in order to improve health and healthcare nationwide.369 Each year, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality,
an agency within HHS, reports on “the quality of healthcare received
by the general U.S. population and disparities in care experienced by
different racial and socioeconomic groups.”370 This focus on disparities reveals the importance of equitable access to healthcare as an element of the National Quality Strategy.
State policies that exclude noncitizens from subsidized health
coverage negatively affect several of the widely recognized measures
of health-system quality, including equity.371 Without access to afford-
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364 See, e.g., NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY & DISPARITIES REPORT, supra note
333, at 113, 119–20 (noting that immigration status is a barrier to health coverage).
365 WYATT ET AL., supra note 294, at 5.
366 MARTIN ET AL., supra note 333, at 1 (noting that the purpose of the paper is to
promote a system of metrics that measure the overall quality of health systems).
367 Id. at 38.
368 42 U.S.C. § 280j(a)(1) (2018) (“The [HHS] Secretary . . . shall establish a national
strategy to improve the delivery of health care services, patient health outcomes, and
population health.”); The National Quality Strategy: Fact Sheet, AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, https://www.ahrq.gov/workingforquality/about/nqs-factsheets/fact-sheet.html (last updated Nov. 2016).
369 Id.
370 NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY & DISPARITIES REPORT, supra note 333, at 2.
371 See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 333, at 18–19 (briefly describing each of these quality
measures). The rate of adverse events measures “injury or harm to [a] patient related to
(or from) the delivery of care.” Id. at 20. A landmark publication on the effects of
uninsurance on health found that uninsured hospitalized patients are more likely to
be injured due to substandard care than insured patients. INST. OF MED., CARE WITHOUT
COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE 72–73 (2002) [hereinafter CARE WITHOUT
COVERAGE], https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK220639/pdf/Bookshelf_
NBK220639.pdf. Unadjusted raw mortality percentage is “a measure of acute care
inpatient mortality” and is computed by dividing the number of in-hospital deaths in the
acute care inpatient population by the number of acute care inpatient discharges. MARTIN
ET AL., supra note 333, at 24. Uninsured patients who are hospitalized are more likely to
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able health coverage, low-income noncitizens are less likely to seek
healthcare in a timely manner. When uninsured low-income noncitizens do seek care, they are often limited to a small number of providers who are willing to provide uncompensated care or to charge
affordable rates. Such providers are often overextended and have long
wait times for appointments.372 In order to stay financially viable, they
may have to see a large volume of patients, which means patients
receive less individualized attention and providers are more likely to
miss signs and symptoms. Insured patients, on the other hand, can typically choose among various providers and withdraw from a provider’s
care if they are not receiving high-quality care. This serves as an indirect regulation of quality control that is absent in the pool of providers
that serve uninsured, low-income patients.
In addition, because a majority of excluded noncitizens are members of already disadvantaged social groups, policies that exclude
noncitizens from access to subsidized health coverage exacerbate—
rather than ameliorate—existing health inequities by reducing opportunities to be healthy.373 For example, laws that bar noncitizens from
eligibility for Medicaid disproportionately affect people of color.374
States’ health policies are undoubtedly influenced by cost, which
is the denominator in the cost-effectiveness equation. For some politicians, limiting eligibility for healthcare subsidies by citizenship and
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die in the hospital than insured patients. CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE, supra, at 72. The
functional health outcomes score is measured using the Functional Health Survey and is a
measure of a system’s patient population’s physical and mental health status. MARTIN ET
AL., supra note 333, at 25. Uninsured adults are more likely to have “worse overall
functional and health status” than similar insured adults. CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE,
supra, at 81.
372 See Bettigole, supra note 321, at 2192 (noting that even had one of her patients
discovered her clinic earlier, they likely would have experienced a wait time of several
months because the clinic was struggling to keep up with existing demand).
373 See Zhu & Xu, supra note 261, at 460 (“[B]ecause of immigrants’ particularly
vulnerable legal and social status, the immigrant-specific provisions of welfare reform may
have increased immigrants’ confusion about their eligibility for welfare benefits . . . .”)
(quoting Jennifer Van Hook, Welfare Reform’s Chilling Effects on Noncitizens: Changes in
Noncitizen Welfare Recipiency or Shifts in Citizenship Status?, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 613, 613–14
(2003)); Paula Braveman, Health Disparities and Health Equity: Concepts and
Measurement, 27 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 167, 187 (2006) (“[H]ealth disparities reflect
unequal opportunities to be healthy, making disadvantaged groups even more
disadvantaged with respect to their health; correspondingly, reducing health disparities
means giving disadvantaged social groups equal opportunities to be healthy.”).
374 See Samantha Artiga, Kendal Orgera & Anthony Damico, Changes in Health
Coverage by Race and Ethnicity Since the ACA, 2010-2018, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 5,
2020), https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/changes-in-healthcoverage-by-race-and-ethnicity-since-the-aca-2010-2018 (“[U]ninsured Hispanics and
Asians are less likely than Whites to be eligible for financial assistance with coverage, in
part, reflecting higher shares of noncitizens who face immigrant eligibility restrictions
among these groups compared to Whites.”).
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375 See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 297 (manuscript at 14). Buchanan and Dorf
describe how arguments based on finding “efficient” solutions are incoherent if one does
not acknowledge the normative priors on which the term “efficiency” rests. Id. The same
could be said about arguments for the “cost-effective” solution.
376 See, e.g., David E. Bloom, Alexander Khoury & Ramnath Subbaraman, The Promise
and Peril of Universal Health Care, 361 SCIENCE 766, 766 (2018) (noting that the high costs
of new healthcare technologies and meeting the healthcare needs of older populations are
a barrier for achieving universal health coverage in wealthy industrial countries).
377 See David E. Bloom, Alexander Khoury & Ramnath Subbaraman, The Promise and
Peril of Universal Health Care, 361 SCIENCE eaat9644, Aug. 24, 2018, at 1 (“These
economic arguments [in support of universal health coverage] are bolstered by evidence
that committing resources to health care is associated with a high return on investment,
rivaling, or even surpassing, other high-return investments like those in primary and
secondary education.”).
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immigration status in order to cut costs in the short term is more
palatable than limiting benefits based on some other criteria that
would affect citizens. There is no doubt that expanding access to subsidized health coverage costs money. However, even if expanding
access results in healthcare spending that is higher than current
spending, it does not necessarily mean that such a reform is not costeffective.375 Exclusionary policies may save costs in the short term but
not over the long term.
Any attempt to calculate the costs of restrictive versus inclusive
health policy is informed by value-laden assumptions. The ACA provides an example of health policy that recognizes the costeffectiveness of equitable access to health coverage even if absolute
healthcare spending increases as a result. The high cost of healthcare
in the United States is an oft-cited barrier to achieving universal
health coverage.376 However, efforts to achieve universal health coverage are based, in part, on the understanding that expanding access
can reduce inefficient healthcare spending and otherwise improve
national prosperity by improving health—a goal deemed worthwhile
even if overall public spending increases.377
Opponents of expanding Medicaid for excluded noncitizens may
argue that subsidizing primary and secondary healthcare for noncitizens is not cost-effective because it would increase overall public
healthcare expenditures on noncitizens. This argument rests on an
assumption that high-priority medical needs of noncitizens are “covered” by Emergency Medicaid (severe, acute conditions) and public
health agencies (vaccinations, screening and treatment for communicable diseases), and that treatment of chronic disease among noncitizens should not be a priority. It also relies on the “right now”
baseline rather than a baseline of equitable access to health coverage.
What it overlooks, however, is that it can be more cost-effective to
cover non-emergent than emergent care, e.g., covering routine versus

42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 77 Side A

12/10/2020 14:19:35

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\95-6\NYU603.txt

December 2020]

unknown

Seq: 68

LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION

9-DEC-20

16:25

1747

emergency dialysis, and that people are less likely to seek screening
and treatment for communicable diseases if they do not have a primary care provider, even if those services are covered financially.378
Insurance enables people to establish care with a provider. Another
consequence that this argument does not consider is the absurd and
cruel result of prioritizing the subsidization of life-saving versus lifeenhancing healthcare for uninsured noncitizens: those with chronic
diseases must delay seeking care until their lives are in jeopardy
before they can qualify for subsidized care in a hospital emergency
room.379
What is cost-effective for U.S. citizens and Medicaid-eligible
noncitizens is likely cost-effective for excluded noncitizens. Therefore,
if a future health reform is guided by the principle of equity, as the last
health reform was, inclusion of a broader range of noncitizens in publicly funded healthcare should be considered cost-effective if it meets
more healthcare needs per dollar spent, particularly when it reduces
inequitable suffering and morbidity.380 Addressing vertical inequity
between citizens and noncitizens in access to publicly funded health
coverage, therefore, has the potential to be cost-effective.381
Some scholars have pointed to the ways in which restricting
noncitizens’ access to health coverage—and, by extension, affordable
preventive healthcare—may even increase net costs.382 Researchers
have found that excluded noncitizens are disproportionately likely to
seek care in the most expensive healthcare venue: hospital emergency
rooms.383 This is because uninsured immigrants often delay seeking
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378 See, e.g., K. Tom Xu, Usual Source of Care in Preventive Service Use: A Regular
Doctor versus a Regular Site, 37 HSR 1509, 1509–10 (2002) (discussing studies finding that
having a regular doctor is a stronger predictor of timely care-seeking than having health
insurance and that “individuals with a usual source of care were more likely to receive
timely immunizations”); cf. Access to Primary Care, HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, https://
www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/social-determinants-health/
interventions-resources/access-to-primary (last visited Oct. 13, 2020) (noting that people
residing in rural areas may face geographical barriers to having a primary care provider,
and in turn, “may be less likely to seek preventive care”).
379 See Culyer, supra note 22, at 279 (discussing and criticizing the argument that “[w]e
should first allocate resources to those areas where they are immediately needed to save
life and only when this is done should the remainder be allocated to alleviating non-fatal
conditions”).
380 See Daniels, supra note 273, at 1067 (explaining why efficiency and cost are ethical—
and not simply economic—concerns).
381 See Woodward & Kawachi, supra note 343, at 926 (“[R]educing inequalities will lead
to larger gains in health status than might be achieved by similar expenditures
elsewhere.”).
382 See, e.g., Arijit Nandi, Sana Loue & Sandro Galea, Expanding the Universe of
Universal Coverage: The Population Health Argument for Increasing Coverage for
Immigrants, 11 J. IMMIGRANT & MINORITY HEALTH 433, 435 (2009).
383 Id.
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care for health problems that could have been detected or treated
effectively at an earlier time.384 Such delay can lead to unnecessary
complications from common chronic diseases such as diabetes and
asthma,385 and remedial treatment of these complications, especially
in emergency situations, is much costlier than preventive care.
The federal government ultimately absorbs much of the costs of
treatment for emergency conditions affecting excluded noncitizens
through Emergency Medicaid funding, Medicaid Disproportionate
Share Hospital payments, and other supplementary funding for states
burdened by these costs.386 Most Emergency Medicaid expenditures
are for services provided to undocumented noncitizens, who make up
the largest category of excluded noncitizens nationwide.387 A 2011
article states that the program “has long paid about $2 billion a year
for emergency treatment” for noncitizens.388
Costs were one of the concerns motivating Congress’s passage of
the ICHIA options, which restored Medicaid eligibility for lawfully
present children and pregnant women who had been excluded by
PRWORA.389 Congress recognized that many treatable conditions
affecting children and pregnant women can be addressed in a costeffective manner through primary and preventive care, which
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384 See Gostin, supra note 43, at 1438; Nandi et al., supra note 382, at 435 (noting that
undocumented immigrants are relatively more likely to have preexisting disease and wait
longer before seeking medical care).
385 Nandi et al., supra note 382, at 435.
386 See, e.g., Nathanael J. Scheer, Comment, Keeping the Promise: Financing
EMTALA’s Guarantee of Emergency Medical Care for Undocumented Immigrants in
Arizona, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1413, 1421–23 (2003) (discussing the various sources of federal
funding that Arizona hospitals use to defray the cost of providing emergency medical care
to undocumented noncitizens).
387 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-472, UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS:
QUESTIONS PERSIST ABOUT THEIR IMPACT ON HOSPITALS’ UNCOMPENSATED CARE COSTS
10 (2004) (noting that several states have indicated that “most of their emergency Medicaid
expenditures were for services provided to undocumented aliens”); id. (reporting that five
of ten states polled reported that labor and delivery services for pregnant women made up
at least half of their Emergency Medicaid expenditures).
388 Phil Galewitz, Medicaid Helps Hospitals Pay for Illegal Immigrants’ Care, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 12, 2013), https://khn.org/news/medicaid-illegal-immigrantemergency-care. In addition, DSH payments totaled about $16.5 trillion in FY2018, with
Texas, New York, and Louisiana receiving the largest amounts. Distribution of Medicaid
Spending by Service, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., https://www.kff.org/medicaid/stateindicator/distribution-of-medicaid-spending-by-service (last visited Aug. 9, 2020).
389 See 155 CONG. REC. S1028 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2019) (statement of Sen. Durbin)
(“[E]xtending health insurance to this population actually saves the health care system of
America a lot of money. . . . Avoiding . . . pregnancy complications is not only the humane
thing to do, it is the economic thing to do. . . . ER care is expensive, sometimes
unnecessary.”).
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Medicaid enables.390 When pregnant women do not receive prenatal
care, costs associated with postnatal and pediatric care can be twice as
high.391 This example illustrates that “the goal of increased equity
need not be incompatible with the goal of maximising efficiency.”392
Another often overlooked cost of restrictionist subsidized health
coverage laws is the increased administrative burden for government
agencies and healthcare providers that must determine whether a
patient qualifies for benefits or services. These determinations, which
are often complicated, divert resources to government agencies and
can increase the cost of providing publicly funded coverage.393 Lack of
certainty about whether care will be covered can also lead healthcare
providers to delay treatment, which can increase costs and reduce
effectiveness. For example, a dentist diagnoses a noncitizen patient
with a tooth infection and recommends surgery. The patient does not
have health insurance and is unable to pay for the surgery out of
pocket. The patient tells the dentist that they “overstayed” a tourist
visa and are afraid of applying for public benefits. Based on their
experience treating other noncitizen patients, the dentist assumes that
the patient is ineligible for publicly funded coverage. Several months
later, the dentist learns that the patient, as an applicant for asylum
whose application has been pending for more than six months, is eligible for state-funded health coverage comparable to Medicaid.394 By
the time the patient has coverage, it has been eight months since the
infection was diagnosed, and the surgery is much more complicated
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390 See Youdelman, supra note 170, at 3 (explaining how ICHIA’s expansion of
Medicaid eligibility can reduce emergency room visits and prevent expensive exacerbation
of preventable conditions).
391 See Gostin, supra note 43, at 1438.
392 Woodward & Kawachi, supra note 343, at 927 (describing how a policy to schedule
Pap screening for cervical cancer every three years instead of annually saved resources that
could be devoted to reaching women who were screened only every ten years, resulting in
fewer cases of cervical cancer at the population level).
393 See Hacker et al., supra note 344, at 178 (reviewing studies identifying bureaucratic
barriers for healthcare providers created by policies excluding undocumented noncitizens
from healthcare); Jeffrey T. Kullgren, Restrictions on Undocumented Immigrants’ Access to
Health Services: The Public Health Implications of Welfare Reform, 93 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1630, 1632 (2003) (“Sorting through immigration documents for each patient, and
turning away those who lack sufficient documentation but are unable to pay for the full
cost of services, would increase administrative costs and waiting times, reducing the
efficiency of already overburdened safety-net institutions.”); Michael E. Fix & Karen
Tumlin, Welfare Reform and the Devolution of Immigrant Policy, in NEW FEDERALISM:
ISSUES AND OPINIONS FOR STATES 1997, at 1, 5–6 (Urban Inst., Ser. A., No. A-15, 1997)
(describing how PRWORA forces states “to bear new administrative costs from expanded
verification and reporting requirements” such as new systems to enforce the affidavit of
support signed by an immigrant’s sponsor).
394 See supra Section I.C.
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and expensive than it would have been had the patient received timely
care.395
Laws excluding noncitizens from the ACA Marketplaces also
create inefficiency in health insurance financing by preventing risks
from being spread across a broader population.396 This causes instability and unpredictability in health insurance risk pools. It is likely
that noncitizens are relatively healthy compared with citizens.397 Permitting undocumented noncitizens to purchase subsidized insurance
on the Marketplaces could result in insurers lowering premiums for all
participants.398 Consumers who are eligible for little or no subsidy
would benefit from lower premiums. The federal government could
share in these savings through a reduction in the subsidies it pays to
insurers.
Finally, in the absence of subsidized insurance for excluded
noncitizens, physicians and hospitals may shift the costs of treating
uninsured excluded noncitizens to insurers and insured patients.399
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395 Cf. Robin E. Canada, Best Practices for Teaching Care Management of
Undocumented Patients, 21 AMA J. ETHICS E44, E45 (2019) (describing the different
standard of care provided to undocumented patients treated at a low-cost clinic versus at
an academic medical practice); Peter Ellis & Lydia S. Dugdale, How Should Clinicians
Respond when Different Standards of Care Are Applied to Undocumented Patients?, 21
AMA J. ETHICS E26 (2019) (describing the ethical conflict faced by providers who lack the
resources to provide optimal care); Meredith Van Natta, First Do No Harm: Medical Legal
Violence and Immigrant Health in Coral County, USA, 235 SOC. SCI. & MED., Aug. 2019, at
1, 3 (2019) (finding that since the 2016 election providers have started to weigh the risk of
untreated illness or injury against the risk of immigration surveillance and enforcement
when treating undocumented noncitizens or noncitizens who are subject to public charge
determinations).
396 Makhlouf, supra note 49, at 270. Although federal law restricts participation in the
ACA Marketplaces to lawfully present noncitizens, states can apply for waivers to permit
residents to purchase coverage on state-run exchanges or create state-funded exchanges
that do not discriminate based on immigration status. See, e.g., Ana B. Ibarra & Chad
Terhune, California Withdraws Bid to Allow Undocumented to Buy Unsubsidized Plans,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 20, 2017), https://khn.org/news/california-withdraws-bid-toallow-undocumented-immigrants-to-buy-unsubsidized-obamacare-plans (describing
California’s filing and withdrawal of a section 1332 ACA state innovation waiver to permit
excluded noncitizens to purchase unsubsidized coverage on its exchange). However, states
may have legitimate concerns about the federal government’s use of information gathered
from the exchanges for immigration enforcement purposes, which was one of the concerns
cited by Sen. Ricardo Lara, the California state senator who spearheaded that state’s
authorizing legislation for the waiver. Id.
397 See Glen, supra note 46, at 222 (describing research indicating that recent
immigrants and those who have resided in the United States for an extended period tend
to be healthier than natural-born U.S. citizens).
398 See id. (explaining how adding undocumented noncitizens to the insurance risk pool
could lead to cost savings for all of the insured participants).
399 See Austin B. Frakt, How Much Do Hospitals Cost Shift? A Review of the Evidence,
89 MILBANK Q. 90 (2011) (reviewing the literature on cost shifting in response to public
payment policy).
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Healthcare providers are ethically400—and in some cases legally401—
obligated to treat patients in need. For example, federal law obligates
hospitals participating in Medicare (nearly all hospitals)402 to provide
emergency care to all patients who need it, regardless of their ability
to pay, immigration status, or any other factor unrelated to medical
need.403 When states foreclose reimbursement for care that hospitals
provide to uninsured noncitizens, they leave those hospitals and their
physicians vulnerable to financial losses from the provision of uncompensated care. In turn, physicians and hospitals may seek to shift these
costs to insurers and insured patients by increasing charges. This is a
perennial topic of interest in health policy, and there is no good
reason to distinguish cost shifting generated by uninsured excluded
noncitizens from that generated by any other population. Subsidizing
insurance for excluded noncitizens can prevent this wasteful cost
shifting.
As described here, expanding health coverage for noncitizens
would certainly shift health-system costs and may save costs overall, in
addition to improving population health outcomes and healthcare
quality.404 Taking a wider lens, some researchers have examined how
expanding health coverage could improve state and local economies
over the long term.405 This is based on the observation that untreated
health issues reduce worker productivity,406 increasing the economic
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400 See The Refusal of Care, HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT. REV. (Jan. 26, 2015), https://
www.hrmronline.com/article/the-refusal-of-care (“Healthcare providers have legal, ethical
and professional duties to address a patient’s needs that fall within the provider’s scope of
practice.”).
401 See infra note 403 (obligating hospitals to treat patients in emergencies, regardless of
their eligibility for health insurance).
402 See AM. HOSP. ASS’N, UNDERPAYMENT BY MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FACT SHEET
1 (Dec. 2017), https://www.aha.org/system/files/2018-01/medicaremedicaidunderpmt%
202017.pdf (explaining that while hospitals can elect not to participate in Medicaid or
Medicare, conditions on federal tax exemptions prompt most hospitals to participate).
403 Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd(a)–(b) (2010).
404 See Gostin, supra note 43, at 1438 (“Shifting toward prevention and early diagnosis
and treatment would avoid or reduce costs over time.”); Nandi et al., supra note 382, at 435
(noting that offering noncitizens the same standard of care as citizens may save costs); see
also Makhlouf, supra note 49, at 269–70 (describing research on how expanding
immigrants’ access to health coverage could decrease total healthcare expenditures).
405 See, e.g., Woodward & Kawachi, supra note 343, at 925 (“[H]ealth is an exquisitely
sensitive mirror of social circumstances. . . . [R]educing the social and economic
inequalities that lie behind the uneven distribution of disease will bring a wide range of
benefits.”); CBPP REPORT, supra note 229, at 13–14 (noting that extending health
coverage, regardless of citizenship status, can lead to better long-term economic
outcomes).
406 WYATT ET AL., supra note 294, at 9 (noting how “higher rates of absenteeism and
presenteeism (i.e., working while sick)” can reduce worker productivity).

42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 79 Side B

12/10/2020 14:19:35

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\95-6\NYU603.txt

1752

unknown

Seq: 73

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9-DEC-20

16:25

[Vol. 95:1680

costs of restricting noncitizens’ access to healthcare: “From an economic standpoint can any country afford to have the talent and performance of sizeable sections of the population stunted to such an
extent?”407 Additionally, low-income families with health insurance
experience greater economic security than those without because they
are not subject to high out-of-pocket medical costs.408 Health insurance and the household economic security it promotes make it more
likely that children will succeed in school, earn higher incomes, and
amass more wealth.409 For these reasons, the Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities has called extending health coverage regardless of citizenship status “a smart investment in a state’s long-term health and
prosperity.”410
This Section has demonstrated how state decisions to exclude
noncitizens from eligibility for subsidized health coverage in order to
cut costs undermine the national health policy goal of improving costeffectiveness. Whether the goal is to have a fairer or more efficient
national health system—or, ideally, both—the answer is inclusion.
D.

Racial Dynamics

407

12/10/2020 14:19:35

Whitehead, supra note 282, at 431.
CBPP REPORT, supra note 229, at 13.
409 Id. at 13–14.
410 Id. at 13; see also Gostin, supra note 43, at 1439 (“[E]xpanding coverage for
undocumented immigrants could save costs over all.”).
411 See, e.g., Michener, supra note 206, at 557–61 (summarizing ACA provisions
supporting the goal of reducing racial and ethnic inequities and discrimination); id. at 549
(describing Medicaid expansion as “one of the ACA’s boldest and most promising
mechanisms for reducing racial inequities”).
412 See, e.g., ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL, TRAPPED IN AMERICA’S SAFETY NET: ONE
FAMILY’S STRUGGLE 72–75 (2014) (explaining the links between the tradition of state
control of social assistance programs and efforts to maintain the racial and class structure
of the South).
413 See Gerken, supra note 313, at 1710 (“Academics often unthinkingly blame
decentralization for shortfalls in our equality norms.”).
408
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National health policy seeks to eliminate the influence of
antidemocratic values, such as racism, in Medicaid.411 Historically,
federalism arrangements regulating public accommodations, voting,
housing, healthcare, and other areas were proxies for the preservation
of states’ rights to discriminate based on race. In particular, state control of means-tested social assistance programs is a legacy of racial
politics.412 Scholars adopting a nationalist perspective blame federalism for weakening norms underlying the federal government’s goal
of promoting racial equality.413
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Racism plays a particularly ugly role in the development of federal health policy414 and, in particular, Medicaid’s cooperative federalism arrangement. Congress agreed to devolve authority to states to
make critical decisions regarding their Medicaid programs in order to
appease Southern Democrats, who wished to avoid federal scrutiny of
racist policies.415 The racist belief that Black people are undeserving
of public benefits has long influenced social welfare policy.416 In
health policy, this belief, along with the racist trope of the “welfare
queen” taking advantage of taxpayer contributions, has motivated the
development of stringent eligibility criteria and unforgiving, punitive
policies.417 Racial inequities in healthcare access are attributed in part
to state control of Medicaid eligibility policies.418 As Professor
Evelynn Hammonds stated, “There has never been any period in
American history where the health of blacks was equal to that of
whites . . . . Disparity is built into the system.”419
The ACA was designed to implement a uniform national standard for Medicaid eligibility that would stealthily reduce healthcare
inequities affecting low-income Black and Latinx people.420 Because
the NFIB v. Sebelius decision devolved the issue of the new Medicaid
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414 See Jeneen Interlandi, Why Doesn’t the United States Have Universal Health Care?
The Answer Has Everything to Do with Race., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/universal-health-care-racism.html (“In
the United States, racial health disparities have proved as foundational as democracy
itself.”).
415 See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 1710 n.82 (describing the racist origins of
Medicaid’s devolution to states); see also Interlandi, supra note 414 (describing how
Southern Democrats obtained key concessions during negotiations over the Hill-Burton
Act, enabling states to control the disbursement of funds for hospital construction and
ensuring that they remained segregated).
416 See MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE
POLITICS OF ANTI-POVERTY POLICY (1999) (positing that white Americans oppose welfare
because recipients have often been portrayed through the lens of racial stereotypes, casting
recipients as lazy and undeserving people of color); Madison Allen, Racism in Public
Benefit Programs: Where Do We Go from Here?, CTR. FOR L. & SOC. POL’Y (July 23,
2020), https://www.clasp.org/blog/racism-public-benefit-programs-where-do-we-go-here
(discussing the connection between racism and the history of public benefit programs and
welfare reform in America).
417 See, e.g., Michener, supra note 206, at 557.
418 Id. at 550–51; Interlandi, supra note 414 (“Federal health care policy was designed,
both implicitly and explicitly, to exclude black Americans. As a result, they faced an array
of inequities . . . .”).
419 Interlandi, supra note 414.
420 See Michener, supra note 206, at 548 (“[T]he ACA was viewed as a stealthy civilrights achievement of the Obama presidency.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at
550 (“Though the planned expansionary tack was not explicitly race based, the outsized
presence of blacks and Latinos among the population of Americans living in or near
poverty . . . meant that uniform national expansion of Medicaid would have had inequalityreducing racial effects.”).
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expansion to the states, however, the ACA did not reach its potential
to achieve this goal.421 Most of the thirteen states that have not
adopted the Medicaid expansion are in the South.422 Given the
existing racial demographics of these non-expansion states, lowincome Black people are disproportionately impacted by state decisions to not expand Medicaid; as a result, they disproportionately lack
access to health coverage.423
Some scholars have linked citizenship dynamics in social policy
with racial dynamics, suggesting that programs with decentralized
administrative structures devolving power and discretion to local
authorities are more prone to immigration politics.424 Because most
noncitizens are people of color, the structural discrimination of
alienage restrictions in Medicaid eligibility layers on to existing racebased institutional discrimination in the public benefits system.425
Many scholars have explored the ways in which negative attitudes
toward Latinx and Asian people have shaped anti-immigrant provisions of welfare laws.426 More generally, scholars have identified a link
between growing racial and ethnic complexity attributed to immigration and a decrease in generosity in social policy at the state level.427
As Professor Kevin Johnson has written, “[a]ntipathies for benefit
recipients and immigrants are not completely unrelated. Indeed, one
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421 See id. at 551 (discussing Sebelius’s “negative implications for the racial equitability
of health resources”).
422 See Interlandi, supra note 414 (“Several states, most of them in the former
Confederacy, refused to participate in Medicaid expansion. And several are still trying to
make access to the program contingent on onerous new work requirements.”).
423 Michener, supra note 206, at 551.
424 See Brown & Kahn Best, supra note 26, at 793 (discussing research suggesting that
decentralized programs may see stronger immigration effects); see also Reese et al., supra
note 26, at 98–99 (“[M]any scholars suggest that the policies towards [legal immigrants]
were shaped by wider attitudes toward the foreign-born population and its racial and
ethnic make-up. . . . Various studies thus highlight the role of anti-Latino and anti-Asian
sentiment in contributing support for PRWORA’s anti-immigrant provisions.”).
425 Daniel E. Dawes provides a simple, clear definition of these types of discrimination:
“[S]tructural discrimination advantages one group to the disadvantage of another, whereas
institutional discrimination employs seemingly facially neutral policies that have a
disparate impact on racial and ethnic groups, women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and people
with disabilities, among others.” DANIEL E. DAWES, THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF
HEALTH 65–66 (2020).
426 See Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of
Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 17 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 457, 465
(1995) (“[T]he ethnicity of ‘illegal aliens’ is often a subtext to the debate about the
availability of public benefits and services to noncitizens, as well as to the entire
immigration debate.”); Reese et al., supra note 26, at 98–99; Zhu & Xu, supra note 261, at
459 (noting that PRWORA “was driven by a wave of strong anti-immigrant sentiment
along with the resurgence of nativism”).
427 See Zhu & Xu, supra note 261, at 458–59 (reviewing the literature on this
relationship).
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could view the ability to immigrate . . . as one of the scarcest, and most
highly sought after, public benefits.”428 Noncitizens, like low-income
Medicaid recipients, are politically marginalized.429 Therefore, their
ability to oppose state policies that restrict their access to publicly
funded health coverage and other public benefits is attenuated.430
Scholars have noted that some state-driven policies are designed
to include noncitizens.431 However, it is unlikely that the decentralization trend in immigration law will lead to inclusive health policy
because of health policy’s increasingly national character and because
expanding noncitizen access to subsidized health coverage is more
about health policy than it is about immigration policy. While it may
be said that one principle of immigration policy is integration of
noncitizens into society at large and especially the political community,432 the normative goal of integration in this context is narrower:
integration into the U.S. healthcare system. In addition, eligibility
changes in subsidized health coverage programs are only tangentially
related to the core aspects of immigration law, admission and removal
of noncitizens.433
Though the nuances of immigration politics are distinct from
racial politics because of sovereignty-related concerns, the history of
alienage restrictions in Medicaid has racial overtones that should not
be ignored by policymakers concerned with eliminating the influence
of racism in the healthcare system.
III
FEDERALISM’S INFLUENCE

428
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Johnson, supra note 426, at 458–59.
Id. at 486 (discussing how noncitizens may be in fact more marginalized than lowincome citizens); see also MICHENER, supra note 19, at 57.
430 Johnson, supra note 426, at 486 (“The idea that undocumented persons are not part
of the community carries great weight in the political process.”).
431 See, e.g., Burch Elias, supra note 6, at 706 (discussing inclusive state-level policies
such as expanding noncitizens’ access to driver’s licenses, in-state tuition rates, and
financial aid); see also Rodrı́guez, supra note 6, at 581–82, 591 (detailing local
governments’ role in integrating noncitizens into public life).
432 See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341,
378–79 (2008).
433 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
434 Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, Federalism Under the ACA: Implementation,
Opposition, Entrenchment, in THE TRILLION DOLLAR REVOLUTION: HOW THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT TRANSFORMED POLITICS, LAW, AND HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA
176, 190 (Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Abbe R. Gluck eds., 2020); see also Zhu & Xu, supra note
261, at 457 (describing state-level policy on immigrant access to Medicaid as “show[ing]
mixed promises”).
429
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explains the fact that, even though all states host undocumented
noncitizens, very few have engaged in serious efforts to address these
individuals’ health coverage needs?
This Part describes how Medicaid’s structure can influence states’
policymaking on noncitizen access to health coverage. It explains how
federalism enables states to make or maintain policy that entrenches
the “othering” of noncitizens in healthcare and undermines national
health policy goals;435 and how it frustrates other states’ attempts to
enact inclusionary policy that would advance those goals. This analysis
is inspired by leading scholars from the progressive federalism school
who urge others to bring “focused attention to historical realities and
policy specificities” in order to understand the relationship between
federalism and equality in a given context.436
A. Enabling Exclusionary Policymaking
The laws governing noncitizen access to subsidized health coverage are situated at the intersection of health law and immigration
law. History demonstrates the uneven but steady progress toward centralizing the regulation of matters related to health.437 Immigration
law, on the other hand, is the traditional domain of the federal government.438 Immigration laws govern matters relating to the admission and expulsion of noncitizens, which sometimes take into
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435 See generally Edna A. Viruell-Fuentes, Patricia Y. Miranda & Sawsan Abdulrahim,
More Than Culture: Structural Racism, Intersectionality Theory, and Immigrant Health, 75
SOC. SCI. & MED. 2099, 2101 (2012) (describing the concept of “othering” as “processes
[that] produce and reproduce marginalization, disempowerment and social exclusion”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
436 MICHENER, supra note 19, at 33; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K.
Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1308 (2009) (describing the
usefulness of case studies for illuminating their account of uncooperative federalism);
Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2012)
(encouraging context-specific examinations of institutional arrangements); Gluck &
Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 1703 (criticizing federalism scholarship for being “high on
abstraction and low on concreteness”); Hammond, supra note 19, at 1724–27 (2017)
(describing the need for a case-specific approach as opposed to a trans-substantive and
theoretical approach to federalism). But see Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 1694
(arguing that assessing the success of structural arrangements in healthcare is impossible
until the field of health law establishes first principles).
437 For example, in 1944, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could regulate health
insurance under the Commerce Clause, because insurance is national commerce. Gluck &
Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 1707 (citing United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S.
533, 552–53 (1944)). In 1945, Congress legislated to return that power to the states, so long
as Congress has not explicitly regulated in that space. Id. at 1707–08 (citing McCarranFerguson Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011–15 (2018)).
438 See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text (discussing the plenary power
doctrine).
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consideration a noncitizen’s use of public benefits in the United
States.439 Alienage laws govern matters relating to the lives of noncitizen residents once they are within the United States.440
The federal government’s authority to impose alienage restrictions on eligibility for public benefits is well-established under its
broad constitutional powers over immigration-related matters.441 So
long as alienage restrictions are supported by a rational basis, they will
generally be upheld.442 Because of this low bar, only rarely have
courts invalidated federal laws discriminating against noncitizens as
unconstitutional.443
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has interpreted state
authority to impose alienage restrictions on eligibility for public benefits differently.444 In Graham v. Richardson, the Court considered an
equal protection challenge brought by lawfully residing immigrants
against state welfare laws that discriminated between citizens and
noncitizens.445 After considering whether the state laws violated the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court looked to whether the state laws
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439 Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187, 35
VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 202 (1994).
440 Id.
441 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) (noting that “the fact that Congress has
provided some welfare benefits for citizens does not require it to provide like benefits for
all aliens” and suggesting that “[n]either the overnight visitor, the unfriendly agent of a
hostile foreign power, the resident diplomat, nor the illegal entrant, can advance even a
colorable constitutional claim to a share in the bounty that a conscientious sovereign
makes available to its own citizens and some of its guests”); Wishnie, supra note 6, at
506–07 (describing how the plenary power doctrine explains the Court’s deference to the
federal government’s decisions to discriminate between citizens and noncitizens in the
administration of public benefits).
442 See Andrew Hammond, The Immigration-Welfare Nexus in a New Era?, 22 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 501, 511–14 (2018) (summarizing case law on challenges to disparate
treatment of noncitizens in welfare programs). Courts have recognized several rational
bases for discriminating between citizens and noncitizens in the administration of public
benefits in the many unsuccessful legal challenges to PRWORA’s alienage restrictions. See,
e.g., City of Chicago v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598, 606–07 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he citizenship
requirement is still rationally related to the goal of encouraging aliens to rely on private,
not public, resources to meet their needs.”); Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. United States,
169 F.3d 1342, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 1999) (recognizing “the legitimate purpose of reducing
the cost of . . . welfare programs [food stamps and Supplemental Security Income]”); Kiev
v. Glickman, 991 F. Supp. 1090, 1100 (D. Minn. 1998) (“promoting naturalization and
placing the highest priority for limited welfare funds to provide for citizens”); Cid v. S.D.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 598 N.W.2d 887, 892 (S.D. 1999) (recognizing the “legitimate interest
in implementing the nation’s immigration policy and its uniform rules with respect to alien
eligibility for public benefits”).
443 Wishnie, supra note 6, at 501.
444 See generally Ava Ayers, Discriminatory Cooperative Federalism, 65 VILL. L. REV. 1
(2020) (analyzing doctrines governing Congress’s authority to devolve its power to
discriminate against noncitizens).
445 403 U.S. 365 (1971).

42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 82 Side B

12/10/2020 14:19:35

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\95-6\NYU603.txt

1758

unknown

Seq: 79

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9-DEC-20

16:25

[Vol. 95:1680

were preempted by the exclusive federal immigration power.446 A
state alienage restriction on public benefits eligibility is considered
immigration policy because it imposes an auxiliary burden on lawfully
present noncitizens that is stricter than the conditions that Congress
has imposed on their residence.447 If it is not preempted, equal protection principles apply because states lack a like power to regulate.448
The Court struck down the alienage restrictions because the states’
cost-based rationales did not satisfy strict scrutiny.449
The legacy of Graham v. Richardson prior to the passage of
PRWORA was that state public benefit laws that discriminated
against lawfully present noncitizens were upheld only if they satisfied
strict scrutiny.450 On account of the exclusive federal power over
immigration, courts analyzed equal protection claims brought by
noncitizens differently depending on whether they were challenging
state or federal laws.451 With the passage of PRWORA, Congress
largely eliminated the divergent treatment of state and federal
alienage restrictions on federal public benefits by explicitly authorizing states to enact discriminatory public benefit laws in a way that
does not withstand strict scrutiny. As Professor Parmet notes,
“PRWORA attempts to protect states that discriminate against noncitizens in a manner that would otherwise violate the Equal Protection
Clause.”452
Post-PRWORA, courts’ analyses of discriminatory state laws
have focused on whether the state is merely implementing federal
law—in which case rational basis review applies—or whether it is gov-

12/10/2020 14:19:35

Id. at 376–78.
See id. at 378–79 (“[W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its superior
authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation . . . states cannot,
inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or
complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” (alteration in
original) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66–67) (1941)).
448 See id. at 377–78. LPRs have long been considered “persons” protected by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n,
334 U.S. 410, 419 n.7 (1948) (citing several Supreme Court cases dating back to 1886
recognizing this principle). State discrimination against undocumented immigrants, on the
other hand, has not been subject to heightened scrutiny except for in one case, Plyler v.
Doe, in which the Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny to a Texas law restricting
public education access to undocumented immigrants. Cf. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (“If the State is
to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers to
other children residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it
furthers some substantial state interest. No such showing was made here.”).
449 Graham, 403 U.S. at 376.
450 Jenny-Brooke Condon, The Preempting of Equal Protection for Immigrants?, 73
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77, 93, 102–03 (2016).
451 See Parmet, supra note 6, at 226.
452 Id. at 233 n.81.
447
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erning a state-funded, state-administered program—in which case
strict scrutiny would still apply.453 In essence, in the area of public
benefits, Congress has devolved its authority to discriminate against
noncitizens with limited judicial review to states.454 As a result, states
have faced very few barriers to excluding noncitizens from Medicaid,
regardless of their reasons for doing so. Racism, nativism, and xenophobia are among the motivations driving social welfare policy in the
states.
B.

Creating Barriers for Inclusionary Policymaking

12/10/2020 14:19:35

453 See Conn. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2004-002, Opinion Letter on Constitutionality of
2002 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 02-07 (Feb. 24, 2004). As described in note 448, supra, this
bifurcated standard does not apply to state discrimination against undocumented
noncitizens.
454 In Massachusetts and New York, courts have determined that alienage restrictions
for subsidized health coverage that apply to lawfully present immigrants violate their state
constitutions. See Parmet, supra note 6, at 234 (citing Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins.
Connector Auth., 959 N.E.2d 970, 984 (Mass. 2012) and Fayad ex rel. Aliessa v. Novello,
754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098–99 (N.Y. 2001)).
455 Robin Rudowitz, Kendal Orgera & Elizabeth Hinton, Medicaid Financing: The
Basics, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/
medicaid-financing-the-basics/view/print.
456 Cf. ZIMMERMANN & TUMLIN, supra note 156, at 4 (“States with higher per capita
incomes are also generally more likely to provide assistance than states with lower per
capita incomes.”).
457 David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2587 (2005).
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For states desiring to enact health policies that are inclusive of
low-income noncitizen residents, the decentralized structure of the
laws governing noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid represents a barrier.
In this Section, I describe the fiscal and political barriers that frustrate
state efforts to enact inclusionary policies that address the healthcare
needs of noncitizens.
Any expansion of health coverage, whether it is at the state or
federal level, requires the infusion of public funds. For states,
Medicaid is both a major expenditure and the largest source of federal
funding.455 In terms of fiscal capacity, states begin at remarkably different baselines. In addition, states have varying ratios of noncitizen
residents to citizen residents. These factors can limit their ability to
self-fund health coverage programs or even to take advantage of federal options to expand Medicaid coverage, since states are responsible
for a portion of the costs.456 Indeed, Medicaid’s cooperative federalstate financing arrangement does not effectively address states’ fiscal
difficulties because “the states most in need of help will be those least
able to claim it.”457 In the broader health reform context, we see that
some states have cited fiscal concerns as one reason for declining to
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458 See David K. Jones, Phillip M. Singer & John Z. Ayanian, The Changing Landscape
of Medicaid: Practical and Political Considerations for Expansion, 311 JAMA 1965, 1966
(2014) (describing state officials’ concerns that the federal government will not sustain its
increased share of Medicaid funding, further burdening states in the long term). The
federal share of the cost of Medicaid expansion was 100% from 2014 to 2016, phasing
down to 90% in 2020. Id. at 1965.
459 See supra notes 151–55, 158 and accompanying text.
460 See ZIMMERMANN & TUMLIN, supra note 156, at 46 (“States with higher per capita
incomes are generally more likely to provide assistance than states with lower per capita
incomes. States with the lowest per capita incomes almost uniformly provide fewer benefits
. . . .”); Reese et al., supra note 26, at 117 (“[L]egal immigrants’ welfare rights partly
depend on economic conditions. . . . [S]tates adopted more exclusive policies when they
had a higher poverty rate (and hence a larger demand for welfare).”).
461 Super, supra note 457, at 2608–09.
462 See id. at 2632–33.
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adopt the ACA Medicaid expansion, even though federal support for
expansion is exceptionally generous.458 Because federal funding for
Medicaid expansion to noncitizens is less generous or nonexistent, we
can expect fiscal concerns to be an even greater consideration in state
policymaking. For example, PRWORA imposed a five-year bar on
LPR eligibility for Medicaid, with limited exceptions.459 Immediately
post-PRWORA, states had to consider the fiscal implications of
devoting state funds to restoring Medicaid eligibility to certain LPRs
for whom expansion was optional. More dauntingly, states were faced
with the decision of whether to use state funds only to restore publicly
funded health coverage for LPRs during their first five years in the
United States. It is likely that some states concluded that it was infeasible to do so.460 After the ICHIA options became available, providing states with the opportunity to expand Medicaid to a subset of
noncitizens who had lost coverage under PRWORA, states once again
weighed the decision of devoting significant state funds to expanding
access to health coverage for low-income noncitizens against other
fiscal needs.
Most states, unlike the federal government, are constitutionally
required to balance their budgets every year.461 This means that
during economic recessions, states must find ways to cut spending.
Often, these cuts disproportionately affect countercyclical spending
programs such as Medicaid, which increase spending when revenues
are down.462 As more residents become eligible for Medicaid due to
income loss, there is pressure for the state to restrict eligibility criteria
and services in order to limit spending. Since eliminating programs
due to budget constraints is always unpopular, politicians may be wary
of committing funding to covering groups that are not required to be
covered by Medicaid—which includes many noncitizens.
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463 Id. at 2635–36 (“[T]hese programs’ budgets are vulnerable to budget-driven cuts in
bad economic times and demand-driven reductions in good ones.”).
464 Id. at 2615.
465 See id. at 2565–66 (noting that the federal government, in healthcare financing,
“commonly takes the most politically appealing functions for itself, leaving the less
desirable ones to uncertain fates at the hands of the states”).
466 Wishnie, supra note 6, at 514–16.
467 See ZIMMERMANN & TUMLIN, supra note 156, at 59 tbl.4.
468 See id. at 64 tbl.8.
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Even if a state had elected federal options to expand Medicaid to
some noncitizens and then cut coverage of these groups during a
recession, it is unlikely that the former level of coverage would be
restored after the recession. During economic recoveries, states rarely
restore eligibility and services back to their prior level due to competition for resources from other programs. Spending generally declines
as the economy improves and fewer residents qualify.463 Therefore,
state balanced budget requirements, among other structural influences, have the effect of systematically ratcheting down state spending
on countercyclical programs over time.464 With fewer resources to
devote to subsidizing health coverage overall, programs covering the
least politically appealing groups, such as low-income noncitizens, are
deprioritized.465 For example, post-PRWORA, most states were not
persuaded to maintain the status quo of coverage for lawfully present
but non-qualified noncitizens.466 Programs that cover populations that
are ineligible for Medicaid matching funds, such as undocumented
noncitizens, may be considered the most expendable from both fiscal
and political perspectives.
By 1998, only fourteen states had used state funds to restore publicly funded health insurance comparable to Medicaid for noncitizen
groups affected by PRWORA’s five-year bar.467 Some states initially
restored eligibility for state-funded health coverage to only a subset of
noncitizens affected by the five-year bar. For example, within two
years of PRWORA’s passage, Illinois and Rhode Island provided coverage to noncitizen children and pregnant women; Maryland provided
coverage to noncitizen children, full-time students expected to complete high school before the end of the calendar year, and pregnant
noncitizens; Virginia provided coverage to noncitizen children and
noncitizens receiving Medicaid and living in long-term care facilities
on June 30, 1997; and Washington and Connecticut imposed new residency requirements of twelve months and six months, respectively, for
noncitizens who were no longer eligible for Medicaid because of the
five-year bar.468 Since then, at least fifteen more states have used
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exclusively state funds to provide publicly funded health coverage to
categories of noncitizens excluded by PRWORA.469
These state-funded programs differ significantly in terms of the
eligible noncitizen categories,470 reflecting different priorities about
how best to fill the gaps that federal law leaves behind. This variability
is a function of PRWORA’s new federal floor of noncitizen eligibility
for Medicaid and its devolution of authority to states to determine
noncitizen eligibility for groups above that floor. Even some states
that had provided relatively generous benefits to lawfully present
noncitizens in the past “reset” their floor during this period of public
benefits retrenchment in order to maintain high benefit levels for the
mandatory coverage groups.471
Since fiscal and political concerns are typically two sides of the
same coin, a related way in which the federalism arrangement governing noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid creates a barrier for inclusionary policymaking is by siloing state-level advocacy. In consequence,
it becomes harder for organizations to harness synergies and pool
knowledge and resources to advance equitable policy.472 Since states
have wide discretion to make policy in this area, every state is a
unique piece of the patchwork of immigration exclusion from
Medicaid.473 When each state has a different baseline of coverage for
immigrants, advocates for inclusionary policy must focus their energy
and resources on different goals.
Despite these political and cost-related barriers, recent state
efforts to expand coverage for noncitizens are making incremental
progress toward coverage for all residents.474 California has taken the
42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 84 Side B
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469 See MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR IMMIGRANTS IN VARIOUS STATES, supra
note 29, at 1–5. In addition to the six states (California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York,
Oregon, and Washington) and the District of Columbia, whose programs are discussed in
Section I.B, they are Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Section I.B.4 reviewed how states have taken advantage
of the ICHIA and Unborn Child options to jointly fund coverage for some categories of
noncitizens who lost eligibility post-PRWORA.
470 See id. For example, Minnesota uses state funds only to provide coverage to DACA
recipients and individuals who receive services from the Center for Victims of Torture,
while New Mexico provides coverage to qualified battered noncitizens and PRUCOL
noncitizens who resided in the United States before PRWORA was enacted.
471 Cf. Reese et al., supra note 26, at 105–06.
472 See Michener, supra note 14, at 119 (describing the “‘many-headed’ [Medicaid]
policy that takes very different forms in different places” and thus makes it harder for
advocates to coordinate efforts across state lines).
473 See supra Section I.B (describing the patchwork of exclusion).
474 See, e.g., Odette Yousef, Undocumented, Low-Income Illinois Seniors Can Soon Get
Publicly Funded Health Coverage, NPR (June 11, 2020), https://www.npr.org/local/309/
2020/06/11/874985727/undocumented-low-income-illinois-seniors-can-soon-get-publiclyfunded-health-coverage (describing how Illinois became “the first state in the country to
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lead in this effort by expanding Medi-Cal to undocumented children
in 2016 and to young adults up to the age of twenty-six in 2020.475 Still,
in 2019, a proposal to expand Medi-Cal to all undocumented adults
was vigorously debated and ultimately defeated over cost-related concerns.476 A modified proposal to cover undocumented senior citizens
was defeated on the same grounds.477 California governor Gavin
Newsom continues to support an expansion of Medi-Cal to undocumented senior citizens, maintaining that universal health coverage will
ultimately save money.478 In January 2020, he proposed to allocate
$80.5 million from the state general fund for that purpose in the 202021 budget.479
Meanwhile, in Georgia, undocumented and lawfully present but
non-qualified noncitizens are excluded from Medicaid, as are most
qualified noncitizens for the first five years after obtaining that
status.480 The state has not elected any of the federal options to
expand Medicaid or CHIP to additional noncitizens.481 Nor, unsurprisingly, has it created state-funded programs to expand noncitizen
access to health coverage.482 In 2015, the executive director of
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expand publicly funded health care coverage to undocumented seniors and seniors who
have held green cards for less than five years,” although fiscal concerns limited the initial
proposal to expand state-funded health coverage to all Illinois residents who qualified
financially); Rosanna Carvacho, Charlie Iovino, Sage Schaftel & Gianna Setoudeh,
Expansion of Medicaid Eligibility for Undocumented Young Adults, JD SUPRA (Mar. 1,
2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/expansion-of-medicaid-eligibility-for-55794
(describing proposals by California and Washington to expand Medicaid eligibility for
undocumented young adults and related fiscal considerations).
475 SB 75 - Full Scope Medi-Cal for All Children, DHCS, https://www.dhcs.ca.gov/
services/medi-cal/eligibility/Pages/SB-75.aspx (last updated July 19, 2019); Young Adult
Expansion, DHCS, https://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/medi-cal/eligibility/Pages/
YoungAdultExp.aspx (last updated July 21, 2020).
476 See, e.g., Caiola, Promise of Health Benefits, supra note 240.
477 Id.
478 See, e.g., Angela Hart, Newsom Proposes Medicaid Benefits for Undocumented
Senior Citizens, POLITICO (Jan. 10, 2020, 3:11 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/
california/story/2020/01/10/newsom-proposes-medicaid-benefits-for-undocumented-seniorcitizens-1248937 (noting that “Gov. Gavin Newsom is proposing that California provide
Medicaid benefits to undocumented senior citizens” and citing the Governor’s remarks
that doing so “is the right thing morally” and also “financially responsible”).
479 Id.
480 See Laura Harker, Five-Year Waiting Period Is a Barrier to Immigrant Health Care
Access, GA. BUDGET & POL’Y INST. (Oct. 21, 2019), https://gbpi.org/2019/five-year-waitingperiod-barrier-immigrant-health (“Georgia children and pregnant women who are lawful
permanent residents (LPRs or ‘green card’ holders) typically must wait five years after
they gain this status to be eligible for Medicaid or PeachCare.”).
481 See id. (“When the CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2009 was signed into law on
February 4, 2009, it included several policies to get more children enrolled in health care
coverage. . . . Georgia’s Medicaid agency can take [these options] . . . .”).
482 See MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR IMMIGRANTS IN VARIOUS STATES, supra
note 29 (listing states that provide access to health coverage to noncitizens beyond the
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Georgians for a Healthy Future, an advocacy group dedicated to
closing the coverage gap for low-income Georgians, observed: “We
are having a very different conversation . . . I think we are really far
away as a state from where California is.”483 Health advocacy efforts
are currently focused on supporting Medicaid expansion for lowincome citizens and otherwise eligible immigrants.
This is a sign of a larger flaw in Medicaid’s structure. Jamila
Michener writes that “[f]ederalism can fragment the politics of
Medicaid, splinter policy coalitions and interest groups, raise barriers
to political coordination across locales, impede democratic accountability, and differentially demobilize policy beneficiaries as well as
those who live in communities alongside them.”484 These effects are
particularly acute in the post-ACA, polarized health policy space in
which state-level advocates must funnel resources toward defending
against attacks and maintaining the status quo rather than imagining a
more inclusive future.485 For example, in states like Georgia that are
proposing to adopt the ACA Medicaid expansion only if a waiver
imposing work requirements on recipients is approved, advocacy
organizations are divided on whether to support the effort.486 One can
imagine how immigrant-inclusionary policy would meet a similar fate,
dividing healthcare consumers who would otherwise stand to benefit
from joint advocacy.487
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federal floor of Medicaid and CHIP coverage and enumerating the programs offered, but
excluding other states, such as Georgia, that offer no such access).
483 Anna Gorman, California Has Novel View of Health Care for Undocumented
Immigrants, USA TODAY (Jan. 17, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nationnow/2015/01/17/california-dramatically-different-approach-to-health-care-forundocumented-immigrants/21871167.
484 Michener, supra note 14, at 119.
485 See id. at 120 (“Although [health policy advocates] continue to push back as each
new hurdle is erected, doing so absorbs energy that might otherwise be useful for
mobilizing more broadly and deeply, thinking beyond the most immediate political
challenges and organizing affirmatively—not just against regressive change but for positive
change.”).
486 See Michener, supra note 14, at 120–21; Georgia Proposal to Partially Expand
Medicaid Would Disproportionately Jeopardize Patients with Cancer, ASCO (Jan. 21,
2020), https://www.asco.org/practice-policy/policy-issues-statements/asco-in-action/georgiaproposal-partially-expand-medicaid; Jill Nolin, Commenters Question State Medicaid
Waiver Plan for Work Requirements, GA. RECORDER (Dec. 13, 2019), https://
georgiarecorder.com/2019/12/13/commenters-question-state-medicaid-waiver-plan-forwork-requirements.
487 Id. at 125–26 (“[T]hese negative feedback processes can dampen coalitional
possibilities by straining the organizations that might work to forge coalitions and dividing
those with the most at stake.”).
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See discussion supra notes 81–84.
For example, Abbe Gluck has described four ways in which state implementation of
federal law can benefit federal lawmaking: it can do so by (1) encouraging and influencing
experimentation at the state level; (2) entrenching federal statutory norms; (3) easing entry
into a field of lawmaking that is traditionally governed by the states; and (4) effectuating
traditional federalism values such as autonomy, policy variation, and political participation.
Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 565
(2011). Although this discussion focuses on the policy experimentation rationale, it should
not be read to exclude these and other factors that may have influenced Congress’s
decision to devolve authority over immigrant eligibility for Medicaid to the states.
490 See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 1799.
491 Huberfeld, supra note 34, at 457.
492 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (“It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.”).
493 See id.
489
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As described in Part I, federalism arrangements in healthcare are
not constitutionally required.488 Therefore, Congress must have had
other reasons for designing Medicaid as a cooperative federalism program. Scholars have explored many possible reasons why Congress
devolves regulatory authority to states on matters which it indisputably possesses the power to regulate.489 However, the overarching
justification for federalism in Medicaid is the assumption that staterun programs will result in better policy outcomes: better quality,
lower costs, and more competition and innovation.490
Policy experimentation is the federalism value that is most often
used to justify cooperative federalism arrangements in the regulation
of healthcare and is the focus of this discussion.491 In theory, federalism arrangements enable states to engage in policy experimentation.492 These experiments are considered valuable because they
produce useful knowledge in a contained environment, provide templates for other states to replicate successful experiments, and result in
the enactment of optimal policy, i.e., policies that accomplish their
intended effects and that do not have counterproductive side effects.
This is Justice Brandeis’s well-known depiction of states as “laboratories of democracy.”493
However, federalism arrangements do not always produce
optimal experimentation. This Part explores the limits of decentralization for producing optimal policy, showing why the current structure
of Medicaid fails to meet the goals of federalism itself. I identify the
mechanisms that stifle state policy experimentation and that impede
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replication by other states. Although this Part focuses on the devolution of policy governing noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid, the
insights described extend beyond this context. Federalism scholars
may use this analysis to inform broader investigations of the relationship between decentralization of policy and its effects on equality.
A.

Sluggish Experimentation

12/10/2020 14:19:35

494 See, e.g., Corrado Giulietti, The Welfare Magnet Hypothesis and the Welfare Take-up
of Migrants, 37 IZA WORLD LAB. 1, 3 (2014) (“There is a widespread perception in
developed countries that immigrants from less-developed areas . . . potentially decide to
migrate to countries offering more generous welfare programs.”); Peter Nannestad,
Immigration and Welfare States: A Survey of 15 Years of Research, 23 EUR. J. POL. ECON.
512, 516–17 (2007) (reviewing scholarly literature on the welfare magnet hypothesis).
495 Nannestad, supra note 494, at 516–17 (citing George J. Borjas, Immigration and
Welfare Magnets, 17 J. LAB. ECON. 607 (1999)).
496 See id. at 513 (noting that most research on the welfare state and immigration has
only been done within economics).
497 See id. at 516–17 (reviewing the mixed findings in the literature on the welfare
magnet hypothesis); Giulietti, supra note 494, at 4 (reviewing the same body of literature,
but concluding that any welfare magnet effect that may exist is “limited compared with
other determinants of migration”); Neeraj Kaushal, New Immigrants’ Location Choices:
Magnets Without Welfare, 23 J. LAB. ECON. 59, 79 (2005) (finding that the availability and
generosity of welfare programs have little effect on the location choices of newly arrived
immigrants); Madeline Zavodny, Determinants of Recent Immigrants’ Locational Choices,
33 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 1014, 1028 (1999) (finding “little evidence that recent recipients
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In the ideal conception of states as laboratories of democracy,
states would compete to test hypotheses about the effects of
expanding or restricting noncitizen eligibility for publicly funded
health coverage. But states have not done this in practice. Rather,
experimentation has been sluggish, and immigrant-inclusive policy diffusion is nearly nonexistent.
One of the challenges of policy learning across states in this context is undoubtedly ideological polarization on issues relating to
noncitizens’ rights. Restrictionist ideology can cloud state officials’
judgment even in the face of empirical evidence contradicting their
views. For example, in popular and scholarly discourse, a principal
argument against offering generous healthcare or other benefits to
noncitizens is the fear of creating a “welfare magnet” for low-income
noncitizens.494 The welfare magnet hypothesis predicts that lowincome noncitizens will cluster in nations or states with the most generous benefits.495 Despite the dominance of this justification for immigration restrictionism, theoretical and empirical social science
literature on the relationship between welfare states and immigration
is surprisingly sparse.496 Existing empirical support for the welfare
magnet hypothesis is mixed, and there is some evidence against it in
the Medicaid context.497 One recent study examining interstate migra-
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of LPR status base their locational choices within the United States on the generosity of
welfare benefits,” but noting that new refugees and asylees are more likely to settle in
states with more generous welfare programs providing cash and nutrition benefits).
498 Vasil I. Yasenov, Duncan Lawrence, Fernando S. Mendoza & Jens Hainmueller,
Public Health Insurance Expansion for Immigrant Children and Interstate Migration of
Low-Income Immigrants, 174 JAMA PEDIATRICS 22, 27 (2020).
499 Id.
500 See Chiles v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1994), aff’d, 69 F.3d 1094
(11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1188 (1996); Legomsky, supra note 6, at 1471
(describing state lawsuits against the federal government to recover social service costs
associated with undocumented immigration).
501 See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 436, at 1267 (explaining that one of the
main arguments against commandeering is the belief that the federal government should
cover the costs of its policies); Calvo, supra note 73, at 411 (describing how Florida
senators successfully advocated for making PRUCOL noncitizens eligible for SSI in 1972
based on the disproportionate economic burden they would face if eligibility for the
benefit were more restrictive).
502 All were dismissed as presenting a nonjusticiable political question.
503 See Super, supra note 457, at 2572 (describing the compensatory model).
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tion of noncitizens between 2000 and 2016 found that state expansions
of Medicaid or CHIP to lawfully present children or pregnant women
under the ICHIA options were not associated with migration in pursuit of health insurance.498 The authors suggest that this conclusion
has important implications for states considering expanding health
coverage for noncitizens, particularly as they estimate the short- and
long-term costs of expansion.499 Despite the lack of evidence supporting the welfare magnet hypothesis, it is among the most common
objections to expanding public benefits for noncitizens.
Conversely, state-level executive officials like governors and
healthcare agency heads may already be persuaded that expanding
access for noncitizens is good health policy, but they may be unwilling
to enact such policy if they feel it is the federal government’s responsibility to remedy the disparity in noncitizen access to health coverage.
Communities with large populations of excluded noncitizens have
sued the federal government in order to obtain reimbursement for the
cost of providing healthcare benefits to them.500 Their argument is
that since the federal government is responsible for both making
immigration policy and barring certain noncitizens from eligibility for
federal public benefits, it should be responsible for the results of its
policies.501 Although these lawsuits were ultimately unsuccessful,502
they reflect the normative argument that the federal government
should indemnify or compensate state governments when federal policies—particularly those that are exclusively within federal authority—
create costs for states.503 At times, the federal government has recognized a responsibility to compensate states for such costs, as when it
created State Legalization Impact Assistance Grants to assist states
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504 See id. (naming the State Legalization Impact Assistance Grants as one of the few
times the federal government has compensated states for costs resulting from federal
policies).
505 See, e.g., Angela M. Elsperger, Florida’s Battle with the Federal Government over
Immigration Policy Holds Children Hostage: They Are Not Our Children!, 13 LAW & INEQ.
141, 147 (1995) (telling the story behind Chiles v. United States, in which Florida claimed
that it must deny foster care to undocumented noncitizen children in response to the
federal government’s lack of enforcement of immigration laws and reimbursement for
program costs).
506 Gluck, supra note 489, at 568.
507 See discussion supra Section III.B.
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with the costs of providing social services to formerly undocumented
noncitizens who obtained status through the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986.504 In the absence of such recognition and assistance, states may be driven to make suboptimal policy.505 When states
fail to enact the policies that they deem optimal for their populations,
federalism is not producing useful knowledge from the state
laboratories.
More broadly, PRWORA crippled meaningful state experimentation on immigrant-inclusive Medicaid policy by making exclusion,
rather than inclusion, the norm at the federal level. It is an example of
how federal legislation can “influence the direction of state experiments in ways that state experimentation in the absence of federal law
does not.”506 By imposing new restrictions on the use of federal funds
to cover many previously eligible, lawfully present noncitizens,
PRWORA made it much harder for states to experiment with inclusive Medicaid policy. States are unable to function as autonomous laboratories because, in the current federalism arrangement, they are
heavily beholden to federal funds and, therefore, federal laws dictating how those funds must be spent. Moreover, the reality is that
most states are not in a good position to self-fund expansions of publicly funded health coverage to noncitizens because of variability in
resources (complicated by the requirement in most states to balance
the budget each year) and in where excluded noncitizen populations
reside.507
Finally, the existing structure of federal exclusion of noncitizens
from Medicaid, the state patchwork of coverage, and federal mechanisms to reimburse healthcare providers for treating excluded noncitizens depress state experimentation and produce suboptimal policy.
When states undersupply the optimal level of subsidized health coverage for noncitizens, they increase the likelihood that noncitizens will
delay care until there is an emergency. Rather than seek treatment for
health conditions from a primary care provider, where it is likely they
can be treated relatively effectively and inexpensively, uninsured
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people tend to seek treatment when the condition has progressed to
the point that it is too painful or debilitating to bear. And they seek it
in the emergency room, the most expensive place to receive care.508
The federal government has committed to bearing a significant
portion of these costs through programs to partially reimburse states
such as Emergency Medicaid,509 Disproportionate Share Hospital
payments,510 and supplemental funding for healthcare provided to
undocumented noncitizens.511 By stepping in to cushion the costs of
bad policy, the federal government creates another disincentive for
state innovation. When states are shielded from bearing the full cost
of inefficient policies—and instead externalize a significant portion of
the costs on to the federal government—they do not have the incentive to improve those policies. Centralizing funding and decisions
about noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid would avoid this scenario.
On the other hand, if the federal government did not absorb
some of the costs of healthcare for excluded noncitizens, there would
be a risk of creating a “race to the bottom” in which states that are
concerned about the welfare magnet effect and the associated fiscal
burden of expanding healthcare benefits would enact policies that are
less generous than those of their neighbors.512 Specifically, in this context, states would select more restrictive alienage criteria for
Medicaid.513 From both the state and national perspectives, the race
to the bottom would produce suboptimal policy for residents who
would benefit from health coverage.

12/10/2020 14:19:35

See supra notes 383–84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 386–88 and accompanying text.
510 See Teresa A. Coughlin, Leighton Ku & Johnny Kim, Reforming the Medicaid
Disproportionate Share Hospital Program, 22 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 137, 137,
139 (2000); Super, supra note 228, at 8–9; see also discussion supra Section I.B.2.
511 See Legomsky, supra note 6, at 1470 (describing Congress’s authorization of “state
legalization impact assistance grants” in 1986 to partially reimburse states for costs
associated with providing services to previously undocumented immigrants who obtained
status under the Immigration Reform and Control Act); Perkins, supra note 356, at 392
(describing Balanced Budget Act of 1997 funding to subsidize emergency Medicaid for
twelve states with the greatest number of undocumented immigrants and the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 funding for providers in
all states for emergency health services to undocumented immigrants).
512 See Jan K. Brueckner, Welfare Reform and the Race to the Bottom: Theory and
Evidence, 66 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 505, 507 (2000) (explaining the race-to-the-bottom
argument in favor of federal welfare contributions in the form of matching grants). Even
though the evidence does not support the existence of a welfare magnet effect, states may
rely on it out of fear or xenophobia.
513 See Legomsky, supra note 6, at 1471 (explaining how state-level cuts to public
benefits could create a race to the bottom if the welfare magnet hypothesis is accepted).
509
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514 See Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulatory Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1689 (2014)
(explaining that many theories about state policy experimentation expect states to copy the
policies of other states when there is accessible information about the policy).
515 See Ansell et al., supra note 120, at 782.
516 Id. at 782–83.
517 Id. at 783–84.
518 Id. at 784.
519 See supra text accompanying notes 119–23.
520 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV.
953, 955 (2016) (describing how, on some policy issues, state action seems to be motivated
more by ideological preference than by the desire to achieve federal policy outcomes in
cooperative federalism arrangements); Wiseman, supra note 514, at 1718 (2014) (noting
that states may produce inadequate information regarding their policy experimentation in
part as a result of their “political views”).
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Another theoretical benefit of the laboratories of democracy concept is that states should replicate successful healthcare policy experiments.514 As described in the previous Section, few states have been
able to engage in meaningful policy experimentation to expand health
coverage to noncitizens. The successful experiments that have been
conducted have, with few exceptions, not been replicated. Take coverage of kidney transplants as a case study: Illinois is the first and only
state to fund kidney transplants for people with ESKD regardless of
citizenship or immigration status.515 In order to pass the authorizing
legislation, physician advocates joined forces with community activists
to explain to state legislators that, “[f]or patients with renal failure, a
kidney transplant represents the only path to full recovery.”516 They
assembled evidence that undocumented noncitizens donate a disproportionate share of transplanted organs.517 Although humanitarian
and fairness concerns did play a role in persuading legislators to support the bill, the most persuasive rationale was related to costs,
because the cost of providing standard dialysis treatment begins to
exceed the cost of a kidney transplant at two years and nine
months.518 Despite this compelling pragmatic and moral case for why
states should fund kidney transplants for excluded noncitizens, no
other states have followed Illinois’s example. In fact, some states do
not even cover regular dialysis treatment for excluded noncitizens
with kidney failure.519
This example demonstrates that even if a state’s policy experimentation produces useful information from a social welfare perspective, other states may not use that information to inform their own
policy content.520 Rather, state policies on subsidizing healthcare for
noncitizens—like state policies on subsidizing healthcare generally—
track other factors (demographic, fiscal, political, etc.) more closely
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than any useful indicator of “good” health policy.521 Scholars have
also observed a remarkable degree of path dependence in healthcare
policy: poorer, southern states tend to decline options to expand cooperative federalism social welfare programs while wealthier states cash
in on such options to the maximum extent.522
A tradition of welfare generosity to residents may also influence
a state’s decision to provide public benefits to noncitizens. Some
scholars have theorized that “states with more generous welfare
spending in the past would be more likely to spend more subsequently
and to be more inclusive.”523 In line with this hypothesis, one study
found that states with the most generous welfare benefits for the general population were more likely to restore benefits for noncitizens
after PRWORA.524
Studies that have examined the effect of immigration on state
social welfare policies do not reach consistent conclusions about the
direction and extent of the relationship.525 For example, they do not
establish a relationship between the size of a state’s foreign-born population and the inclusivity of social welfare policies for noncitizens.526
Reese et al. have proposed various theories to explain the causal
mechanisms behind the relationships identified in these studies;527
however, additional research is needed to determine the precise
mechanisms by which these relationships operate.528

42738-nyu_95-6 Sheet No. 89 Side A
12/10/2020 14:19:35

521 See Reese et al., supra note 26 (describing the relationship between states’ decisions
to restore public benefits eligibility to authorized noncitizens after PRWORA and various
other factors).
522 See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 1717 (discussing poorer, southern states’
reluctance to expand Medicaid and wealthier states’ embrace of the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion).
523 Reese et al., supra note 26, at 105 (describing the “institutionalist perspective”).
524 ZIMMERMANN & TUMLIN, supra note 156, at 46. Some studies have found that states
with more immigrant-inclusive welfare policies tend to provide less generous TANF
benefits. Rodney E. Hero & Robert R. Preuhs, Immigration and the Evolving Welfare
State: Examining Policies in the U.S. States, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 498, 510 (2007) [hereinafter
Hero & Preuhs, Immigration and the Evolving Welfare State]. However, this could be
explained in at least two different ways: that immigrant-inclusive policies erode support for
TANF or that they signal support for equitable eligibility criteria over maximization of
TANF grants for a more exclusive group of recipients. Reese et al., supra note 26, at 106
(citing Rodney E. Hero & Robert R. Preuhs, Black-Latino Political Relationships: Policy
Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 38 AM. POL. RES. 531 (2010) for the first
explanation and Ybonne Zylan and Sarah A. Soule, Ending Welfare As We Know It
(Again): Welfare State Retrenchment, 1989–1995, 79 SOC. FORCES 623 (2000) for the second
explanation).
525 Brown & Kahn Best, supra note 26, at 789.
526 Hero & Preuhs, Immigration and the Evolving Welfare State, supra note 524 (finding
no relationship); Reese et al., supra note 26 (finding a positive relationship).
527 Reese et al., supra note 26, at 104–05.
528 See id. at 119 (describing the types of data and future research that are needed to
establish the causal mechanisms behind these relationships).
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State policies on the subject of noncitizen eligibility for publicly
funded health coverage are motivated more by factors unrelated to
good health policy. Rather, they are what I term “incidental health
policy,” untethered to the normative goals of efficiency and equity.
Since states in this context are not functioning as effective laboratories
of experimentation for health policy, this justification for federalism
does not apply.
CONCLUSION
A decade after the passage of the ACA, prominent Democratic
lawmakers have co-sponsored “Medicare for All” bills in the House
and Senate that would transform the U.S. healthcare system into a
single-payer system for “[e]very individual who is a resident of the
United States,” including, potentially, currently excluded noncitizens.529 Others, including President-elect Joseph R. Biden Jr., support more modest plans that would build on the ACA and herald a
new standard of inclusion of noncitizens in publicly funded health
insurance programs.530 Although there is substantial popular support
for preserving the ACA’s coverage expansions and protections, the
idea of including more noncitizens in national health insurance programs is deeply contested.531
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529 Medicare for All Act of 2019, S. 1129, 116th Cong. § 102(a) (2019); Medicare for All
Act of 2019, H.R. 1384, 116th Cong. § 102(a) (2019). The bills do not define the term “U.S.
resident” with enough specificity to guarantee that currently excluded noncitizens would
be eligible to enroll; rather, they delegate this responsibility to the HHS Secretary. S. 1129,
§ 102(a); H.R. 1384, § 102(a). However, the primary sponsors of the bills publicly support
the inclusion of noncitizens—including undocumented immigrants. See, e.g., Paulina Firozi,
Jayapal’s Medicare-for-All Bill Reflects Influence of Hard-Line Progressive Groups, WASH.
POST: THE HEALTH 202 (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/
paloma/the-health-202/2019/03/11/the-health-202-jayapal-s-medicare-for-all-bill-reflectsinfluence-of-hard-line-progressive-groups/5c82a8d61b326b2d177d6037; Bernie Sanders
(@BernieSanders), TWITTER (June 21, 2019, 12:31 PM), https://twitter.com/BernieSanders/
status/1142107691671859200 (“If you are a human being, regardless of your immigration
status, you have a right to health care. #MedicareForAll.”).
530 See Medicare for America Act of 2019, H.R. 2452, 116th Cong. § 111 (2019) (stating
that all residents who would be eligible for Emergency Medicaid, which has no alienage
restriction, would qualify for coverage); Larry Levitt, Trump vs. Biden on Health Care,
JAMA HEALTH FORUM (Sept. 3, 2020) (describing Biden’s proposal to expand Medicaid
and CHIP to a broader group of noncitizens and to allow undocumented noncitizens to
purchase unnsubsidized coverage on the ACA Marketplaces).
531 Compare Proclamation No. 9945, 84 Fed. Reg. 53,991 (Oct. 9, 2019) (restricting the
entry of immigrants “who will financially burden the United States healthcare system”),
with N.Y. Times Editorial Board, Opinion, With Coronavirus, ‘Health Care for Some’ Is a
Recipe for Disaster, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/06/
opinion/coronavirus-immigrants-health.html (noting doctors’ and immigration advocates’
concerns that the Trump Administration’s public charge rule “could deter millions of
noncitizens . . . from using programs like Medicaid, WIC and SNAP or from seeking
medical care of any kind”).
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Conover, supra note 45.
See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Distinguished Scholar in Residence Lecture: A User’s
Guide to Progressive Federalism, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1087, 1087 (2017) (“[F]ederalism
doesn’t have a political valence.”).
533
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Why should the United States subsidize the healthcare of noncitizens, especially if they are undocumented? Not only is it morally
imperative to provide coverage to all who need it, but it is also directly
beneficial to the community as a whole. The entire community benefits along a number of measures when all receive access to health coverage. Moreover, because taxpayers already subsidize healthcare for
some excluded noncitizens, the question, more accurately, is how to
realize these benefits in the most efficient way, where greater efficiency has a substantial connection to greater equity. Through various
safety net programs, federal subsidies to healthcare providers that
treat a disproportionate share of uninsured people, hospital charity
care programs, higher insurance premiums, and the patchwork of state
and local policies on noncitizen eligibility for subsidized health coverage, the United States spends approximately $18.5 billion to subsidize the healthcare of noncitizens who are currently excluded from
Medicaid.532
When Congress passed PRWORA in 1996, it devolved authority
to the states to make policy about noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid,
thus relieving the federal government of pressure to address a
national problem and contributing to political stasis. The existing
patchwork of noncitizen exclusion from Medicaid is counterproductive to our national health policy goals of improving population health
outcomes, cost-effectiveness, and quality; it cuts against the emerging
norm of healthcare equity within health law scholarship and healthcare regulation; and it undermines efforts to eliminate the influence of
antidemocratic values like racism in health policy. Making access to
federal health insurance programs more equitable for noncitizens is a
fiscally responsible option that also helps to safeguard public health
and align policy with ethical norms in healthcare.
This Article analyzes the role of federalism in shaping states’
policy decisions about noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid. Although
federalism theory has coalesced around the idea that federalism has
no political valence,533 scholars have called for research to understand
the effects of federalism on fragmentation, inequity, and exclusion in
practice. Scholarship analyzing federalism arrangements across a
range of subjects opens the door to deeper insights about how federalism shapes policy. This Article makes a unique contribution to this
effort by synthesizing insights from three fields that rarely comment
on one another: health law, immigration law, and federalism theory.
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See Huberfeld, supra note 34, at 473.
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For states that wish to expand noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid,
the current federalism arrangement poses legal, fiscal, and political
obstacles. Of these, fiscal concerns likely represent the greatest barrier: PRWORA restricts the use of federal funds to enact inclusionary
Medicaid policy. The federal ceiling of Medicaid coverage excludes a
substantial population of noncitizens residing in the United States,
such as all but a few categories of LPRs during their first five years of
residence, DACA recipients, and undocumented noncitizens—
including those noncitizens with pending immigration applications.
Although there are federal options to expand Medicaid coverage to
select groups of noncitizens, state fiscal concerns can pose an insurmountable barrier to electing those options, as well as to creating
state-funded programs to expand coverage for noncitizens.
By examining the role of federalism in shaping state policies that
exclude noncitizens from Medicaid, this Article helps to explain why
some social policies are linked to fragmentation and inequity.
Although, in theory, fragmentation should equally enable states that
support inclusionary health policy to expand coverage for noncitizens,
this Article demonstrates the uphill battle they face. Under an administration that is hostile to progressive health policy embodied by the
ACA, advocates for inclusionary health reform are looking to statebased solutions. It is therefore important to acknowledge that, for
some issues, the potential for large-scale reform at the state level is
weak.
This Article provides a case study for understanding the efficacy
of federalism arrangements in achieving equity for those who were
left behind by health reform. It offers insights to federalism scholars
generally and to advocates seeking to advance healthcare equity. It
links evidence about the uneven patchwork of subsidized health coverage for noncitizens to the federalism literature on laboratories of
experimentation. In this context, Medicaid’s structure has failed to
incentivize the type of state policy experimentation and replication
that justifies federalism arrangements. Rather, it has skewed state
“experimentation” toward exclusionary policy and limited states’
ability to experiment with inclusive policy.
The implications of this analysis are clear: centralization of noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid could correct or reverse the existing
imbalance. It would also promote uniformity, transparency, and
equity in noncitizen access to healthcare among the states.534 Centralization does not necessarily require federalizing the entire healthcare
system or even Medicaid. Thoughtful federal reforms to Medicaid that
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535 For Congress to do this without affecting noncitizens’ eligibility for other public
benefits under the PRWORA bar, it could list Medicaid as an exception to the general rule
barring non-qualified noncitizens from eligibility for federal public benefits. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1611(a) (2018) (general rule); id. at § 1611(b) (exceptions). The reason why
undocumented and other excluded noncitizens are currently able to access Emergency
Medicaid, public health services such as immunizations, and some emergency disaster relief
programs providing medical services is that they were carved out as statutory exceptions to
the general rule. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 401(b), 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1611(b)).
536 Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 436, at 1268.
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create a more unified and inclusive national policy on noncitizen eligibility could be just as effective.
Potential approaches to immigrant-inclusive reform run the
gamut from radical to incremental. For example, Congress could raise
the federal floor of Medicaid eligibility by mandating coverage of all
otherwise qualifying U.S. residents. This would eliminate states’
ability to enact immigrant-exclusionary Medicaid policies, which may
be justified by evidence indicating that inclusive policy is cost-effective
in the long term. A more modest—yet still impactful—reform could
be to raise the federal floor of noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid by
eliminating the five-year bar for LPRs. Alternatively, Congress could
remove the federal ceiling on noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid by
eliminating the citizenship and immigration status criterion entirely.535
This would have the effect of enabling states to make inclusionary
policy while not requiring states to expand coverage. By both raising
the floor and removing the ceiling, Congress could reverse the existing
imbalance by making it easier for states to expand coverage for noncitizens than to restrict coverage.
In order to ward off uncooperative behavior by states, Congress
might consider giving states some flexibility—“microspheres of
autonomy”—to make policy choices that best serve their populations
within a federal scheme that promotes national goals.536 There are
ways to structure a mostly federalized regime in order to preserve
values typically associated with decentralization, such as competition
and experimentation. Giving states some flexibility with federal
guardrails may enable policy experimentation just as well as (and possibly better than) totally decentralized approaches because it provides
states with the federal funds they typically need to engage in true
experimentation. One way to do this could be to provide states with a
limited menu of options for expanding noncitizen eligibility for subsidized health coverage with different funding mechanisms attached to
each option. For example, each of the following would be an improvement on the status quo of noncitizen exclusion from publicly funded
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537 Some might argue that, on this issue, there are no real differences among the states
that justify offering these options. After all, there are excluded noncitizens living in every
state and they all have bodies that can contract diseases, malfunction, age, or be injured
(regardless of whether they live in California or Wyoming). On a topic as polarized and
racialized as immigration, the only reason states might choose one option over the other is
ideology. I do not necessarily disagree; I offer this as a proposal that may placate various
constituencies while still moving our national health system toward greater efficiency and
equity.
538 See Howard F. Chang, Public Benefits and Federal Authorization for Alienage
Discrimination by the States, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 357, 369 (2002) (explaining
how, in a slightly different context, if Congress is “required to impose a uniform rule
nationwide, [it] could respond to these concerns with a nationwide rule of exclusion,
imposed even on those states that would prefer to be more generous”).
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health coverage: (1) Medicaid expansion to all income-qualifying state
residents, regardless of citizenship or immigration status, based on the
existing per capita funding structure with, perhaps, an eFMAP in the
initial years as in the ACA Medicaid expansion; (2) elimination of the
citizenship and immigration status criterion for purchasing insurance
from the Marketplaces; and (3) a categorical grant to finance health
coverage for excluded noncitizens that meets federally established
standards of creditable coverage. This strategy would allow states to
retain some autonomy, preserve some of the experimentation benefits
of decentralized policymaking, and still potentially achieve universal
health coverage.537 These are just some of the potential approaches
and issues that are worthy of further investigation as the United States
reexamines its commitment to sharing healthcare costs and risks,
achieving univeral coverage, and financing health reform.
A possible objection to centralizing policy on noncitizen access to
Medicaid is that an anti-immigrant Congress could just as easily roll
back noncitizen eligibility for subsidized health coverage, defunding
existing programs or restricting coverage to a smaller group of noncitizens.538 This would be unfortunate and would make terrible health
policy, but Congress can do that today with the current federalism
scheme. The political entrenchment of Medicaid eligibility for at least
some noncitizens would hopefully protect against dramatic new
alienage restrictions under a politically conservative administration. If
not, this would certainly be an issue around which a broad-based,
national coalition of groups could organize in opposition.
During the next round of health reform, whether policymakers
start from scratch or use Medicaid as a building block for universal
coverage, it is imperative to consider the ways in which the patchwork
of noncitizen exclusion is economically inefficient, medically ineffective, and morally damaging. This patchwork arises from the governing
structure of noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid, which enables states to
become “laboratories of exclusion” rather than experimentation. In
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this historical and policy context, federal leadership is needed in order
to enact inclusive policy on noncitizen eligibility for health coverage.
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